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Foreword                    
This is the eleventh volume in “The World of Political Science” book series 
sponsored by Research Committee 33 on the Study of Political Science as a 
Discipline”, one of about 50 Research Committees of the International Politi-
cal Science Association (IPSA). Each volume of the series has been prepared 
by leading international scholars representing one of the research committees 
of IPSA. This volume is one of the four final volumes in this book series, all 
published in July, 2012, just prior to the Madrid IPSA triennial World Con-
gress. The series consists of 12 volumes in all, published between 2004 and 
2012. 
“The World of Political Science” series is designed to fulfill several dif-
ferent objectives. First, it is international in scope, and includes contributors 
from all major global geographic regions. Second, each volume provides an 
up-to-date overview of a specific sub-discipline of political science. Third, al-
though prepared by leading academic specialists, its volumes are written in a 
manner accessible both to students of that field and those who wish to learn 
more about it. Fourth, the books are meant to offer both a state-of-the-art 
overview of the sub-fields and an explanation of how they have evolved into 
what they are today. Thus they serve as part of a broader objective of evaluat-
ing the current state of development of political science. Fifth, on the basis of 
their evaluations, the volume editors and authors have made proposals for the 
future progress and improvement of each sub-field, and also for the discipline 
as a whole. 
This eleventh volume in the series was authored primarily by members of 
IPSA RC 10 (Electronic Democracy). It is a book that is both very current 
and futuristic in its relevance for the systematic study of politics. It summa-
rizes and evaluates the comparative impact of the Internet and social media 
on evolving global political democratic trends. Its editor, Norbert Kersting, 
offers as its principal argument that “the development and proliferation of the 
Internet has inspired not only techno-utopians, but also activists, academics, 
and political philosophers in recent political debates.” It explores general 
electronic trends and developments in the social and political spheres, and 
considers whether and how the main challenges to democracy in this new 
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millennium may be related to these new information and communication 
technologies. It also evaluates whether the problems associated with these 
new developments can be attributed to the electronic technologies, and 
whether they can also be solved by them. 
The book encompasses several major themes in the current debate about 
electronic media, including the role played by social networks in political 
mobilization during the Arab Spring of 2011-2012 (Norris); the range of so-
cial networks and participatory, user-generated webs (Abbott); the impact of 
electronic campaigning on political elections, civil society protests such as 
the Occupy Movement in the US and globally in 2011; political party com-
munication with the public and campaigning (Roemmele); techniques of 
face-to-face participation and open government (Wojcik); electronic voting 
(Hall); and so-called Voting Advice Applications or VAAs (Ladner/Fivaz). 
The editor concludes that “although hardly predictable”, electronic democ-
racy has already produced 1) enhanced political transparency, 2) greater use 
of Internet voting; 3) increasingly blended online and offline political partici-
pation; 4) a more hybrid form of democratic participation involving direct, 
dialogical and representative democratic forms; 5) a more open and transpar-
ent form of e-innovation; and 6) an amalgamation of new and different in-
formation and communication functions. 
A special thanks is owed to Barbara Budrich and her staff for their will-
ingness to produce this volume in an amazingly short period of time, without 
sacrificing its publishing quality. We also acknowledge our debt once again 
to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) 
for its initial Development Initiatives Grant (#820-1999-1022) and subse-
quent extensions; to members of the IPSA Executive Committee, its Secre-
tariat and Committee on Research and Training; and to the members of IPSA 
RC 33 for their continued encouragement and support. 
As series co-editors, we assume ultimate responsibility for this book se-
ries and its objectives. This joint and equal collaborative effort has given us 
immense satisfaction and a strong sense of academic and personal reward. 
We are proud and also somewhat sad to finally bring the series to a conclu-
sion at this time (July 2012). 
 
Michael Stein (Visiting Professor, University of Toronto and Emeritus Pro-
fessor, McMaster University) 
 





The rapid spread of the Internet since the 1990s has led to high expectations 
for democracy and public administration. Democratic participation can be 
enhanced by electronic channels for information processing, communication 
and transaction. Through electronic devices these features are also becoming 
increasingly integrated. From the PC in the parlour, for example, the citizen 
may get information about local and international  politics, discuss political 
matters with fellow citizens or with council members, and, when his/her 
mind is made up, (perhaps) cast a vote for the party or candidate of his/her 
choice. E-democracy and e-government includes all forms of public service 
delivery as well as internal public administration.  
The Internet has been presented as a means to more transparency in de-
mocracy (WWW, e-mail etc.) and new forms of political communication 
(e.g. social media, Internet conferences,) as well as new form of transaction 
(Internet voting) as features of e-democracy and e-government.  
In 2003 a workshop at Marburg University (Germany) brought together 
colleagues working on electronic voting, which resulted in a comparative 
study on this subject. Already at that stage it was obvious that there are 
threats and promises. It was also apparent that the Internet was much more 
than a voting machine. 
International Political Science Association’s (IPSA) Research committee 
10 on Electronic democracy (RC 10) founded at the workshop in 2008 in 
Stellenbosch. The “Kick off workshop” took place in 2008 at Stellenbosch 
University (South Africa). From this group of experts I would like to high-
light Prof. Harald Baldersheim (University of Oslo) as being one of the cata-
lysts in this research committee. The workshop primarily focused on two sets 
of issues: The main focus was on the potentials, problems and experiences 
associated with e-democracy, and why some institutions (states, municipali-
ties, political parties) seem more willing than others to take steps toward the 
introduction of electronic voting. Hereby, problems and possibilities of 
emerging democracies in the global South as well as in “old democracies” 
were to be analysed. The workshop brought together academic experts from 
different parts of the world.  It highlighted similarities in the continental re-
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form trajectories but also drew attention to variations in the strategies of elec-
tronic democracies. Path dependency was a perennial feature of the findings, 
as evidenced by the importance of different politico-cultural contexts and na-
tional administrative and legal systems.  
In the following workshops it became clear that with the development of 
the information and communication of social media, political aspects (such as 
copyrights, fair use, freedom of information etc.) became more important. 
Meanwhile there is a website (http://rc10.ipsa.org), a mailing list and vibrant 
international community. In the meantime different workshops in Chile, Slo-
venia, Croatia, Luxembourg were co-sponsored by RC 10. Further confer-
ences are planned for India, US etc. There is a strong cooperation with other 
IPSA research committees – especially with IPSA’s research committee on 
Political Communication. A fruitful collaboration exists also with ECPR 
groups working on electronic democracy. RC 10 liaised with annual interna-
tional conference organizers such as UN-ICEGOV (Estonia), CEDEM at 
Krems Universities and EVOTE in Bregenz (Austria) etc. 
 I highly appreciated the help from my assistants in Münster, Sophie 
Schmalz and Thomas Pinz. Thanks also go to my students and doctoral can-
didates at the seminar at Münster University working on electronic democ-
racy. Additionally I have to thank Melanie Bailey, Cameron Brown, Jakob 
Horstmann for their copy editing and for proofreading. I would like to thank 
Barbara Budrich and her team and the editors of this series Michael Stein and 
John Trent for their outstanding support. On a personal note, I would like to 
thank my wife Bettina and my children Paulina Kersting and Ben Kersting 
who followed me to the University of Stellenbosch at the Southern tip of the 
African continent and back to Germany and the Westphalian University 
Münster. Intercultural discussions can sensitize us to multicultural under-
standing. This study tries to offer one such step in this direction.  
 
Münster, June 2012 Norbert Kersting 
 
 
1. The Future of Electronic democracy    
Norbert Kersting             
The development and proliferation of the Internet have inspired not only the 
techno-utopians but also activists, politicians, academics and political phi-
losophers. In the 1990s a discussion about the information superhighway re-
sulted in the idea of new democratisation and a revival of an idealised Athe-
nian democracy. Expectations regarding the Internet were very high. The 
Internet was supposed to strengthen political rights and to bring more trans-
parency and democratisation. 
Already in the 1980s the peace movement, as well as the environmental-
ists, used mailboxes and e-mail. The new techno-utopiasm declared the “In-
dependence of the Cyberspace”. The idea of counterculture  very much simi-
lar to the movement in the 1968  developed. With commercialisation, the dot-
com euphoria, and the new economy in the late 1990s, some of these dreams 
and utopian ideals vanished and trends towards commercialisation became 
obvious. On one hand, further discussion about new information and com-
munication technologies resulted in some criticism of a reduction of civil lib-
erties and extensive chances to control by the state (big brother, Orwell in 
Athens) not only among the academia. On the other hand the implementation 
of new social network instruments using the Internet, often described as web 
2.0, revived expectations regarding the process of democratisation. It was 
thought that these social media would reinvigorate a society which was char-
acterized as individualistic and by social disengagement.  
The web 1.0 focused more on information and less on communication or 
participation (Abbott in this volume). Besides its one to many communication 
the Internet also allows a many-to-many communication flow often described 
by the term web 2.0. Tapscott and Williams (2010: 45) argue, “[...] that the 
Web is no longer about idly surfing and reading, listening or watching; it is 
about peering, sharing, socialising, collaborating and most of all creating 
within loosely connected communities”. Social networks (SNS), blogs, mi-
croblogging social bookmarking services, video and picture communities, the 
keys and outcasts constitute the broad range of social media instruments. The 
term web 2.0, introduced by O’Reily (2005), is criticised in academic dis-
course. It is seen as a misleading term because some argue that with the so-
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cial web no new version of the Internet was implemented, but a new social 
characteristic with potential for communication appeared. In social media, 
user-generated content became more important. Web 2.0 is seen as an easy to 
use, participatory Internet. According to the theory of communication (actor 
network theory) from the French sociologist Bruno Latou, citizens are more 
attracted by low hierarchical open networks and particular public spheres.  
Besides social networks, governmental strategies, such as open govern-
ment and open data, are discussed. Open government is seen here as a gov-
ernment strategy which includes citizen participation in the process of politi-
cal decision making and which allows open access to public data to enhance 
transparency and to assist policy making processes. 
In the following chapters, the political context of electronic democracy 
will first be analysed. What are general trends and developments in the po-
litical spheres? Can these challenges be tackled and solved by the instru-
ments? Next, the new trends in the development of democratic innovation 
will be discussed. Different functions and types of electronic democracy will 
be presented. A range of participatory instruments will be analysed. Democ-
ratic innovation pronounces the development of direct and deliberative de-
mocracy. 
Next, the focus will be on problems and challenges introduced by the 
Internet and the new information and communication technologies. What are 
the main socioeconomic problems and challenges in the new millennium? 
Are these problems related to the new information and communication tech-
nologies? The unequal proliferation of Internet users will be debated. Social 
media describes new social network and communities in the Internet. Then, 
the role of the typical digital individual will be analysed. Finally, typical digi-
tal dilemmas, ethical questions and problems are discussed. In the final chap-
ter the prospects of electronic democracy will be considered. What is the fu-
ture of democracy? Is the future of electronic democracy focused on develop-
ing pure netizens. These are participating in an online cyberworld, or are we 
heading towards a stronger mix between the online and offline world? 
At this point it is relevant to consider if the socio-economic and political 
challenges can be solved. What are the prospects and the trends regarding the 
new media? Will these future instruments contribute to a qualification of de-
mocracy? It is normal practice to discuss future developments in the final 
chapter, but this is difficult because we do not know what future inventions 
will be like. A comedian once pronounced the following dictum: “It is diffi-
cult to make predictions, especially about the future.” New communication 
information technologies are one of the most flexible, innovative, and least 
predictable fields in our society. 
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1.1 Political trends: Crisis of political legitimization, 
political apathy and protest  
In the 1970s most democracies were rich, industrialised nations in the West-
ern hemisphere. Only 14 nations in the “Third world” were characterised as 
democracies or polyarchies. Besides the communist and socialist countries in 
Eastern Europe, South East Asia and some Latin American and African re-
gions, traditional authoritarian rulers and military dictatorships also existed 
(Berg-Schlosser/Kersting 1996). In the 1970s the military dictatorships in 
Portugal, Greece and Spain collapsed. The next wave of democratisation 
started with the military withdrawal in Latin America. In Latin America the 
third wave of democratisation starting in the 1970s, and saw a resurgence of 
presidential regimes. Some of these developed in reaction to strong authori-
tarian regimes, such as in Chile and Paraguay. Democratisation gained impe-
tus with the demise of the Communist bloc (Huntington 1991). In Africa the 
winds of change brought with them a wave of democratisation in the early 
1990s. Before the 1980s only Botswana and Mauritius were seen as democ-
racies, and most countries were regarded as one- party systems and were au-
thoritarian and/or socialist in nature.  
1.1.1 End of history and post-democracy?  
The end of the Cold War introduced a number of new democracies, but the 
critique of electoral democracies started after a short democratisation-honey-
moon. This rapid breakdown of some democracies and the phenomenon of 
failing states were not evident at the end of the 20th century. The predicted 
“End of History” (Fukuyama 1992) and the victory of democratic systems 
seemed to be a myth in some countries, especially in Africa and Asia; the of-
ten problematic nation-building has not yet ended, and with the breakdown of 
some dictatorships, ethnic cleavages have led to civil war and segregated au-
thoritarian sub-systems. 
However, the old autocratic regimes in the Middle East have continued to 
follow traditional and often religious authoritarian rules. During the demonstra-
tions of the Arab Spring in 2011, some of these authoritarian regimes collapsed 
and others are under pressure. In the second decade of the new millennium, 
countries like China, Indonesia, etc. seem to be more open to democratic ideas.  
Political systems worldwide seem to be under stress. New, often unelected 
institutions, such as technocratic advisory boards and the media, are gaining in-
fluence. Because of privatisation, the public sector seems to be partly losing 
control. 
Elected parliaments appear to be becoming obsolete and are no longer a fo-
rum or plaza for open discussion or decision-making (Crouch 2004). Instead, 
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commercialised, frequently deformed and skewed media often seem to shape 
public discourse (Bryant/Oliver 2009). But which institution is guarding these 
guardians? Furthermore technocratic administrations seem to dominate deci-
sion-making. This may lead to a crisis in the legitimacy of local democracy 
based on political cynicism as well as on political apathy, an absence of politi-
cal interest, and finally a crisis in participation. 
The growth of non-voting is a complex phenomenon that continues to lack 
adequate explanation (Leduc et al. 2010). The decline of traditional social and 
concomitant political ties, such as class and church, may be factors. Post-
materialist values among the younger generation may be part of the explanation, 
leading to a preference for unconventional channels of participation (demonstra-
tions, NGOs, referenda, single-issue politics, etc.). The feeling of civic obliga-
tion that has so far characterized the voting habits of the older generations is on 
the wane in other groups (Wolfinger/Rosenstone 1980; DETR 1998, 2000). 
Younger democracies are often regarded as having degenerated into purely 
electoral democracies. The dominance of political parties is highly criticised 
(see Dalton/Wattenberg 2000). This has led to political apathy as well as to 
cynicism. But the whole political process is in distress. Post-democracy is re-
lated to Post-Parliamentarism (Crouch 2004). Parliaments are losing their 
power to other democratic instruments such as direct democracy referendums, 
constitutional courts, elected administration, and supranational or local institu-
tions. During the wave of privatisation starting in the early 1980s, and pushed 
by new public management strategies, non-democratic private institutions took 
over former state responsibilities. Furthermore, at the supranational level such, 
other indirectly elected (European Union) or non-elected institutions, such as 
general trade agreements that lack democratic legitimacy (WTO), became 
prominent. This became obvious during the financial crisis in 2008 with its 
strong privatisation and extreme market liberalism. Nevertheless, in some 
countries this strategy of privatisation was stopped. Pushed by civil society, a 
re-municipalisation and a revival of state controlled (or owned) public enter-
prises brought the state back in. Reinvigorated state companies have to show 
that they can compete with private companies without showing the negative ef-
fects of state enterprises such as nepotism and a lack of efficiency, etc.  
Political dissatisfaction is not only based on political apathy but also on 
political cynicism (Kersting 2004). It is no longer political apathy and lack of 
knowledge of politics which are seen as main reasons for non-participation. 
On the contrary, an improved educational system results in better knowledge 
of some aspects of politics.. But this comes with political cynicism, a feeling 
of little political efficacy and a high level of dissatisfaction with the political 
system and political parties (Kersting/Cronqvist 2005: 28; Scarrow 2010). 
High expectations concerning policies often coexist with high expectations 
concerning the capacity of the state. Rather, stronger individualism together 
with a breakdown of societal networks has led to stronger demands and ex-
pectations directed to the respective political system.  
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Some authoritarian regimes reacted by using repression. Most govern-
ments reacted by providing more democratic space and implementing new 
instruments for participation such as invited space (Barber 1984; Budge 
1996; Kersting 2008). Political systems implemented new invited space such 
as referendums, round tables, forums etc. Some of these new experiments 
were dominated by political parties and formal institutions. In this case, the 
people were still not satisfied, and found their own channels to express their 
interest using invented space as an answer to this hierarchically dominated 
intervention. New forms of protest and participation were developed as a 
kind of public counterweight to existing structures. They were used to chal-
lenge existing power structures and dominance by the old ruling elites. The 
question is whether these new structures can become sustainable forms of de-
liberation and open democracy, but it can be shown that new elites emerged. 
New social movements have led in some cases, to violent demonstrations 
as in London (2011) and in South Africa (2008), but also to non-violent pro-
test that subsequently turned violent such as Stuttgart (2010) or to non-
violent demonstrations such as the Occupy movements in 2012. The new po-
litical movements use on-line and off-line instruments. They connect people 
as well as spread and exchange ideas. Some focus on Internet copyrights and 
freedom of the media. Some of them are rooted in the old classical political 
cleavages, and some go further than the political issues that they protest 
about. The new social movements seem to incorporate ideology and agendas 
which go beyond single issue protest. It seems as if they are developing the 
old idea of participatory democracy, namely that political participation and 
protests against the deficits of the existing political system are a civic duty in 
themselves. In Sweden and in Germany, new cleavages have led to the de-
velopment of new political parties such as the Pirates party. Meanwhile, the 
Pirates party is losing support in Sweden, but in Germany it is represented in 
a number of parliaments. Through the development of new movements and 
political parties, it can be deduced that the message and medium overlap. In 
this new party the message and medium overlap.  
Is there a crisis of democracy? Globally electoral representative democ-
racies are highly criticized. Voter apathy and cynicism is growing. But un-
conventional participation is also facing a crisis. New social movements of-
ten seem to deteriorate into violent meaningless protest. The de facto reduc-
tion in pure electoral democracies (ballot option) and the escalating political 
violence (brick option) are both criticized. Are there any alternatives to the 
brick and the ballot? Is there a new cleavage in the field of new media, from 
which new political parties can emerge? 
 
– Crisis of Democratisation and Waves of Democracy: brick or ballot? 
Conventional political participation is decreasing. Political parties are seen as 
empty railway stations (Alain Touraine) or abandoned piazzas (Giacomo 
Marramao), in which political debates are lacking (Kersting 2003). 
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Since the 1980s, voter turnout has been decreasing dramatically in a 
number of countries. The greater volatility of electorates is affecting the es-
tablished parties, which are experiencing problems mobilizing their core par-
tisan groups. Low voter turnout is also seen as a symbol of diminishing le-
gitimacy of the political system. Widespread participation in free and fair 
elections is postulated as a constitutional goal and is seen as an important 
element in the definition of democracy (Dahl 1989). Some argue that the 
spread of negative attitudes towards politicians and parties represents a crisis 
of the political system (Lijphart 1997). 
Political participation has experienced an expansion of other types of 
participation besides electoral and party participation, and an expansion of 
unconventional participation. For a long time political participation has 
been influenced by voter turnout. New, conventional participation patterns 
have developed next to the electoral participation of the 1950s (Bar-
nes/Kaase et al. 1979). The parties themselves have changed from elite-
parties to public “catch-all” parties. Conventional participation includes, 
above all, campaign work and political contacts. Voting nevertheless re-
mains the central act of participation. As a consequence of the 1968 move-
ment, unorthodox acts of participation have become increasingly relevant. 
The external parliamentary opposition seeks exertion of influence through 
protest actions in social movements. Since the 1990s, in the frame of the 
governance strategies with regard to participation, two development paths 
have become clear. Next to social engagement in the sense of self-help, 
there is an expansion of possibilities for participation through politics. Rep-
resentative democracy, i.e. parliaments and political administration, offers 
stronger citizen participation as well as a way to order channeled protest ac-
tions.  
At the same time, next to declining political participation, an increasing 
participatory divide and a biased social structure are appearing (Kersting 
2006). Voter turnout is decreasing, except in countries with obligatory vot-
ing. Voter turnout is based on media coverage and individual competence. 
Voter turnout at the national level, for example in Sweden and Germany, is 
about 80%, but in Great Britain and France on the other hand, it is only about 
60%. It is declining drastically in second order elections (EU elections, mu-
nicipal elections). In most countries, voter turnout in municipal elections is 
about 20% less than in national elections. 
A lack of participation is not only a problem of representative democracy 
but also of direct democracy. A similar phenomenon appears in many coun-
tries which have even lower voter turnouts in referendums (Kersting 2008). 
Also, participation in dialogical participatory procedures is strikingly low. 
Here, large population groups can only be mobilized by a supportive pro-
gramme and special incentives. Organisations that regularly demand an hon-
orary engagement of volunteers complain about very little participation and a 
lack of long-term sustainable engagement.  
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At the same time political participation shows a distortion with regard to 
age, but also with regard to the social structure (income, education). Sections 
of the population with higher education are more strongly politically en-
gaged. Reasons for non-participation are political apathy and cynicism. Po-
litical apathy is characterized by political disinterest and a diminished avail-
ability of resources, i.e. little political knowledge. This political cynicism is 
marked by a high availability of resources (high political knowledge), a high 
discontent regarding the participation possibilities (input-legitimacy), and the 
policies (output-legitimacy). The younger generation is marked by non-
participation both due to apathy and cynicism. This applies to elections as 
well as dialogical participatory instruments. The election norm (elections as a 
citizen’s right and duty) is more present in the older population groups, who 
have often experienced more authoritarian rulers. Demographic change also 
intervenes. The new old- group is simultaneously the time rich-group. These 
active seniors and old age groups participate more regularly in political or-
ganisations and institutions. In contrast, within the developing countries, the 
disadvantaged groups are not time rich, but they have to respect efficiency 
within the context of multi-occupationality. Participation is dependent on the 
political socialisation, i.e. the dominant value system and political interests 
(election standards, etc.), as well as the available resources (income, educa-
tion, knowledge, time) and integration into social milieus (social control). It 
is moreover dependent on the existing participation opportunities of the po-
litical institutions (some want, some cannot, some are not asked).  
1.1.2 Democratic innovation  
As a reaction to the crisis of the political system, legitimacy can be increased 
in the input-and-output area. Since the 1990s, in many countries, there has 
been political reform and administrative reform, mostly by new public man-
agement strategies. Both expanded the participatory rights of the population 
as customers and as citizens. Administration and political reform are the two 
dominating reform paths of the 1990s and two sides of a coin (Kersting 2004). 
Governance is defined here more as the intensified inclusion of the civil soci-
ety and formerly blocked interest groups in decision making processes and 
less as a cooperation of citizen and private organisations in service produc-
tion of public goods. This Governance reform process highlighted the politi-
cal inclusion into the political process (DiGaetano/Strom 2003).  
New instruments for the qualification of democracies are seen in the field of 
direct, dialogical, as well as electoral participation, in the field of empowerment, 
as well as in the field of control of power (Kersting/Schmitter/Trechsel 2008). 
Here democratic innovations focus on new institutions of participation 
(Smith 2009). In the following four different types of democratic innovation 
will be presented. These four different fields can be characterised briefly.  
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– Symbolic participation: from representative democracy to demonstrative 
eventual participation 
The critique against representative forms of democracies is characterised by the 
distrust of trustees and delegates dominating the invited space. This leads to 
new forms of symbolic politics and political demonstrations. Individualism and 
new lifestyles distract people from commitments to long-term engagement in 
political organisations. People prefer symbolic events where they can express 
themselves.  
Demonstrative democracy includes forms of participation which are not 
always instruments of the invited space produced by government or political 
parties, but are sometimes introduced and invented by civil society. New forms 
of demonstration include civil society protest, flash mobs, as well as citizen in-
formation systems organised by civil society groups. These demonstrate protest 
against or in favour of certain policies. They indicate problems of corruption 
and mismanagement as well as local, regional, and national best practices. 
 
– Informative Democracy: From Spectator to Information Subject 
Electoral representative democracy has developed new instruments, which 
not only inform the citizen, but also simultaneously ask the citizens the rea-
sons for their vote, i.e. turning the citizen into an information subject. Citizen 
information systems try to inform the population in time. Timely participa-
tion should increase the control function (whistle blower-function), especially 
of the civil society organizations. These are also often initiators of parliamen-
tary control systems, etc. The target-group-specific processing of the infor-
mation is a problematic point. Information must range between reduction of 
the complexity and detailed information, as well as between infotainment and 
scientific expertise to make it interesting and relevant for the citizen.The ori-
entation towards the needs of the citizen leads to a stronger focus on crowd 
sourcing (Surowieck 2004; Chesbrough et al. 2006). The detection of knowl-
edge, preferences and interests of the citizen and the wisdom of the crowd is 
relevant when it comes to their own preferences. This is related to open inno-
vation. Innovation by the citizen is oriented towards their needs.  
 
– Institutionalized Political-Monitoring: From facilitated representative to 
direct democracy 
Political control and monitoring is also guaranteed in modern instruments of 
numerical direct democracy that realize bare effects and veto power through 
their existence (Setälä/Schiller 2012). Referendums and initiatives open up 
the inert separation of the representative system of special decision to the 
concerned citizen. The trustee and advocate-problematic nature do not pre-
sent themselves in this issue-orientated direct participation. Direct participa-
tion circumvents the representatives, but the pure existence of direct democ-
ratic instruments, such as initiatives, changes politics. Politicians try to de-
velop adequate policies in order to avoid a citizen initiative. Rather, more 
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pre-effects of initiatives are generated in the institutionalisation and composi-
tion of the referendums that lead to increased participation.  
New forms of voting techniques in the field of numerical democracy are 
discussed. The modernisation of the electoral infrastructure and rearrange-
ments of the electoral rules have one main goal, which lies in the reinvigora-
tion of voter turnout. The different reforms are discussed such as electoral 
systems, size of electoral districts, conjunction of elections, age of voting, 
personal vote, compulsory voting etc. Electoral infrastructure incorporates 
new technological developments but also new bureaucratic settings, and in-
cludes different forms of early voting, electoral voting machines, alternative 
polling booths, electronic voting by telephone, SMS text messages, digital 
TV, as well as remote Internet voting.  
 
– Dialogical democracy: From conflict to consensual deliberative decision 
making  
These new interactive participation instruments are often implemented as 
open dialogues (Kersting 2008; Sintomer et al. 2010). These procedures tend 
to move structural conflicts into the foreground. Because they have no deci-
sive character, and are often occupied with basic questions of social forma-
tion, they are often discredited as democratic playfulness. Nevertheless, their 
effects and sustainability are dependent on the political context. Further, pro-
cedures try to solve latent and manifest conflicts and aim at consensual solu-
tions and decisions, even if they are not always attainable. However, media-
tion also belongs to discursive procedures for the management and operation 
of latent and manifest conflicts. Here, consent and compromise stand in the 
foreground.  
Dialogical democracy includes forms of deliberative participation in dif-
ferent settings. Contrary to numerical democracy, communication and con-
versation play an important role here. New forums open up this dialogue to 
ordinary citizens as well as to organised interest groups. New committee sys-
tems allow, especially on the neighborhood level, concrete town planning. 
Meanwhile, these forms mostly refer to a kind of self-selection or representa-
tion of organised groups and institutions; the mini-public acts as a citizen jury 
where a randomly selected assembly discusses certain topics and produces a 
report in this field. 
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In most recent decades a trend is visible where different forms of political 
participation (representative, direct, dialogical and symbolic participation) 
are intermingling. Democratic innovation leads to hybrid democracy which 
includes elements of these different forms of participation. Traditional gov-
ernment focuses heavily on representation, and mostly includes different 
forms of civil society intervention within a neo-corporatist design. Since the 
1990s the governance strategy has mixed representative as well as direct and 
dialogical forms of political participation. Moreover, it has included formerly 
blocked interests groups. This trend towards the strong incorporation of civil 
society has had some backslashes and declines in implementation, but seems 
to be an on-going trend in the next few decades. The incorporation and inclu-
siveness of new social movements as a nucleus for the development of new 
political parties following new political cleavages shows the connection be-
tween demonstrators and representative democracy.  
In the last decades referendums and initiatives became en vogue in some 
Latin American countries. African plebiscites are frequently used in nation 
building as well as in constitutional processes. In some European countries 
referendums seem to boom at the local level, where more municipalities im-
plement referendums and initiatives. 
Nowadays, democratic innovation seems to be generated mostly in the 
global South. Brazil and other countries export participatory instruments to 
the old democracies in Europe and Northern America.  
New dialogical participatory instruments such as participatory budgeting 
were first implemented within developing countries such as Porto Alegre, 
Brazil and spread worldwide. Democratic as well as non-democratic coun-
tries such as China implement deliberative dialogical instruments at the local 
level.  
1.2  E-governance and e-democracy 
The new information and communication technologies led to new democratic 
innovations. But these also had a strong influence on different forms of eco-
nomic and social behaviour. Electronic management, and electronic govern-
ment have focused less on the process of decision-making and more on pub-
lic services and the production of public goods (Karmack/Nye 2002). These 
will not be analysed here. In this chapter the focus is on the input, participa-
tion, and citizen perspective, focusing less on withinput-services and output-
services. E-governance consists of different initiatives (West 2002). We do 
not concentrate here on instruments of electronic bureaucracy, which may be 
called self-service (Engström 2000) but rather on electronic participation. 
The military as well as academia play an important role in the develop-
ment of the Internet. In 1996 the APRA-Net connected mainly Californian 
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universities (Bleicher 2010). In the 1970s local area networks used a similar 
transmission control protocol to foster global communication, but the main 
push for the Internet came with the proliferation of microcomputers, such as 
the Apple Computer in 1977, and the introduction of the World Wide Web 
developed by Tim Berners-Lee and his hypertext networks.  
Electronic democracy is oriented towards electronic possibilities to sup-
port democracy. There are, three relevant political functions of ICT: informa-
tion, communication and participation. (Chadwick/Howard 2009; Zittel/ 
Fuchs 2007; Kersting/ Baldersheim 2004; Karmack/Nye 2002). 
The Internet was used for e-mail, and later for peer-to-peer file sharing. 
In the 1990s big media companies began to use the Internet. New services 
such as online shopping, electronic banking, and online gaming were intro-
duced. Together with the World Wide Web, other forms such as e-mails, 
news groups, Internet telephony, chats, and digital videos were implemented. 
The political web concentrated on information and on “one to many” 
communication. Political organizations presented newsletters, contact infor-
mation, archives and other websites to download material. Communication 
focused on e-mail and later on web forums, newsgroups, and chat rooms. The 
discussion on Internet voting, e-petitions, online shops and donating func-
tions became relevant for the political parties. In the following years social 
media and “many to many” communication became more important. Mobile 
phones allowed augmented reality and crowdsourcing as well as new dialogi-
cal and commenting instruments. Videos portals and SNS (YouTube, Face-
book, and Twitter) became dominant. Video supported conference software 
was used and rating and sharing became popular.  
Research in this volume focuses on evaluating the consequences arising 
from the introduction of these new democratic instruments (Kersting 2004; 
Kersting/Svensson/Leenes 2004). Are these new techniques strengthening 
political participation? For example, do they enhance the level of political 
participation or are they strengthening the political legitimacy of democratic 
institutions? Here, different functions of Internet instruments such as e-access 
to information, e-consultation, e-petitions, e-polling and e-forums are rele-
vant. E-government and its political cultural consequences have not yet been 
analysed adequately. The development of a research agenda is still needed 
(Jansen/Pridat 2001; Stromer-Galley 2003). 
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Table 2:  Electronic democracy functions and selected instruments 
Information Communication Participation 
News, press clippings, press releases, 
photo gallery E-mail Internet- voting 
Newsletter News groups E –petition 
Webcam-feed, (real simple syndication) 
rss-feed Webforum 
Register as voter,  
Register as volunteer 
Archives; (Newsletter, Text, Video, Au-
dio, Photo, Speeches, Chat, Other) Chat forum 
Join party: Newsletter, email-list, 
Events, 
Download promotional material Internet conference Donate function 
Contact information, Links  Online shop (political organizations) 
Personal events calendar  Political games, apolitical games  
General political information: (in-
ter)national political info, voting proce-
dure info etc.)  
E-polling 
   
Voting advice application 
Dialogic instruments 




Augmented reality Online Commenting on blogs, wikis etc.  
Crowdsourcing time location based on 
information (Ushahidi etc.), geosocial 
services 
Comments on external 
instruments (e.g. SNS, 
Twitter etc.)  
Online Rating (voting, rating, social 
book marking events) 
Social media (external colaboration pub-
lication) (You Tube, Twitter, Wiki, SNS) 
Video Online confer-
ence (Barcamps etc.)  
Social media (internal) podcasts, we-
blogs, YouTubes-plug-in, Twitter- plug-
in)  
 
(Gibson 2003, Lilleker et al. 2009, own overview)  
 
1.2.1 Information 
The possibility for citizens to consult dynamic or static political information 
is an important capability of new information and communication technolo-
gies. Similar to electronic billboards, information can be easily disseminated 
and, as a very important consequence, transparency in local politics can be 
achieved. Complicated policy making procedures, information on democratic 
institutions, political parties’ programmes and candidates, etc. can be com-
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municated. Such information normally reflects broadcast characteristics be-
cause one authority delivers to many citizens. But it could also include one to 
one communication in which one individual gives information to another (see 
table 2). 
In the beginning, the Internet was developed as an organisation’s mem-
ory, where information could easily be found in the hierarchical structure of 
the worldwide web. Hence, public administration can also use it as an archive 
as well as an information and knowledge management system.  
The proliferation of telephone, radio and television and the diminishing 
role of newspapers started in the early 20th century (Bimber 2003). In the 
1990s, the Internet became a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The abundance 
of information seems to weaken the gate-keeping function of traditional me-
dia. This allows political candidates, political parties, and new interest groups 
to use new means for communication that provide a rich array of content and 
are less costly (Norris 2002, Gibson et al. 2003). Obviously, easier recruit-
ment of new members by the Internet results in weaker affiliations after 
membership is secured. Modern communication and campaigning involves 
the tendency toward opportunism and event-driven recruitment (Wagner/ 
Gainos 2009). Within organisations, information abundance leads to non-
hierarchical communication flows. On the other hand the new ICT seem to be 
colonized by the established and traditional broadcasting media; because of 
marketing, Internet presence often merges with other technologies (broadcast 
television, radio, telephone, etc.) (Küng et al. 2008). Therefore, the abun-
dance of information is counterbalanced through a new colonisation of the 
public sector by media giants who try to monopolize political communica-
tion, e.g. using entertainment instruments. On the other hand, in part not only 
because of the digital divide, the Internet fosters a higher fragmentation of 
the information society (Klüver et al. 2010). Within the Internet communities 
all sources of information can survive, both non-democratic and democratic.. 
In principle the Internet allows inexpensive, decentralised, and widely 
distributed information within and among organisations as well as between 
the organisation and citizens. Idealistically, the emancipated citizen selects 
information and is not manipulated by a monopolised media in the hands of 
powerful politicians and traditional organisations. In the past, with a dearth of 
information available, strong political groups were strengthened. Former tra-
ditionally strong groups now use low-cost communication to maintain their 
influence. However, weak and often blocked new elites also use the new 
technology in order to become strong political players. An essential question 
is whether new instruments allow former blocked elites to gain adequate con-
trol of political institutions.  
At the beginning World Wide Web was used by political organisations 
such as political parties to give information about the political organisation 
using stop news, press releases and clippings, a photo gallery as well as 
newsletters. General information about the voting system and politics was 
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also presented and accessible in archives. In the next step rapid response RSS 
feeds and WebCam feeds were implemented. Better information was also 
produced by voting advice applications such as votematch (UK), smartvote 
(Switzerland, Luxembourg), Wahl-O-mat (Germany) (see Cedroni/ Garcia 
2010; Ladner et al. 2010; Trechsel/Mair 2011; see Ladner/Fiaz in this vol-
ume). Voting advice applications allow voters to get an overview over party 
manifestos. With the mobile new technologies, augmented reality functions 
enhanced the use of the cellphones. This external function enhanced the so-
cial media instruments such as podcasts, weblogs, YouTube-plug-ins, and 
twitter plug-ins.  
Because of their relatively good infrastructure when it comes to infor-
mation and communication technologies, some of the developing countries 
such as Kenya, India, and Brazil have implemented and developed new 
forms of information. During the elections in Zimbabwe, opposition parties 
could document the results in the different polling stations by photograph-
ing the results with cell phones and distributing these by SMS within the 
country, as well as globally. In that way, electoral mismanagement and vote 
rigging could be prevented or documented. During the ethnic clashes in the 
aftermath of the 2006 elections in Kenya, cellphones could be used to warn 
and to witness (in Kishuaheili ushahidi) ethnic violence. This form of local-
ized information technologies was used for the development of the smart-
phone app Ushahidi. Ushahidi has the potential for crowd sourcing and this 
is also seen as one of the top 10 innovations of 2011 (Noble 2011). Here 
the difference between information and communication becomes blurred. 
Ushahidi is used now to warn of corruption and for other forms of political 
protest worldwide. As an individualised geographic information system, it 
strengthens transparency and social control. Other forms of democratic in-
novations can be used for monitoring politicians (Abgeordnetenwatch, can-
didates watch). UReport or SOL (Uganda) and Huduma (Kenya), and were 
implemented successfully. These forms of politician watch documented be-
haviour and voting patterns of members of different parliaments and coun-
cils, and relate this information to their pre-election promises and their 
party manifestos.  
1.2.2 Communication 
Different forms of communication can be characterised by their spatial and 
time oriented structure, the number of actors, and the level of activity in the 
instruments. Communication can be visual, auditive, and dynamic. It is a 
computer mediated communication and only video technology can change it 
into face-to-face communication. In the 1980s computer mediated communi-
cation included videotext, personal computers conferencing, computer bulle-
tin boards, office information systems and electronic voicemail. 
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In contrast to e-mail as a one-to-one communication and standardized e-
mail projects (one-to-many communication), the latter being more informa-
tive than communicative, web forums, chat pages, newsgroups and Internet 
conferences, allow a “many-to-many” form of communication (see table 2). 
The instruments analyzed here allow participation by large groups. Besides 
discussions by large groupsthere are people who are passive followers of the 
discussion. These observers (lurkers) only use the information function of the 
Internet and will not be analyzed here.  
The Internet also allows information exchange between individuals and 
groups: a form of individual consultation where authorities address single 
citizens and receive single replies. Individual communication via e-mails is a 
fast and inexpensive way for the citizen to contact an administration. It could 
also be a form of collective consultation, in a two-way information system 
when citizen address citizens. Collective communication is possible in a less 
standardized way through web forums, news groups and chat pages. Here, 
citizens can communicate with each other, but there is also the opportunity to 
include elected officials or bureaucracy members. 
Although blogs were developed by Tim Berners-Lee in the early 1990s, 
it was in 1997 that the blogosphere became an important instrument. This 
was due to the development of the weblog community by Cameron Barratts. 
This was enhanced by the introduction of Google in 1998, which could 
browse the information of 320 million webpages at the beginning, and You-
Tube, which became part of the Google family in 2006. YouTube and its slo-
gan “Broadcast Yourself” show that the new virtual room for interaction in-
creased. New forms of citizen journalism compete with traditional media. 
Broadcasting in the Internet became a “many-to-many” communication. Mi-
cro-blogging, such as Twitter, which was introduced in 2006 with limited in-
formation of a maximum of 140 characters allowed, became important. So-
cial media services such as Facebook started in 2004. In this way the social 
web produced an interactive room for network communication.  
The problem of spam as an unintended form of mailing mostly for mar-
keting purposes, surfaced with the advent of emails. Everyday communica-
tion could become aggressive when it is not moderated and if it is anonymous 
(Kersting 2005).  
John Barger wrote the first weblog-book to document his Internet activi-
ties in 1992. Weblogs are bidirectional communications and are dialogical. 
Blogger-world is a network of different blogs. Weblogs are short, highly 
interlinked and daily renewed personal websites. “V blogs as the dominant 
form of user created content is fundamental to YouTube’s sense of commu-
nity […] The V blog as a genre of communication invites critique, debate and 
discussion. Direct response through comment and via video is central to this 
form of engagement.” (Burges/ Green 2009: 94)  
Internet changed the traditional communication from a push model, 
where a limited number of media produced news and information for a broad 
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audience, to a pull model of communication, where the users can choose their 
own media channel produced by an abundance of citizen journalists (Bleicher 
2010). So it becomes a medium of choice and a medium of selected commu-
nication. This selective communication can also lead to information bubbles 
where self-selected peers discuss subjects that interest them.  
The level of engagement on the Internet ranges from active to passive in-
volvement. Active involvement changes the citizen into a producer of infor-
mation. Users are not just limited to reception but also to the production of 
messages within mass communication. Passive involvement represents the 
typical recipient of information. But as a “lurker” in a many-to-one structure, 
one can choose one’s own public sphere. 
In the typical model sender, the channel and the recipient are invalid 
(Bleicher 2010). Also, the different types of mass and individual communica-
tion vanish and a hybrid form of mass communication with individual com-
munication has developed. Besides individual communication via online 
telephone, e-mail chats and individual presentation have emerged. These in-
clude the construction of identity and social relations as well as e-services 
and the virtualisation of everyday activities. Mass communication includes 
information, entertainment, and social communication. 
The level of communication ranges from public to private communica-
tion. In the past one-to-one communication was mostly characterised by pri-
vacy and secrecy, but the new forms of communication are characterised by 
higher involvement of the public. In the new media in weblogs, the commu-
nication process is public and the sender focuses on the recipient as well as 
on the audience. 
Communication has different outcomes. The discourse aims towards a 
process of generating ideas, exchange and a presentation of opinions, and a 
decision-making process characterised by bargaining and arguing. Argumen-
tation is a process in which “someone tries to convince someone of some-
thing by citing evidence and drawing or suggesting, inferences from this evi-
dence and from other beliefs and assumptions (hypotheses)“ (Seboek 1986: 
50-51). 
In electronic democracy, government regards itself as the important ini-
tiator and facilitator (government-to-government, government-to-people and 
government-to-business). When we analyze political discourses and e-com-
munication, we discover that in some cases government has only an enabling 
function and in others it is not participating at all. Therefore, our focus is 
more on people-to-people communication with the electorate controlling the 
role of government and less on government-to-people communication. 
The typology of communication must reflect special characteristics of the 
medium Internet. We can have a synchronic and an asynchronic dialogue. 
With the exception of video-discussions, the virtual-dialogue, like a paper-
based-dialogue, does not have face-to-face contact and verbal or non-verbal 
instruments (see table 3).  
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Table 3:  Typology of communication 
Medium/Time Split Virtual  Real  
Asynchronic asynchronic communication (e-mail, 
newsgroups, web forum) 
asynchronic communication 
(mail) 
Synchronic synchronic communication 
(chat pages, internet conferences) 
synchronic communication 
face to face (verbal) 
(Kersting 2005) 
 
The characteristics of asynchronic paper-based communication show the pos-
sible disadvantages and the advantages of an Internet discourse. It is regarded 
as positive that an asynchronic dialogue allows one to re-think and develop 
arguments. In this dialogue, free time management is only restricted by un-
certainty about the dialogue partner. In general, there is more time to answer 
questions and to formulate statements in web forums, Internet conferences, 
etc. Answers can be detailed or brief. It is also possible to use multimedia- 
instruments (text, pictures, graphs) to support arguments.  
A virtual dialogue cannot rely on body language and other non-verbal 
gestures. Therefore, a higher possibility for misunderstandings exists because 
of wrong formulations. Generally, a paper-based conversation like this is less 
complex but re-questioning and re-defining much more difficult. Because di-
rect verbal communication with social contacts is common for an individual, 
there may also be less experience and self- confidence to participate in the 
public sphere of a virtual dialogue. 
Although this seems to be changing, most web forum dialogues and chats 
use an alias, not a proper identification as required in most Internet confer-
ences. This anonymity is considered ambiguous. On the one hand, the ano-
nymity allows a frank and free discussion without prejudices and a discourse 
not based on social desirability. It is a non-hierarchical discourse, because 
status symbols are not visible. This implies that there may exist fewer com-
munication barriers because nobody fears blame. On the other hand, anonym-
ity is also the main counter-argument. Because of few barriers, there is no re-
sponsibility. An aggressive “junk conversation” may occur because it has no 
consequences and there is no social discrimination (Kersting 2005). To avoid 
this there is a trend towards registration and authentication. 
1.2.3 Participation 
Online participation can be seen as the final step at the end of different 
phases of empowerment and deliberation. This enables consulting and influ-
encing government and parliamentary decisions. 
Research is focusing on evaluating the consequences arising from intro-
ducing these new democratic instruments. Are these new techniques strength-
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ening political participation? For example, are they enhancing voter turnout 
or strengthening the political legitimacy of democratic institutions?  
Empowered with new information and community discussion, involved 
citizens can partake in the decision-making process, participating in opinion 
polls and elections, joining parties, donating to political organisations, shop-
ping in political online shops. From the beginning the Internet has had the 
possibility of conducting electronic polls. Because of the self-selection in 
these open e-polls, as well as because of the digital divide, the quality of e-
polls was poor and e-polls were highly criticized. Most online polls are still 
lacking representativeness. On the other hand it is an easy instrument with 
which to collect data and to produce empirical datasets. From the customer’s 
point of view, an evaluation of topics is appealing. Beside electronic polls, 
rating and sharing activities become more important in the social media (see 
table 2).  
In the formal political process, instruments such as participatory budgets 
enable citizen to make suggestions for town planning, etc.. In electronic par-
ticipatory budgeting instruments, they can evaluate and rank the different 
suggestions. In other forms of participatory budgets, citizen can evaluate the 
different budgets in the different fields such as culture, sport, infrastructure, 
etc. These rankings are incorporated into the formal process of decision-
making in municipalities.  
Electronic petitions have also been introduced in Scotland and the Scot-
tish assembly as well as the UK parliament and in other countries such as 
Germany. These can affect the process of parliamentary decision-making. 
Citizens can make suggestions and in a certain period other citizens can sup-
port their ideas. This leads to the formulation of a proposal which is to be 
discussed in Parliament as soon as a certain quorum has been reached. Par-
ticipating in e-petitions is seen as an additional element for the participation 
of non-organised citizens. 
Finally binding e-referendum and Internet voting are implemented. Some 
countries have experience with this kind of electronic participation. In the 
following the benefits of electronic participation will be analysed with the 
help of an example of this kind of on-line voting.  
 
Online voting 
Here the different types of the electronic instruments such as Internet voting, 
e-petition, and e-polling are relevant. The discussion of online-voting is also 
marked by many prejudices and speculations (Brookings Institute 2000; 
Hague/Loader 2002).  
Voting by the Internet can be divided into three categories:  
 
– Intranet voting in the polling station: Here the Internet is used to transfer 
the data from the polling station to the local, regional or central electoral 
authority. This kind of voting is performed at a public computer and is 
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similar to a system with electronic voting machines. The connection from 
the polling station to the headquarters is for the most part by Intranet. Ex-
ternal manipulation, for example by computer viruses or external service 
attacks, is in principle still possible, but can be prevented more easily. 
 Electronic voting may be characterised by the different channels of 
communication in the electoral process. Beside Internet voting other 
electronic devices may be used. It is also necessary to take the level of 
control of the infrastructure by the electoral authorities as an important 
variable (Kersting/Baldersheim 2004).  
 
Table 4: Channels of Electronic voting 
                 Channel 
 
infrastructure  
controlled by electoral authority 
Internet other electronic devices  
++ Intranet Poll site voting Voting machines  
+ Kiosk voting  
- Internet voting SMS- text voting 
Telephone voting 
Interactive Digital Television vot-
ing 
(see also Gibson 2001; Pratchett et al. 2002; Kersting/Baldersheim 2004) 
 
– Kiosk voting: Here voters have the opportunity to use special computers 
situated in public rooms such as libraries, schools or shopping malls. Be-
cause the electoral process cannot be controlled by public authorities, 
special instruments for electronic identification are necessary, for exam-
ple a digital signature or smart card, finger prints, etc. 
– Internet voting: Remote Internet voting at home or from the workplace 
entails further technical risks. Here, software programs or other instru-
ments such as smart cards are required for identification. However, the 
social context cannot be readily controlled and problems regarding the 
secrecy of the vote may arise.  
 
Voting by electronic devices other than the Internet can be handled, for ex-
ample, by electronic voting machines. Electoral computers are located in the 
polling station and can be completely controlled by the electoral authorities. 
Identification can be handled by the officials in the polling station through 
existing voter registers. External manipulation, for example by computer vi-
ruses, Trojan horses or other service attacks, is not possible because there is 
no external communication and the data is stored on the polling machine. So 
only an internal software bug can interfere with the electoral process. 
It is obvious that discussions of all the different types of innovations lead 
in the same general direction. The critique of voting machines and the legis-
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lation against voting machines in some European countries has had a tremen-
dous effect on the discussion of electronic voting as a whole and on online 
voting in particular. 
 
Table 5:  Prospects and threats of Internet voting  
Pros Cons 
Efficiency (Costs, effectiveness etc.) Political Exclusion (Digital divides) 
Political Inclusion (Participation, turnout) Legitimacy (Technical problems, trust etc.) 
Transparency (Voter information) Identity (symbolism of voting, ritualisation) 
 Secrecy (privacy , coercion etc.)  
 
How are electronic elections actually organised? What are the technical 
means and channels of communications made use of in such elections? Ques-
tions can be asked regarding the unequal distribution of capacities for making 
use of the electronic instruments: Who is likely to prefer electronic voting 
over ordinary ballots? How will the digital divide affect participation in elec-
tronic elections? Does Internet voting really enhance voter turnout, as its pro-
ponents often claim? Are the constitutional standards of the secret ballot re-
spected in electronic elections? What are the threats to such standards in such 
elections? And does Internet voting require changes in electoral legislation? 
If so, in what ways? Do political and cultural traditions of different countries 
impinge upon the propensity to introduce Internet elections and other features 
of electronic democracy? 
An issue of special concern is citizen trust in the electoral process. Will 
Internet voting affect trust in elections? And will concerns with trust retard 
the introduction of Internet voting more in some countries than in others? 
Feelings of identity as a citizen may actually be closely related to the act of 
voting in the traditional way; the trip to the polling station and the ritual cast-
ing of the paper ballot into the ballot box may be acts that confirm the status 
of citizenship and the political significance of an individual. Such attitudes 
may however be more widespread among the older generation than among 
young people.  
Comparative studies show that there are clear indications for the thesis 
that due to differences in context, countries will diverge with respect to Inter-
net voting. There seem to be different strategies regarding the implementa-
tion of Internet voting (Kersting/Svensson/Leenes 2003).  
Given the strong opposition against the implementation of Internet vot-
ing, the question is, of course, why other countries are aiming to become 
Electronic voting champions. Countries regarded as the prospective e-voting 
champions are Switzerland and Estonia, and, since 2011, Norway. Can we 
explain why Internet voting is implemented in countries such as Estonia and 
Switzerland? As suggested, such an explanation may be found in the specific 
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circumstances and in the beliefs and interests of groups promoting Internet 
voting.  
The first route starts with differentiating between the political spheres, 
where local election is seen as a testing ground for new instruments of voting. 
The second path involves differentiating the steps towards Electronic voting. 
This begins with the introduction of electronic registration, which seems to 
be more of a problem than the introduction of polling machines. The next 
step, kiosk voting, leads to less control of the electoral process. The last step, 
the implementation of remote Internet voting, makes the state controlled elec-
toral supervision of the secrecy and the privacy of the vote impossible. Here, 
the citizen is responsible for respecting and protecting his/her rights. In the 
ICT context, the political context, the use of different voting technologies and 
policy plans in national and federal elections it becomes obvious that impor-
tant variations within and between the countries emerge (Kersting/Leenes/ 
Svenson 2004).  
In some countries postal voting is possible. Here the discussion on the se-
crecy of the vote reflects similar arguments to those in the discussion on Inter-
net voting. Postal voting is allowed for particular groups such as foreigners or 
military personnel abroad. The implementation of online voting uses the same 
strategy. Some pilot projects focus on the citizen abroad. Here the Internet pro-
vides an easy and reliable method for these groups to cast their vote. 
The introduction of smart cards as identity cards, which could also be 
used as a digital signature for verification in Online elections, is well on its 
way in Estonia. In Germany, the legal framework needed to implement the 
digital signature exists. Furthermore, Germany and to some extent Finland 
have experience with private sector online elections.  
With respect to Paper technologies, all countries still use the traditional 
polling booth but many also offer the possibility of postal voting and/or 
proxy voting. Advance voting is possible in most of the countries (delegated 
voting). France allows proxy voting, while postal voting is not allowed.  
Voting machines have a long tradition in a number of countries such as 
the United States. They were not used countrywide, and electronic voting 
machines were only introduced in the new millennium. In the Netherlands 
electronic voting machines were implemented and used countrywide since 
the 1970s. Germany adopted these polling machines in pilot projects in a 
number of big cities. Ireland was also interested in implementing the same 
voting machine. There was criticism in the Netherlands against the trustwor-
thiness and reliability of this voting machine and this led to the cancellation 
of this idea. In the Netherlands as well as in Germany, the system is no 
longer in place. Nevertheless in other countries such as India and Brazil, vot-
ing machines are used countrywide for presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions. Countries such as Russia and Venezuela have had pilot projects. 
In Estonia online voting was introduced in national as well as local elec-
tions. Here also cyber-attacks were experienced during election. Switzerland 
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took the longest time to implement online voting in elections as well as in 
referendums. They plan to use the Internet also for voter registration. Never-
theless, Internet voting has been introduced in only a small number of cities 
and regions. Norway successfully implemented Internet voting in local elec-
tions in 2011. Denmark has been discussing the implementation of online 
elections.  
Internet voting is not yet an accepted method of voting in any other 
European country, or elsewhere for that matter. The delay in implementing 
Internet voting reflects the assessment of the promises and risks of Electronic 
voting. The United Kingdom seemed to be on the brink of deciding in favour 
of Internet voting. Germany was planning online voting in the long run and 
seemed to rely on a stepwise approach. However, the discussion and the cri-
tique of voting machines stopped this development temporarily. Looking at 
the reasons why various countries are not opting for Internet voting we find 
that, together with more formal, legal arguments, Internet voting is currently 
dismissed as an option because of the threats to the integrity of the voting 
process. Finland, although advanced in electronic service delivery, has not 
taken any serious steps towards Internet voting because of its strong democ-
ratic tradition and its emphasis on security. In France, a parliamentary bill to 
introduce Internet voting was not passed, and some experiments were even 
prevented by a ruling of the Commission Nationale de l’Informatiqueet des 
Libertés.  
1.3 Electronic democracy and dilemmas: Digital 
Problems and societal challenges  
Democratic innovation by new instruments is facing a number of problems 
and challenges. In the following section these will be analysed in three cate-
gories. The question of the digital divide is crucial in the discussion of the 
proliferation of these innovative instruments (Norris 2001). Secondly the 
analysis of Internet users points to some specific problems. Finally the politi-
cal cultural challenges will be discussed and related to the principles of de-
mocracy. These challenges emerge in the field of ethics. The Internet was of-
ten seen and used as a memory bank for organisations. Does this mean that it 
never forgets, and is it necessary to forget? Is there a problem of data protec-
tion? The Internet promises a higher transparency and better information. Are 
transparency and freedom of information problematic? Is basic copyright ig-
nored? If bridging and bonding are seen as the biggest problems in modern 
societies, can social networks make up for the lack of other social contacts?  
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1.3.1 Socio-economic developments  
The Internet has changed our lifestyle and it is changing our democracy. The 
introduction of the new information and communication technologies is em-
bedded in socioeconomic contexts. These may differ in different developing 
and developed countries. 
Urbanisation  
Worldwide, societal change is leading to higher rates of urbanization. Urban 
centres and metropolitan areas are growing rapidly (Kersting et al. 2009).  
Population density and urbanization (72%) is highest in Europe. In Swe-
den (90%) and in England, the citizens live in urban agglomerations. South-
ern and Eastern Europe are less populous and have a lower level of urbaniza-
tion. The level of urbanization is related to a country’s’ growth rate. In 2005 
urbanization growth in Europe was low (0.2%). Density is relatively low in 
Latin America and Asia (78%). Asian and Latin American countries are 
characterized by extremely large metropolitan areas. Population density is 
lowest in the African countries, which, furthermore, have the lowest level of 
urbanization (38%) (UN 2007). South Africa is an exception, with approxi-
mately 59% of the population residing in urban areas. However, in Africa 
(3.1%) and Asia (2.6%), the process of urbanization is also rapid. Cities in 
African developing countries have the highest urban growth rates. Hence, 
while the level of urbanization is generally low in developing countries, the 
rate of urbanization in these countries is much higher than in the developed 
countries. This fact is expected to have implications for the implementation 
of new information and communication technologies.  
Social Capital, multicultural societies and individualism  
Urbanisation is also related to individualisation and the anonymity of the 
Metropoles. In industrial countries, socio-cultural change, such as individu-
alisation and social capital, is decreasing (Putnam 2000). Developing coun-
tries often perform better when they have well-developed social networks. 
social capital, and social trust. A relatively high level of mutual self-help can 
be found especially in poorer neighborhoods. (Kersting 1996). But in coun-
tries such as South Africa, the empirical data show a low level of social capi-
tal in urban areas. Furthermore social capital is also related to cultural con-
texts, ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, as well as other indicators. In some 
ethnic groups a strong identity and a strong bonding exists. Nevertheless, the 
problem of bridging between the different social groups is critical. This hin-
ders the development of social capital. The diversity in the cities is also re-
lated to the high level of in-country as well as international migration. Mod-
ern cities are more and more amalgamations of different ethnic and religious 
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groups and languages, as well as people of different cultural backgrounds. 
The management of diversity can, on the one hand, foster national identity 
and national culture, or, on the other hand, strengthen cultural diversity. The 
latter strategy has the advantage to produce multiple social and cultural lives. 
With cultural diversity, society benefits from the diverse talents of the differ-
ent groups, but this diversity also risks creating parallel societies that do not 
not communicate with each other, resulting in conflicts.  
Segregation, Structural Unemployment, Poverty  
Cities in the developing world face challenges such as migration, demo-
graphic change, and structural unemployment (Kersting et al. 2009). Glob-
ally, socioeconomic change is resulting in growing structural unemployment, 
a decreasing agrarian and industrial sector, and the growing dominance of the 
service sector. The problem of structural unemployment is becoming a major 
characteristic of most countries.  
In developing countries social inequality produces extreme urban pov-
erty. People living in poorer suburbs and high density areas lack employment 
opportunities and infrastructure such as housing, transport, schools, and sew-
erage systems (Berg-Schlosser/Kersting 2003). Social inequalities are often 
extreme. Surviving in the urban centres is to a large extent dependent on 
monetary income. This is due to the fact that subsistence agriculture is only 
possible in some urban settlements. The population living in slums is hetero-
geneous. Living in a slum settlement does not always mean living in extreme 
poverty. However, the lack of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewerage, 
waste removal, transport, housing, health care) means that people are living 
in a vulnerable situation. Hence, municipalities in developing countries have 
to focus more on developmental policies than those in richer industrial coun-
tries. Because of the absence of welfare systems, unemployment is either 
solved by informal sector engagement and subsistence agriculture (multi-
occupationality) or mitigated by other resources (derived from family and 
neighbourhood networks) (Kersting 1996). 
Demographic Change: Grey society and youth dominance 
In a number of countries, demographic change is obvious. In developed 
countries, a tendency towards a ‘grey society’ resulting from low birth rates 
and high life expectancy is becoming a problem for, among others, the social 
welfare systems. In developing countries, the reverse situation applies: life 
expectancy has been low because of weak health systems, and birth rates 
have been high. However, in some countries, the population is decreasing be-
cause HIV/AIDS is endemic in the 20-40 age group. Youth dominance is 
therefore prevailing. Older generations are also profiting from better health 
systems and higher life expectancy. These factors are leading to societies 
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numerically dominated by children and older people. In some developed 
countries these groups are clients of an all-embracing social welfare system. 
By contrast, developing countries often lack proper educational facilities and 
welfare systems for these groups. 
Information, Knowledge and Education  
The shift from the agricultural and industrial sectors towards the service sec-
tor is associated with the development of a new information society. This is 
supported by a proliferation of new information technologies (Internet, cell 
phones, etc), which has major implications for social life, but also for the 
public sector and governance. Governments have rapidly absorbed new in-
struments of electronic administration and electronic democracy. Neverthe-
less, inequalities still exist within different countries as well as between de-
veloping and developed countries. The digital divide exists with regard to 
Internet technologies. In most developing countries cell phone technologies 
have become important tools of communication in all social groups. Besides 
the proliferation of some technologies, the educational gap remains. Low lev-
els of education are often found in rural and poorer social groups. Educa-
tional programmes are seen as the most important instruments for poverty re-
duction.  
1.3.2 Digital divide  
Similar to the political divide there is also the digital divide and the haves and 
the have-nots of the latest information and communication technology and of 
Internet access. The debate on the digital divide involves a discussion of na-
tional as well as international inequality. Internationally, some countries and 
some continents lag behind when it comes to Internet access. Some of these 
continents focus on alternatives to Personal Computers and implement mod-
ern technologies to leapfrog the industrial countries. For example Africa is 
seen as the first post PC- continent not using Personal Computers to a large 
extent, but focusing on mobile technology.  
Although the proliferation of the new information and communication 
technologies has led to rapid spread since the 1990s, there is still strong dis-
parity when it comes to the usage of these technologies within different coun-
tries as well as between different countries. It is also obvious that there is a 
strong tendency towards the higher mobility (e.g. cloud technology). So indi-
cators focusing not only on bandwidth and Internet usage but also on mobile 
cellular subscriptions are relevant. In this field it is difficult to find robust and 
reliable information.  
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Most studies focus on the rate of subscriptions. This data generated by pri-
vate companies such as Facebook, Google or Twitter tends to overestimate 
the usage. These companies often use subscription rates and ignore the ten-
dency to double inscriptions, where people are using more than one user-id.  
The new information and communication technologies are part of the 
millennium development goals and evaluated accordingly. It is quite obvious 
when it comes to the continental comparison that the Internet usage is much 
higher in the highly developed OECD countries (see UN 2012). Globally in 
1990 Internet usage was less than 1%. In North America Internet usage rates 
increased from less than 42% in the 2000 to 77% in 2010. In Europe in 2000 
only 19% of the population was using the Internet and in 2010 already 65% 
of the population was doing so. Internet usage was much lower in Asia and 
South America. However, in those continents it raised from around 6% in the 
year 2000 towards around 30% in 2010. Nevertheless, statistics on Internet 
users often present a distorted picture. Besides the Netherlands, Norway, 
Finland, and Sweden with around 90%, leading countries worldwide are Aus-
tralia (76%), New Zealand (83%) as well as Canada 82% and the United 
States 79%. In most Central and Northern European countries, about 80% of 
the population uses the internet. Meanwhile, in Southern Europe, percentages 
range between 44% in Greece and 66% in Spain. The same has occurred in 
Eastern Europe with countries such as Belarus (32%), Russia (43%) and the 
Czech Republic (68%).  
In 2010 in Northern Africa Internet usage was between 12% in Algeria, 
14% in Libya, 27% in Egypt and 49% in Morocco. In Southern and Eastern 
Africa, around 25% of the population of Mauritius used the internet, and in 
South Africa 21% used it, but in most other countries the percentage was 
much lower. The resource rich Botswana lagged with only 6%. In West- and 
Central Africa there were countries with no or very little Internet access, such 
as Ethiopia, Burkina Faso Chad, DR Congo, Niger, and Sudan. Even in 
Ghana only 8% of the population had Internet access. 
In Asian countries such as Japan (80%), Korea (84%) as well as China 
(69%), there was a very high level of Internet access in 2010. Countries such 
as Afghanistan and Bangladesh with around 4%, but also old Russian territo-
ries such as Turkmenistan with 2% had a very low level of Internet usage. In 
Iraq with 6% and Iran with 13% as well as Syria with 20%, the digital divide 
was obvious. 
In 2010 Latin America presented a mixed picture, with some Caribbean 
islands with a very high level of Internet usage. In most larger Latin Ameri-
can countries, less than half of the population is connected to the Internet, 
e.g. Brazil (41%), Argentina (36%), Chile (45%). and Mexico (31%). 
It can be shown that in most countries the mobile cellular subscription 
rate is rising rapidly. Fixed telephone lines usage, which is to a certain extent 
a prerequisite for Internet access, is only going up slowly or is even decreas-
ing. In some OECD countries and the United States fixed telephone line 
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came down from 68% in 2000 to only 49% in 2010. The same happened in a 
lot of European countries, where, for example, in the United Kingdom it went 
down from 60% in 2002 to 54% in 2010. 
When it comes to mobile cellular subscriptions a different picture 
emerges. Here the trend also started in the new millennium. In the global 
South subscription rates were much higher than the rate of internet users. 
Mobile subscriptions were higher in Canada and the United States, with 90 
subscriptions per hundred inhabitants. But because of double subscriptions, 
these statistics are slightly distorted. The cellular phones boom started in 
Europe in the 1990s. In the 2000s in Europe as well as in the United States, 
approximately 40 mobile phone subscriptions per hundred persons existed. In 
Africa on average there were 15 cellular subscriptions per hundred inhabi-
tants, but depending on the country and the provider, the picture was quite 
heterogeneous. In countries such as Malawi, only 20, in Burundi only 13, in 
Djibouti only 18, in Somalia only 7 and in Eritrea only 3 subscriptions per 
hundred persons are recorded.  
In 2010 a very high level existed in Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Seychelles, South Africa and Tunisia. In a number of these coun-
tries other human development indicators such as toilets per household etc. 
were at a lower level than the indicators of cellphone penetration. 
Nevertheless, in 2010, the number of smart phones was still very limited 
and usage of cell phone was focused less on Internet access or social net-
works than on telephoning and SMS word texting. 
In Asia in 2010, there were already a number of countries with a wide-
cellphone proliferation. Low percentages were only to be found in the De-
mocratic Republic of Korea (with only two cell phones per hundred), Myan-
mar, and the poorer countries in Western and Southern Asia. China had 64 
subscriptions per hundred, Pakistan and India around 60. But most other 
countries had much higher cellphone coverage.  
In 2010 in Latin America, with some exceptions such as Haiti (40), 
Venezuela (65), Nicaragua (65) and Mexico (80), mobile phone penetration 
was high. In these countries cellphone proliferation was similar to that in 
Europe and the United States.  
New information and communication structures and electronic manage-
ment and government are changing lifestyles not only in the European, 
American and Asian context, but also in Africa (Kersting/Baldersheim 2005, 
Bruns 2008). Africa is seen as the first “Post-PC” (Personal computer) conti-
nent. Because of the low proliferation of Internet usage, cellphone technolo-
gies could develop much faster (Waema/Adera 2011). Because of the avail-
ability of broad band technologies and cheap smartphones (from China), a lot 
of ordinary people could use cellphone technologies. In some cases technical 
infrastructure was supported by the donor society.  
Kenya has a long experience in implementing innovative information and 
communication technologies. Kenya’s Internet-payment system MPESA 
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found worldwide recognition (Economist 2. 6. 2010) and was copied by dif-
ferent countries such as South Africa and Ghana. Also in many OECD coun-
tries international companies such as Google rely on these Kenyan country-
wide tests of e-payment.  
There are different policies to bridge the digital divide. Multipurpose 
community centres, Telecentres, Cyberlabs, Public information terminals in 
post offices, and internet access points in libraries are strategies to allow peo-
ple to use the Internet. Some of the developing countries such as South Africa 
are focusing more on mobile technology and less on personal computer ac-
cess. Developing countries are using a different strategy to leapfrog the 
OECD countries. Some countries, such as Rwanda, concentrate their devel-
opment strategy on a broadband technology network as a major step toward 
development of the country. The bridging of the gap is an important strategy 
especially for developing countries. In a number of countries such as India 
etc. the new information and communication technologies seem to assist the 
development of key strategic sectors. As a result of numerous projects, ordi-
nary citizens also gain access to the Internet.  
In OECD countries such as Germany, which has an average Internet 
penetration compared to other OECD countries, three quarters of the popula-
tion use the Internet regularly. The broadband Atlas in 2011 shows that 
98.7% of German households have Internet access to network with a transfer 
rate of 1 Mbit or more per second (Initiative D21: 2011). However, in East-
ern Germany and in the rural areas (88%), Internet access is below average. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to social media, broadband and high-speed 
Internet technologies are relevant. Around 40% are using the new VDS of 
technology with a download speed of 50 Mbit. 69% have access to 16 Mbit 
connections, and 85% to at least 6 Mbit- connections per second (Roleff 
2012). 
Electronic democracy will come up against the problem of user profi-
ciency, and this might lead to a ‘digital divide’ in voting. ICT is not distrib-
uted equally, nor are citizens from various socio-ethnic and socio-demo-
graphic backgrounds equally likely to be able and willing to use the technol-
ogy (e.g. Pratchett 2002). Widespread electronic participation can thus lead 
to some voters having far more difficulty in voting than others, and even to 
the stigmatisation of citizens as either being luddites or lacking the technical 
means or skills to participate electronically (Pratchett 2002).  
1.3.3 The digital individual. Young, urban, politically 
apathetic? 
The digital divide is probably the most crucial issue. Is the divide likely to 
persist, and perhaps even to widen? Or will the gap be reduced as ICT 
equipment becomes more and more available? This is not only a question of 
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the further spread of technology and a reduction in the price of the equip-
ment, but also a question of making the technology really user-friendly. But 
even in this case, there are people who decide to opt out, for instance, be-
cause ICT does not benefit them. It is also a question of public policies, regu-
lations, and efforts with regard to the training of users. 
The younger generation is strongly oriented towards new media con-
sumption patterns. This screen culture is oriented towards new media, and the 
use of TV, cellphones and tablets. It is characterised by a strong multitasking 
ability as well as permanent accessibility. Here there seems to be a difference 
between the different generations. This elder generation ask for minutes of 
meetings etc. and the younger citizens are highly interested in voting online 
for projects, rating etc. 
The 90-9-1 rule says that 90% of the online audience only passively part-
cipate, 9% interact only occasionally and only 1% take part actively. This is 
typical for social media such as YouTube (Bleicher 2010: 83). In 2011 in 
some OECD countries such as Germany, around 70% of the group between 
15 and 60 and only 40% of the 60+ generation used the Internet. Nearly the 
whole age group between 14 and 30 were online. In 1997 6.5% of the Ger-
mans were using the Internet. The typical first mover and Internet pioneer 
was between 20 and 40 years of age, employed and highly educated, and 
used the Internet for economic purposes and less for entertainment. Then in 
2000 66% of the users over the age of 40 were online and they mostly used 
the Internet for entertainment purposes and communication. On the other 
hand the older generation was becoming a more important Internet user. The 
so-called “Silver surfer” got a tremendous push by new technologies and eas-
ier tablet computers. In 2010 women generally spent less time surfing and 
downloading but devoted more time to chats and information pages, culture 
and leisure. In all groups trends towards habitualisation and the use of only a 
few websites became obvious. Men were more active than women. Men pro-
duced more content and they uploaded more videos (on YouTube portals) 
participated in more blogs, and commented on more articles on the Internet 
(Pinz/Kersting 2012).  
When it comes to certain instruments in 2010, Wikipedia was used by 
70% of all users, video portals such as YouTube by 58%, and social networks 
by 42%. Weblogs were only used by 7% and Twitter by only 3% of the users. 
Meanwhile, only 10% of the 60+ generation used social networks, whereas 
around 70% of the age group between 14 and 29 used them. When it came to 
interactivity within the Social Web, only a few in the communities used it ac-
tively. Content is produced here by only 10%. Only 8% were active in we-
blogs and only 7% in Video portals. Twitter was used by two thirds of the us-
ers passively. Meanwhile, 35% of the users said that they were interested in 
becoming active (Pinz/Kersting 2012).  
Social media bridges the gap between mass media (one-to-many) and 
personal media (one-to-one). In 2012 around 800 million Facebook users 
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were counted worldwide. 3.8%, or 30 million users, live in North Africa and 
the Middle East. The Internet is used for mobilisation, organisation, and ex-
pression. It can maximise speed of communication, shrink costs, and bridge 
distances. It is important for the process of democratisation and for liberation 
movements against authoritarian regimes (Norris 2000: 172). Although its 
role in the Arab Spring is often exaggerated. it influenced the spread of in-
formation, the networking and the engagement of the opposition movements 
against authoritarian regimes. 
In the United States, in election campaigns it can be shown that the 
Internet plays an important role, especially for partisan supporters. Neverthe-
less, research in this field is still limited. As early as 2003 the Internet was an 
important source of information for Howard Dean. Political parties use Face-
book as the most important instrument for obtaining information. Sweetser 
and Terisky (2008) argue that in the American mid-term elections, many par-
tisans produced small and supporting messages. In Germany in 2010 only 
22% of the members of the national Parliament used Facebook for political 
campaigning. 
Classical channels of information such as newspapers and television still 
dominate the social elites, and the early adopters among these elites such as 
students.. On the other hand early adopters have tried to gain contact with po-
litical parties and NGOs by using the Internet (Pinz/Kersting 2012). 
There is a discussion about whether the Internet, because of lower costs, 
can mobilise people more easily and can help to build up social networks. Mar-
golies and Resnick (2000) argue that the Internet is used by political activists 
only. Norris also argues that the Internet mobilises people who are already ac-
tive. Some authors predict new forms of political partcipation, where people 
will actually participate in a fluid and flexible way, signing online petitions, be-
coming partisans etc. without strong partisanship (Coleman/Blumler 2009). 
Internet users are stigmatized as shoppers, chatters, gamblers, informa-
tion junkies, PC freaks, and technical geeks. They split into entertainment-
oriented and business-oriented users. Some user built up their own identity 
(avatar). The Internet is used for construction of a new identity, where this 
second, virtual life in cyberspace can become relevant (Bleicher 2010: 83).  
1.3.4 Internet ethics and human rights, dilemmas and trade 
offs  
In the following section some other social and political issues will be dis-
cussed. These include ethical problems regarding the new information tech-
nologies. But there are also dilemmas and contradictory trends arising from 
these empirical results.e. These aspects can only be analysed and presented 
briefly. But these are also possible research fields for the future. Some are 
tradeoffs between the different goals and targets involved.  
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– Memory for institutions. Remember and forget  
The World Wide Web was developed as a memory aid for an organization, 
and developed later as a memory for an organization. The Internet was devel-
oped to help the organisation to find and retrieve information easily. The hi-
erarchical hypertext structure allows enhanced specific search functions. The 
function as a memory and a data bank for an organisation or society was en-
hanced by search engines such as Google, which relies on the Internet.  
Web 1.0 focused on information and less on communication or participa-
tion. The Internet also allows a “many-to-many” communication flow. In-
formation spread rapidly in the networks (virality).This virality causes certain 
risks. Once published, information on the Internet cannot be withdrawn eas-
ily. So the Internet seems to remember everything and it seems never to for-
get (see OII 2011). The psychological effects of this possibility of retrieving 
information everywhere at any time by a mobile cell phone have not yet been 
researched adequately.  
 
– Data protection and privacy 
Numerous groups have championed the idea of open access to all data. The 
discussion about information was already reflected in the book “Orwell in 
Athens” (van Donk et al. 1995). “Where you are not paying for the product 
you become the product” shows that participants in different projects are 
used as informants for big companies about consumption patterns. The big 
companies use data mining and other instruments to collect personalised in-
formation about consumption patterns etc. The knowledge of Google, Face-
book and other companies is not transparent, open and democratised and can 
easily be misused. Data protection is a customer right underlying national 
legislation. In Europe Facebook is based in Ireland and has to respect Euro-
pean regulations on data protection, privacy and security.  
European regulations were sometimes not effective when it came to the 
Cookie-legislation. This Cookie-legislation asks for information and trans-
formation and the compliance of the user when it comes to cookies, which 
are files which are stored on a user’s computer that identify a PC to a Web 
server. Because these cookies are used in abundance, users resisted giving 
their personal acceptance each and every time. For this reason, this law was 
not ratified in a number of European states. 
 
– Freedom of Information 
Authoritarian governments react to criticism by using censorship and propa-
ganda. These instruments are less effective because of the existence of an 
abundance of public space and information, where the government’s narra-
tive can be proved untrue. According to Zuckerman’s theory, broad networks 
are much more difficult to control by authoritarian regimes. Government has 
to shut down millions of them to block all the views. The Internet is a flexible 
medium with rapid developments, innovations and changes. The Internet is a 
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global medium that cannot be fully controlled by national governments. Nev-
ertheless, the placement of the server is relevant when it comes to litigation.  
Since 2010 authoritarian regimes have tried increasingly to control the 
use of the Internet. In Belorussia, installing websites which were not regis-
tered in the country was not allowed. Google and eBay were not allowed and 
only local websites could be used for economic purposes. In Iran in 2011, 
every user had to identify when he entered an Internet café. In China this 
regulation existed as well and was even extended. Since 2012 registration 
within the Internet became obligatory. Anonymity is an important aspect 
when it comes to the anti-authoritarian usage of the Internet.  
New regulations similar to the regulations in China and Iran can only be 
useful with identification of the IP address. Because of flexible and dynamic 
IP addresses, it has to be proved who used which IP address, and at what 
time. In this regard the storage of important data, which was the subject of 
other European Union legislation, became an important aspect for the Euro-
pean Internet as well.  
 
– Copyrights and fair use 
When file-sharing programs became prominent, companies, especially music 
companies, started complaining. Anonymity allowed users to abuse copyright 
for music and software. Some countries such as France reacted by enacting a 
copyright law in 2009 according to which Internet users breaking the copy-
right legislation three times were punished with a denial of Internet access. In 
the UK the Digital Economy Act was amended in 2010 and the “three 
strikes” rule, which had been previously adopted, was dropped.  
In 2012 the planned ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agree-
ment (ACTA) by the European Union member states triggered numerous pro-
tests which led to a number of governments sending this regulation back for 
discussion. ACTA is also relevant when it comes to the blocking of Internet 
providers who have broken the copyright law. The international pressure on 
governments to support stronger regulations is obvious. A number of coun-
tries are seen as “safe harbours”, others are not (Zittrain 2008; Stöcker 2012). 
In the US the discussed “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA), the “Sinde” regu-
lations in Spain, Digital Economy Act in the UK, HADOPI in France, and 
other regulations in most OECD countries should disallow the Internet corpo-
rations’ contact with certain websites which have broken the copyright regu-
lations. Big Internet companies such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, as well as 
Wikipedia argue that these rules introduce censorship and state surveillance. 
 
– Manipulation and cyber war. Netiquette 
Ethics are becoming more important in the Internet. The World Wide Web 
(www) is seen as a memory organization. But it can be manipulated. This 
manipulation can be organized by hackers, as in the case of Russian hackers 
trying to hinder and block the Estonian election. 
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Social media is firstly an arena for participation and an exchange of 
ideas. In this regard political organizations such as political parties should not 
manipulate this freedom of exchange. Using anonymous participants to influ-
ence the discussion or using political “spies” or “moles”? for negative cam-
paigning in the opposing party blocks is easily done. But this will destroy the 
credibility and the legitimacy of the Internet, as well as all political parties.  
Studies of the deliberative quality of the Internet have shown that webfo-
rums are not operating according to Habermas’ criteria, are not argumenta-
tively -respectful, consensus-oriented, but are often pure monologues and fre-
quently aggressive (Kersting 2005).  
Because of the manipulation of information within the Internet, the wis-
dom of the crowd cannot always correct this manipulation in time. Users cre-
ate and use information. Collective truth becomes individual truth and vice 
versa (Römmele in this volume). Can Netiquette, political correct behaviour 
in the Internet, be introduced and controlled by self-regulation? Individual 
freedoms on the Internet are frequently disrespectful of minority rights. Shit 
storms, where individuals are criticised massively on the Internet using Twit-
ter, are used to silence and intimidate oppositional thinking. Is there a chance 
for self regulation reinforcing netiquette or is there a need for an Internet po-
lice? 
 
– Citizen journalism and responsibility: a guardian for the guardian? 
The shift to peer production is enhanced by the network ability of the social 
media, the producer and the consumer role, when equal individuals voluntar-
ily produce the shared outcome (Bruns 2009). These producers are no longer 
passive consumers but bring in their own ideas and creativity and opinions. 
This becomes highly visible in the field of journalism and broadcasting, 
where producers and users are becoming more and more equal in a network 
of information, and where citizen journalism is on the rise. 
Social networks such as Facebook are creating content and are empower-
ing professional journalists, who are using the social networks in their own 
blogs to benefit from the phenomenon of virality. Virality is a process in 
which incident information is shared rapidly and crosses the boundaries of 
new and traditional media. 
In 2012 it is estimated that there are 115 million blogs worldwide. Here 
citizen journalists are no longer simple active consumers of information. This 
produces a broad spectrum of political information but also much political 
propaganda. It can be shown that some political blogs are related to right 
wing nationalism and xenophobia. There, more sensational topics dominate 
other more altruistic initiatives (Mozorow 2010).  
Journalism has always played the role of a gatekeeper and a guardian. 
Journalists as guardians of political systems have certain obligations. The 
standards and the quality of journalism may have changed because of profes-
sionalization and even more because of commercialisation of the media, but 
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journalists are still responsible for the standards, the reliability, and truth of 
the information they produce. They filter what is interesting and what is not. 
They decide about the agenda, agenda setting, agenda surfing and agenda 
cutting. Here they are dependent on the publishers’ marketing strategies. 
With the new channels of information, some can even enhance their role. 
Some can publish their stories which were not included in the main media, by 
using their blogs on the Internet. 
In the meantime norms and rules for behaviour within the Internet have 
been introduced, but as in real life, not everybody sticks to these norms. Do 
we need guardians for the guardians? 
 
– Self selection- group think and identity 
Stromer Galley (2003) argues that participants look for social diversity and 
heterogeneity. Chadwick (2010) argues that the richness and the relevance of 
the new data is benefiting knowledge and skills and supporting off-line par-
ticipation (Wojcik in this volume). New studies show that ideological segre-
gation (Grentkow/ Shapiro 2010) is strong. Citizens are more interested in 
peer websites and mini spheres than in contradicting viewpoints. Different 
opinions are rejected and the reality they seek in the web supports their own 
position. The plurality of the media which was always a criterion for its qual-
ity is diminished. Especially in 2010 release search engines directed users to 
blogs with a similar vocabulary, the same style of writing in formulating 
questions and the same blogs and websites. 
Markus Prior (2007) argues that the new digital media contribute to 
higher civic apathy. Due to the fragmentation and balkanization of the media, 
people are no longer limited to the leading media (TV), but can select for 
themselves and filter information according to their interests. Here users are 
avoiding conflicts and contradictory interests.  
The segregated, separated and fragmented public sphere becomes an in-
formation bubble (Schmidt 2012).The introverted milieus and public spheres 
define homogeneous networks, where criticism and confronting arguments 
are diminished. Traditional media such as television channels and newspa-
pers often had oligopolistic or even monopolistic characteristics, but they 
covered heterogeneous groups and produced networks, confrontation, and 
protest. Because of self-selection within the small homogeneous networks on 
the other hand, participants exchange fewer opinions (Römmele in this vol-
ume). The discourse in the different subgroups and in the fragmented public 
spheres within the Internet is often seen as an introverted political discourse. 
With the self-selection of the Internet group individuals can choose their own 
preferences and it is often argued that they mostly choose “friendly” forums 
to avoid cognitive dissonance. This can produce a phenomenon of groupthink 
where people avoid taboos and where those looking for consensus do not 
criticise and question each other’s arguments (Römmele in this volume).  
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1.4 Conclusions and future trends 
The future of the Internet and the future of electronic democracy are hardly 
predictable. New technological developments and new inventions can 
strongly influence our ordinary lives and become part of our lifestyle. During 
the last three decades, it has been seen that the penetration of the Internet has 
changed not only the lives of minority elites, but also of poorer groups within 
our society. Therefore we can speculate about future trends and develop-
ments in electronic democracy. 
The Internet has produced an enhanced political transparency. There is a 
need for political information, but compared to other activities in the internet 
people only a few seem to be interested in politics. Only a few groups log 
into political information and political topics. The potential of the Internet 
still lies largely in unorganised non-elites being able to produce a counter 
public sphere. 
Democratic systems, especially the older democracies, are characterised 
by a strong past reluctance toward democratic innovation. In some countries 
democratic institutions are seen as the glue which holds the country together 
and which produces identity. Trust in these institutions seems to be a relevant 
factor for the survival of the democracy and the political system. Even out-
dated procedures which stem from a past which had no modern form of 
transportation and communication have survived. There are numerous exam-
ples of these relics (e.g. the US electoral college). This can be seen as a kind 
of ritualised institutional setting but they give the political system identity. So 
it is easy to predict that democratic innovations will have to include elements 
from the old system to become accepted. This can be seen for example in the 
development of Internet voting, where trust in the basic real counting system 
led to a development on which even voting machines had to produce a paper 
trail and had to print out a ballot paper which could be counted by real citi-
zens afterwards. In the field of internet innovation, it is obvious that higher 
standards were introduced because of distrust and techno-scepticism. 
In the following section the main future trends will be presented. Some 
have already been partly implemented: 
 
– Blended participation: online-offline, real-virtual 
Strong path dependency and conservatism are also a factor when it comes to 
the important nexus between online and offline participation. Blended de-
mocracy describes the interaction between online and offline participation 
and online and electronic democracy. The proliferation of the Internet and the 
new instruments for electronic democracy will not lead to a fully virtual po-
litical life in the Internet (sometimes labeled as pure cyberdemocracy). Most 
of the electronic democracy instruments will be based on or will head to-
wards offline participation in the real world. Although it can be shown that 
traditional media are losing influence, they are always used as a source of in-
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formation and a kind of marketing place for online media. As we have seen, 
the Internet world is deeply fragmented. Here the use of traditional media 
(TV, radio, newspaper) can be very useful for informing and marketing of 
online websites and to enhance online participation. On the other hand virtual 
online media are heading towards real offline participation. One example 
here is the use of “Flash mobs”, where mobilisation is organised via the 
Internet. Flash mobs are gatherings coordinated and mobilised in secret by 
text messages. 
 
– Direct, dialogical and representative democracy. Hybrid and Liquid de-
mocracy 
In recent decades democratic innovation and reformed political systems 
showed a trend towards hybrid forms of participation. This can be seen in the 
development of governance as a worldwide trend. Elected politicians and old 
political elites are no longer seen as the sole legitimate representatives. It is 
accepted that administration as well as formerly ignored and blocked interests 
from the civil society are included as partners in a kind of roundtable democ-
racy. The nexus between dialogical and representative democracy can be seen 
as an important element of governance. Nearly all definitions seem to include 
a type of public-private partnership. 
There is also trend towards more direct intervention in the case of spe-
cific issues. Dissatisfaction with representative democracy in different coun-
tries in Latin America, Africa, and especially Europe has led to new forms of 
referendums and especially initiatives from below. People want to have a say 
not only in electing representatives for the next four or five years, but they 
want to intervene directly in the policy making process. 
Liquid democracy is an online software for democratic decision making 
which is going in a similar direction. It is a form of hybrid instrument using 
representative and direct democracy. It allows people to choose in which 
cases they want to have a representative (trustee or delegate) and in which 
cases they want to decide on their own. According to the concept of liquid 
democracy, citizens are able to withdraw powers from the representatives in 
certain fields in order to decide directly, so there are delegates for an unde-
fined time and for certain topics. These new forms seem to fit better into the 
demand for political participation by the citizen. It is interesting that the Pi-
rates Party in Germany is using this form of participation for inner party de-
mocracy. The withdrawal of the delegation aspect puts enormous pressure on 
the delegate to focus on his/her own constituency. At this point there will not 
be a discussion on whether this is leading to a strong form of populism. But it 
will be argued that the demand for more participation will definitely focus on 
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– Open E-innovation 
Open innovation is becoming an important development in economics as well 
as in the political system. The old Fordist mode of production was based on 
large-scale industries (Abbott in this volume). Here the consumers had little 
choice. They were part of the passive mass consumption model convinced by 
large-scale marketing strategies. In the subsequent models the influence of 
consumer choice and preferences increased. In the model that followed more 
and more “pro-sumption” and open innovation are likely to become impor-
tant (Abbot in this volume). 
The demand for openness of the political system will lead to new forms 
of open innovation. This can already be seen in new instruments collecting 
the ideas and suggestions of the people within open government, participa-
tory budgeting, neighbourhood committees etc. New Internet technologies 
and mobile phones with geo-location systems will provide an opportunity for 
a comprehensive multi-spatial suggestion box. Empowered with augmented 
reality information, people will give their advice and their ideas regarding 
numerous problems and issues in their neighbourhoods. Suggestions made by 
citizen and related to different issues and problems will enhance the knowl-
edge of public administration and politicians. Online suggestion boxes (see 
e.g. fix my street in the UK ) give permanent information about the problems 
and the demands of the citizen. This process of open innovation by the people 
can be scrutinized by other citizens. In online polls citizen can vote in favour 
or against these suggestions.  
In modern societies knowledge is becoming the main trigger for eco-
nomic and social development. Knowledge is democratised by internet access 
and in principle all sources of information are available to everybody. This 
has led to segregation of traditional authorities such as journalists, politicians 
and scientists; meanwhile the wisdom of the crowd becomes important (Su-
rowiecki 2004). The common sense reflections of the Internet become the 
new model relating decision-making to the wisdom of the crowd and to the 
needs and demands of people. 
Transparency becomes an important aspect. The knowledge gap between 
political representatives, journalists and the citizen decreases, because some 
of the audience knows more about the subject than some politicians or jour-
nalists. Crowd sourcing can generate target group-specific innovation.  
Open innovation includes a stronger focus on user profiles of customers 
and knowledge of their consumption patterns. We discussed the problems of 
piracy and data protection. Social media can be used and abused by govern-
ments, traditional lobby groups and corporations. It is used to try new ways 
of working together. 
Barack Obama’s transparency and open government programme is part 
of the open data movement led by governments mobilising digital networks 
and including the know-how of the citizen in their policies. Similar to Wiki-
pedia, a multitude of initiatives use the wisdom of the crowd and the collabo-
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ration of the citizen. Countries such as Spain, Denmark, Norway, and United 
Kingdom, as well as supranational institutions such as the European Union 
have followed these examples and opened their data bases to allow citizens to 
analyse the data.  
The new information has developed new roles for lay citizens. It seems 
to disguise the difference between political elites and ordinary citizens. The 
formerly traditional gatekeepers, the media, strongly collaborated with the 
new data journalists. Political parties are losing control of their political cam-
paigns, but also ordinary media are losing influence (Wojcik in this volume).  
Coleman and Blumler (2009) argue that direct representation based on 
paternalism will stop. Politicians will have to act under permanent scrutiny 
and subject to the exercise of accountability. The idea of counter-democracy, 
where a critical public opposes mainstream media as a means of control and 
as an instrument for mobilisation will grow. This counter-public (Nancy Fra-
ser) is obvious, and will impact the development of different mini-public 
spheres. 
 
– Multifunctional web 
There is a strong focus on hybrid systems connecting online and off-line par-
ticipation focusing on pure Internet instruments. The trend is towards the 
amalgamation of different functions in a post-personal computer era. New in-
struments include not only information and communication functions, but 
also participation in the form of symbolic demonstration, polling, and voting 
on mobile devices. This combination of information, communication and par-
ticipation can be seen in applications such as Facebook´s “like button”, where 
user can rate and vote for items, ideas etc, and e-polls in other social net-
works. The number of instant polls related to different forms of information 
on political issues and candidates will increase. 
For political parties and for government, this kind of information is also 
important for the development of new policies. Similar to what is done in 
private companies, user-profiles can be developed and policies can be better 
targeted towards certain groups. With new data-mining processes, this infor-
mation can enhance the policy making process.  
The Internet allows tailor-made targeted messages and it also allows vi-
rality and broad outreach among stakeholders, where the sender and recipient 
can interact. 
There will be amalgamation of online and offline worlds. Hartzog points 
out that in the future the distinction between off-line and online will become 
obsolete. The disappearance of the computer shows that the new technology 
is a sustainable innovation. “The most profound technologies are those that 
disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they 
are indistinguishable from it.” (Weiser 1991: 94-104). But as a qualification 
of democracy, the new online technologies will have to include offline, 
“face-to-face” democracy. The future of democracy will not be positioned in 
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a pure online cyber-democracy, but in a blended democracy combining the 
best of the two worlds. 
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2. Political mobilization and social networks. 
The example of the Arab spring  
Pippa Norris                  
The Arab uprisings rocked the foundations of deeply-entrenched autocracies 
in many Arab states, generating after-shocks rippling out as far as Beijing 
and Moscow. In Tunisia, President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, replaced by 
an elected coalition government of the Islamist Ennahda and the left-wing Et-
takatol parties. The Egyptian uprisings led to the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) victory in parliament, although government 
power remains with the military. In Yemen, President Ali Abdallah Saleh has 
agreed to stand down and the regime transition continues to unfold. Libya 
saw bloody civil war, the death of Gaddafi, and governance by the interim 
National Transitional Council. Seeking to prevent similar events in Bahrain, 
Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah unleashed Saudi security forces to repress 
Shia unrest. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad used even greater brutality, 
deploying mortar shells against civilians. For decades, authoritarian regimes 
in the Arab world had seemed immune from change, apparently impervious 
to the third wave of democratization sweeping the rest of the world, and un-
touched by the color revolutions in Eastern Europe. Scholars had previously 
sought to explain the puzzle of the robustness of authoritarianism in the Mid-
dle East (Bellin 2004, Diamond 2010). The Arab uprisings therefore caught 
most seasoned observers by surprise, generating widespread speculation 
about their causes. 
In seeking to explain these events, numerous commentators have empha-
sized the role of information and communications technologies. The expan-
sion of access to social media platforms such as Facebook, MySpace, Twit-
ter, and YouTube is widely believed to have facilitated contentious politics in 
the region, with the capacity to undermine autocratic control of the airwaves 
and the streets. This claim gains plausibility from the way that the Middle 
East has experienced a massive wave of technological change since Al 
Jazeera launched in 1996, with access to satellite television, mobile cellular 
telephones, and social media platforms spreading faster than an oil slick in 
the Gulf. Although highly visible, especially to Western commentators, the 
impact of social media may have been exaggerated compared with many 
other deep-rooted causes of contentious politics and popular uprisings. 
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To examine these issues, part one establishes the theoretical framework. 
This chapter theorizes that social media could potentially have four functions 
for mass uprisings: informational (spreading knowledge, awareness, and 
news), networking (coordinating collective actions and organizing move-
ments), cultural (strengthening democratic aspirations and critical evalua-
tions of regime performance) and behavioral (reinforcing the propensity for 
citizens to engage in protest acts challenging the regime). Part two outlines 
the survey evidence used to analyze the impact of social media in several di-
verse states in the Arab region. Data is drawn from representative surveys 
conducted by Zogby Research Services in September 2011, the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project surveys in spring 2010 and spring 2011, as well as the 
2005-8 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). Part III examines this evi-
dence to determine the functions of social media for information, networking, 
cultural values, and protest politics. The conclusion summarizes the key re-
sults and considers their implications. 
2.1  Theories about the impact of social media  
Social media are understood and conceptualized here as those online tech-
nologies which allow individual citizens to communicate interactively with 
diverse networks, thereby bridging the functions of mass media, designed for 
a large-scale audience, and personal media, designed for one-to-one commu-
nications. The most popular social networking platforms are exemplified by 
the global brands of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube sites, and local equiva-
lents, such as Koora.com, Yallakora.net, and Myegy.com. These reflect the 
public face of social media. Information and news is also spread through so-
cial media channels even more widely and in a less structured fashion by a 
mélange of online blogs, websites, crowdsourcing, photo sharing and text 
messaging, transmitted through mobile cellular phones, laptops, netbooks, 
and tablet devices, and feeding into the aggregating platforms. The term ‘so-
cial media’ is used here to include the use of both online platforms and chan-
nels. They supplement and bridge the use of personal media, exemplified by 
one-to-one conversations by telephone, individual text messages to family 
and friends, and face-to-face interactions, and also mass media, including 
traditional one-to-many mediums such as newspapers and broadcast televi-
sion and radio. Before the rise of social media, even though there could al-
ways be some overlap (such as letters to newspapers, radio call-in programs, 
or water-cooler discussion of TV), it was usually easier for analysts to distin-
guish the original source, the primary channel of communications, and the 
recipients of information flows. In the contemporary communication envi-
ronment, however, interactive multiplatform generate a mélange where in-
formation flows back and forth in multiple directions and traditional bounda-
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ries overlap and dissolve; for example, newspapers publish live blogs and 
readers’ comments, YouTube phone video appears on the BBC World News, 
tweets provide live news ticker-feeds for niche topics, and friends share 
comments and links to mainstream media sources and blogs through Face-
book networks. New ‘Big Data’ mining techniques are still evolving to make 
sense of the plethora of digital messages, tweets, uploaded videos and blogs 
in online social communications. 
The role of social media in the Arab uprisings can be unraveled by disen-
tangling a series of steps in the communication process, namely, to para-
phrase Harold Lasswell (1936), who (the communicator), said what (the mes-
sage), through what channels (the medium), to whom (the receiver), and (in 
particular) with what type of effects (impacts). The extensive literature on 
civic engagement, political communications, and contentious politics in 
Western societies has distinguished several different types of potential effects 
arising from media (Earl et al. 2010). Drawing upon this literature, this study 
conceptualizes and distinguishes four separate functions which social media 
could have played in the Arab uprisings:  
 
– Informational, where social media function as a source of news about 
contemporary events occurring within and outside of each society; 
– Networking, where social media are used to reduce the transaction costs 
of coordinating collective action; 
– Cultural, where social media have the capacity to reinforce democratic 
aspirations and also public disaffection with regime performance; and 
lastly, 
– Behavioral, by strengthening the propensity to engage in protest activ-
ism.  
 
These functions overlap but they should be treated as analytically distinct; for 
example, people using YouTube and Facebook can learn about events in 
Egypt and Syria, but this awareness may have little impact upon their will-
ingness to engage in risky demonstrations. Similarly dissident leaders can 
deploy text-messages, tweets and Facebook posts to coordinate strategies and 
organize activities among activist elites, without necessarily managing to 
mobilize the general public. 
Null hypothesis 
At the same time, a more cautious or skeptical perspective suggests that con-
temporary commentators in Western societies may have exaggerated the cul-
tural impact of social media on the Arab uprisings. Anderson (2011) cautions 
that far from a single cause, despite some superficial similarities, the complex 
series of events and outcomes of the uprisings differed in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya, defying a common explanation. The reaction of regimes to popular 
unrest, including the use of concession and repression, also differs sharply in 
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each of these countries, as well as among the Gulf States. Similarly, Totten 
(2012) regards the upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria as concur-
rent but distinct phenomena, despite attempts to see commonalities. News of 
Tunisia’s success in rapidly ousting President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 
January 2011 cascaded rapidly to other peoples in the region with shared 
grievances, providing inspiration for domestic movements. Nevertheless the 
outcomes elsewhere failed to follow the Tunisian model, generating pro-
longed instability in Egypt, the long civil war and post-conflict chaos in 
Libya, and outright bloody repression in Syria. From this perspective, mass 
protests have been triggered by diverse structural causes within each society; 
Mubarak’s downfall can be attributed to schisms, defections, and in-fighting 
among leaders within the Egyptian ruling elite. Gaddafi’s grip over Libya 
may have been weakened by deep-rooted tribal grievances, with the rebellion 
aided by the military and diplomatic interventions of the international com-
munity. The subsequent repression of popular uprisings in Syria and Bahrain 
could be explained by snowball contagion effect, and the weaker role of the 
international community, as regimes quickly learnt the lessons of the Tuni-
sian revolution and responded with mortar rockets and guns.  
In Western societies, the research literature has conventionally explained 
engagement in protest politics by individual resources (such as cognitive 
skills) and motivational attitudes (such as feelings of external efficacy) which 
encourage individuals to engage in demonstrations, along with the contextual 
structure of opportunities, such as political institutions (Norris 2002, Nor-
ris/Walgrave/Van Aelst 2004, Dalton 2004). In addition the extensive litera-
ture analyzing the general drivers of civil unrest and internal conflict else-
where in the world, notably research at the World Bank by Collier and Sam-
banis (2005), also suggests that a wide range of complex underlying factors, 
including ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’, usually contribute towards popular upris-
ings and civil wars. Prime suspects which may have contributed towards the 
Arab uprisings include, amongst others, grievances arising from long-
standing economic problems, unemployment and the ‘youth’ bulge, the ef-
fects of the ‘resource curse’ on state-capture and rentier behavior in mineral-
rich states, the role of international pressures and also regional diffusion ef-
fects, the gradual spread of democratic cultural values during the third wave 
era, public disgust about kickback, patronage, and nepotism in the public sec-
tor, and divisions among factions within the security forces and ruling elites 
(for a discussion, see Bellin 2012). Poor economic performance, in particular, 
is widely believed to fuel a popular sense of grievance among those who suf-
fer in any society. The combination of low rates of income growth, youth un-
employment, and enduring poverty common in many Arab states is believed 
to foster popular discontent against the governing regime. Rapid economic 
change (positive or negative) is expected to intensify group competition for 
scarce resources, leading groups to support rebellion (Newman 1991, Hewitt/ 
Wilkenfeld/Gurr 2011). From the more skeptical perspective, therefore social 
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media may function to sustain and facilitate collective action, but this is only 
one channel of communications amongst many, and processes of political 
communications cannot be regarded as a fundamental driver of unrest com-
pared with many other structural factors, such as corruption, hardship, and 
repression. 
2.2 Evidence and research design 
Communication studies analyzing the contents and effects of traditional mass 
media and social media reply upon the standard tools of case-studies, content 
analysis of sources, social surveys of users, and quasi-experimental research 
designs. Case studies have been employed to describe unfolding events in 
each country, and the way that mainstream and social media covered these 
events. It is more difficult to establish systematic comparative evidence 
which content analyzes social media during each of the Arab uprisings, given 
the multiple platforms and channels used in a fragmented media environ-
ment. Nevertheless studies have started to document these issues, such as the 
daily volume of Tweets, Facebook postings, YouTube videos, and other 
online social media coverage presenting information about the uprisings in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Howard/Hussain 2011, Lotan et al. 2011, Salem/ 
Mourtada 2011). Previous research has also examined surveys monitoring 
levels of access and use of social media in several Middle Eastern states (Sa-
lem/Mourtada 2011, Zogby 2011). Case-studies of the Egyptian and Tunisian 
revolutions have described how news spread rapidly through social media 
networks, informing local people directly about events, as well as cascading 
through myriad mainstream news media to audiences around the world (Sa-
lem/Mourtada 2011, Wolman 2012). 
Representative social surveys which monitored social and political atti-
tudes across countries, as well as patterns of mainstream and social media 
use, were once scarce in the region. Fortunately survey data has become more 
easily available during the last decade, due to the efforts of the Arab-
Barometer, the Gallup World Poll, the WVS, the Pew Global Attitudes Pro-
ject, and related research initiatives. No single survey provides all the infor-
mation needed for analysis, however, so this study combines three sources. 
This includes representative surveys conducted by Zogby Research Services 
in six Middle Eastern countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Ara-
bia, UAE and Iran), with fieldwork in November 2011 among 4,100 respon-
dents. The Zogby survey monitored Internet penetration and use of both so-
cial and mass media (Zogby 2011). This study also analyzes the Pew Re-
search Center Global Attitudes Project, an annual survey from 2002-2011 
which also monitors the use of digital communications in 22 nations, includ-
ing in Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. Fieldwork was conducted by Pew 
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during spring 2010, prior to the start of the Arab uprisings, and again in 
spring 2011. Trends over time during the last decade can also be examined by 
drawing upon the annual series of Pew surveys conducted from 2002 until 
early 2011. Lastly to analyze cultural and behavioral effects associated with 
use of the Internet in many countries worldwide, this study draws upon the 
2005-7 fifth wave of the WVS, covering around sixty nations worldwide, in-
cluding in Iran, Iraq, Morocco and Turkey. Analysis needs to control for a 
number of micro-level and macro-level characteristics; it is well-established 
that Internet users often differ in their social characteristics and demographic 
background, usually proving younger, more educated and more affluent than 
the general population. Newspaper readers also typically prove more edu-
cated and more affluent than the general population, while in middle-income 
countries, at least, television viewers generally provide a broader and more 
representative cross-section of society. Multivariate analysis therefore needs 
to control for these characteristics. 
The analysis of Middle Eastern societies available through these surveys 
does not cover the whole region although the comparison does include coun-
tries which differ in their geographic locations, sectarian and religious divi-
sions, levels of economic and human development, historical and colonial 
traditions, experience of autocracy and democratization, access to communi-
cation and information technologies, reservoirs of oil and mineral resources, 
and relations with the international community. Countries also differ in their 
contemporary types of regimes, including traditional absolute monarchies, 
one-man dictatorships, electoral democracies, theocracies, fragile states, and 
military-backed oligarchies. Comparisons of Internet activism in the WVS 
survey can also be made with a range of post-industrial and developing socie-
ties elsewhere. 
2.3 The impact and role of social media 
The impact and the role of social media is debated. As we have seen social 
media fulfill four different functions. 
The information functions of social media 
The influence of social media as one of the channels used by dissidents for 
the diffusion of information about events during the uprisings seems almost 
beyond dispute, and this is also the most straightforward and limited claim. 
Just as the American revolution helped to inspire radical insurrection in 
France, so breaking news, images and stories of the successful Tunisian revo-
lution, overthrowing the 24 year long dictatorship of Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali 
in just one heady month, are believed to have inspired contagious optimism 
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about the potential for regime change in Arab countries sharing similar iden-
tities, histories and cultures (Howard 2011). Social media can be regarded as 
important for transmitting current information in all societies but especially 
in authoritarian states, such as in Syria (Odugbemi/Norris 2010), where the 
intelligence services tightly control traditional state-owned terrestrial televi-
sion and radio broadcasting channels, as well as restricting content in many 
major newspapers through press regulation and the arrest of journalists criti-
cal of the regime. Social media can be expected to be less vital in societies 
such as Egypt, with a plurality of independent newspapers and more liberal 
journalistic culture, although even in this society serious threats to press free-
dom and attacks on journalists mean that social media can still be important 
as a way to bypass mainstream media. By publicizing news about repressive 
and corrupt state actions, social media can increase awareness and public dis-
affection within autocracies. Social media also feed eyewitness news updates 
to professional journalists, such as those working in Al Jazeera and BBC 
World Services, a process which then diffuses this information via the main-
stream mass media in the international community.  
Survey evidence has started to document the informational uses of social 
media in the Arab states. The rapid diffusion of access to social media across 
the region has been a remarkable phenomenon. The International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU) (2011), the main international agency responsible 
for monitoring telecommunications statistics, estimates that the world is 
home to 7 billion people, one third of whom are now using the Internet. 
Over the last five years, developing countries have increased their share of 
the world’s total number of Internet users from 44% in 2006 to 62% in 2011.1 
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 1, internet access varies across the region, with 
the highest access in the rich states of Qatar, UAE and Kuwait, and more limited 
access in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. In 2010, the ICT Development 
Index published by the International Telecommunications Union to take account 
of many dimensions of the information society ranked Qatar 44th highest 
worldwide, with Bahrain (45th) and Saudi Arabia (46th) close behind, while by 
contrast Tunisia ranked 84th, Egypt 91st, Syria 96th and Yemen ranked 127th. 
Yet today social media are spread through mobile cell phones with text and 
video facilities, as much as through conventional computers and Internet con-
nections. With 5.9 billion subscriptions, the ITU reports that global penetration 
of mobile-cellular reaches 87% of the world’s population, and 79% in the de-
veloping world. In recent years social media have also spread worldwide like 
wildfire; the Spring 2011 Pew Global Attitudes Survey covering 21 countries 
estimated that 85% own a cell phone, and networking platforms are used by 
around one quarter of respondents, including by those living in Lebanon (20%), 
Egypt (28%), Turkey (29%) and Jordan (29%) (Pew Global Attitudes Project 
                                                          
1 ITU (2011): http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf 
(2012-14-02) 
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2011). Mobile phones are ubiquitous around the world and they are widely 
used for text messaging; the Pew survey estimated that among mobile phone 
owners, on average three-quarters use the device to text, one half take pictures 
or videos, while one quarter use their phone to go online. In Egypt, for exam-
ple, Pew found that in 2010 71% owned a cell phone, of which 72% used the 
device to text, 58% to take photos or video, and 15% to go online. 
 
Figure 1:  Internet access and economic development in the Middle East 
and North Africa, 2007 
(Source: ITU; Penn World Tables). 
 
Moreover Pew reports that use of social media networking sites such as 
Facebook increased by about 6-8% from spring 2010 to spring 2011 in 
Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. This pattern will probably continue to rise in fu-
ture; young people and college graduates are particularly likely to use their 
cell phone for social networking, texting and taking photos or video. Never-
theless the penetration of specific platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, 
shows considerable variations among countries in the region. Estimates sug-
gest that by February 2012, out of 801 million Facebook users worldwide, 
around 30 million users lived in the Middle East and North Africa (3.8%).2 
                                                          
2 Socialbakers (2011). http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/?interval=last-week 
#chart-intervals (2012-14-02). 
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Yet average penetration of Facebook among countries in the region (calcu-
lated by the number of members as a proportion of the total population), var-
ied from societies with high use (see Figure 2), led by United Arab Emirates 
(57%), Qatar (51%) and Bahrain (45%), down to those where Facebook users 
were a small minority, including Libya (7%), Iraq (5%) and Yemen (2%). 
Facebook users in both Tunisia (with 3 million users or 28% penetration) and 
Egypt (with almost one million users or 12% penetration) fall between these 
extremes. Comparisons worldwide in Figure 2 also illustrates a fairly strong 
correlation between Internet users and Facebook penetration, so that affluent 
post-industrial societies such as Singapore, Norway and Iceland have high 
usage of both, while the least developed societies such as Niger, Chad and 
Guinea are marginalized from online connections. Interestingly, most Middle 
Eastern societies are relatively high in both Internet connections and Face-
book users, falling into the top-right quadrant of the scatter-gram. Thus if so-
cial media do change the political culture and propensity to protest, citizens 
in Qatar, Bahrain and UAE are some of the most connected around the globe. 
 
Figure 2:  Internet access and Facebook penetration, worldwide  
 
(Source: ITU; Penn World Tables). 
 
Even in societies where many people have access to social media, however, 
the impact of these channels should not be exaggerated; text messages on the 
cell phone in every pocket have historical roots in the radical pamphlets fuel-
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ling the American and French revolutions, the printed posters, local newspa-
pers, and mass petitions mobilizing English Chartists and working men’s as-
sociations, and the samizdat leaflets, novels, poetry, and magazines circulat-
ing in the Soviet Union. Communications are vital for information and net-
working, but it would be false to claim that social media per se are essential 
for successful radical uprisings; analogies can be drawn between events oc-
curring in Tunis, Cairo, and Tripoli during 2011 with their predecessors in 
post-communist revolutions in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw a decade ear-
lier, prior to the dawn of the mass Internet age (Way 2011). Communist re-
gimes were toppled by opposition forces following the fall of the Berlin wall 
in 1989, but these events occurred prior to mass use of the Internet, which 
only became popular in the United States beyond elite circles following 
launch of Mosaic as the first graphical web browser in 1993 and Microsoft’s 
Netscape Explorer the following year (Norris 2001). Some of the best known 
historical cases of ‘people power’ uprisings prior to the Internet age include 
those resulting in the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, mass demonstrations 
(especially organized by women and the Catholic Church) directed against 
General Pinochet’s rule in Chile, outbreaks of ‘people power’ in the Philip-
pines overthrowing President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the anti-apartheid 
struggles leading to its abolition and the 1993 democratic elections in South 
Africa, and demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in Iran (Bermeo 
2003, Drache 2008, Roberts/Ash 2009). In Western societies, protest activ-
ism expanded in popularity during the 1960s and 1970, the golden age of 
broadcast TV, and mass engagement in peaceful demonstrations has contin-
ued to rise in subsequent decades (Norris 2002). 
 
Table 1:  General use of news sources 
 Tunisia Egypt Lebanon Jordan Saudi
Arabia
UAE Iran 
MASS MEDIA        
Satelite television networks 65 76 43 42 32 28   0 
National or local television networks 20 41 85 62 58 56 53 
Newspapers 13 14 13 27 33 48 57 
ONLINE MEDIA        
Internet new sites   9 28 19 38 24   9 29 
Social media sites such as Face-
book, Twitter
62 23   9   3 10 15   3 
PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS        
Talking to friends and family 27 18 25 28 42 53 59 
Note: Q “What are the two most important ways that you can follow news and information about 
events in your country? Choose two.” 
(Source: Zogby Research Services Surveys 12-29 September 2011 N.4,205). 
 
Political mobilization and social networks 65 
 
Table 2:  News sources used to follow the Arab uprisings 
 Tunisia Egypt Lebanon Jordan Saudi
Arabia
UAE Iran 
MASS MEDIA        
Satelite television networks 82 77 54 91 73 56   8 
National or local television networks   0 39 72 23 18 15 51 
Newspapers 16 16 14 10 20 31 50 
ONLINE MEDIA        
Internet new sites 13 24 19 52 42 33 27 
Social media sites such as Face-
book, Twitter
56 26 12   6 13 20 21 
PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS        
Talking to friends and family 33 18 25 19 33 45 44 
Note: Q “What are the two most important ways that you can follow news and information about 
events in your country? Choose two.” 
(Source: Zogby Research Services Surveys 12-29 September 2011 N.4,205). 
 
Moreover social media are not the only development in communications; the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has also experienced the 
spread of pan-Arab newspapers published simultaneously in several cities, 
and the growth of satellite television networks (particularly Al-Jazeera and 
Al-Arabiya). Cosmopolitan communications are thought to have broken 
down state control of information within national borders, opening Arab so-
cieties to pluralistic forms of political debate and more critical journalistic 
commentary, as well as fostering a stronger pan-Arab identity (Ghareeb 
2000). Broadcast media have not been emphasized by many commentators 
but they may have played a more important informational role during the 
Arab uprisings than social media. In fall 2011, Zogby polls asked respon-
dents in seven countries in the MENA about the media used to follow news 
of the Arab uprisings (Zogby 2011). In all societies which were compared, 
satellite television networks emerged as the most important source of general 
news, and news about the uprisings, including in Tunisia and Egypt (see Ta-
bles 1 and 2). Indeed across the seven MENA countries included in the sur-
vey, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter proved on average 
less important as a source of information in most societies compared with 
television, newspapers, Internet news sites, and talking with friends and fam-
ily. The informational role of social media platforms during the Arab upris-
ings therefore needs to be understood as only one source within the context 
of many other interpersonal and mass communication channels, including 
face-to-face and telephone discussions with friends, family and neighbors, 
satellite TV and radio broadcasts, and print newspapers and online news web-
sites. 
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The networking functions of social media 
Social media can also play a networking and organizational function for 
leaders and elites engaged in organizing collective actions, linking messages 
among decentralized and scattered networks of dissenters, and facilitating 
street protests which sustained the popular Arab uprisings. As I predicted 
more than a decade ago now, and well before the launch of Facebook, You-
Tube and Twitter: “The characteristics of the Internet to shrink costs, maxi-
mize speed, broaden reach, and eradicate distance provide transnational ad-
vocacy networks with an effective tool for mobilization, organization and ex-
pression which can potentially maximize their leverage in the global arena … 
Digital outlets can be particularly important under authoritarian regimes, 
where protest activities and the independent news media are severely con-
strained or silenced.” (Norris 2001: 172-173). 
The rapid spread of mobile phones with text, photo and video facilities, 
combined with the easy availability of brand-name technological platforms, 
has facilitated rapid, low-cost interactive networking. For decentralized and 
scattered social movements, this has made the spread of information from so-
cial media more ubiquitous, fast, and more independent of state censorship 
and control than ever before. During the 1968 civil unrest and demonstrations 
outside the Chicago Democratic National Convention, for example, violent 
riots were broadcast to the rest of the world mainly through journalists work-
ing for CBS and NBC. Demonstrators chanted that ‘the whole world is 
watching’ but most American witnessed this was through the lens of network 
television. During the recent ‘Occupy’ movement, by contrast, every activist 
with a mobile cellular phone had become a potential eye-witness reporter of 
events. Howard (2011) quotes one Egyptian activist about why digital media 
proved so important to the organization of political unrest. “We use Facebook 
to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the 
world.” The potential consequences for protest activists engaged in collective 
action, mobilizing and organizing promises to be profound – especially in 
autocratic states which control and censor channels of mass broadcasting. 
Many commentators therefore suggest that social media accelerated conten-
tious politics in the region, through information and networking, thereby 
helped to facilitate and sustain collective action among dissident mass move-
ments, without social media functioning as a primary driver or long-term 
cause of the Arab uprisings (Howard 2011). 
Thus a number of scholars have argued that social media played a critical 
role by networking scattered groups of protestors, facilitating collective ac-
tion. This is a more demanding use of the social media than simply surveying 
news and information, as it involves an organizational component which 
aims at actions, for example announcing meeting places and times for rallies, 
demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience, or coordinating tactical re-
sponses, such as recording and uploading mobile phone videos with images 
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of the regime crack-downs. The report by the Project on Information Tech-
nology and Political Islam, by Howard et al. (2011), argues that online media 
caused a cascade of civil disobedience to spread among populations living 
autocratic rule, as well as providing unique new means of civic organizing. 
Other observers about recent events in the Middle East have come to similar 
conclusions. The spread of social media, Bellin (2012) suggests, is a ‘game-
changer’ which authoritarian regimes worldwide will need to heed in future if 
they seek to remain in power. Social media can promote the deliberate diffu-
sion of ideas, especially sharing tactics and repertoires of civil disobedience 
through transnational networks of activists, as well as facilitating copycat 
protests imitating events elsewhere in the region and within each society. 
Lynch (2011) argues that dramatic changes in the information environment 
over the last decade have transformed individual competencies, especially 
expanding the ability for citizens to organize collective action, as well as fa-
cilitating the transmission of local information to the international stage. 
Commentators note that the ubiquity of cell phone video cameras and text 
messaging, combined with online social platforms and related secondary 
news websites, allow insurgents to coordinate their actions more rapidly and 
on a larger scale than before these tools existed (Shirky 2011). Analysis of 
Twitter and Facebook content by Howard and Hussain (2011) concluded 
“Social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab 
Spring…[The evidence] suggests that social media carried a cascade of mes-
sages about freedom and democracy across North Africa and the Middle 
East, and helped raise expectations for the success of political uprising. Peo-
ple who shared interest in democracy built extensive social networks and or-
ganized political action. Social media became a critical part of the toolkit for 
greater freedom.” (see also Howard 2010, 2011, Lotan 2011). The network-
ing function can be examined most thoroughly by case-studies documenting 
the use of online channels by parties, social movements and activists, as well 
as content analysis of Twitter feeds, Facebook posts, and the blogosphere 
(see, for example, Wolman 2012). 
 
Table 3: Most popular uses of social media, Tunisia and Egypt  
 Facebook users Twitter users 
 Tunisia Egypt Tunisia Egypt 
Communication with family and friends 59 59 18 15 
Meeting new people 33 35 15 17 
Expressing my views 45 53 30 31 
Getting news or information 62 57 44 32 
Becoming involved in politics 20 33 22 18 
Professional networking 21 26 25 22 
(Source: Zogby Research Services Online Surveys, 13-15 September 2010, N. 1133). 
 
68 Pippa Norris 
 
To provide an idea about the general scope of these activities among the mass 
public, we can examine Zogby Research Services online surveys of the Inter-
net population in Tunisia and Egypt, conducted during September 2010. Re-
spondents were asked about their uses of Facebook and Twitter, including the 
range of functions illustrated in Table 3. The results show that among online 
users, the most popular function of these social media platforms is communi-
cating with friends and family, expressing views, getting news and informa-
tion, and meeting people. At the same time, roughly one fifth to one third of 
respondents in both countries found that social media platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter were very helpful for becoming involved in politics. 
Similarly when asked about common activities, members of Facebook in Tu-
nisia and Egypt emphasized that they ‘frequently’ communicated directly 
with friends (58%), read other people’s posts (53%), and posted information 
(36%). By contrast only 16% frequently used Facebook to connect with 
groups or organizations. There is a fine line between spreading awareness 
and networking activists, and social media seems to fulfill both functions 
among many online users, although in general the political uses of social me-
dia are less popular among users than the more purely social functions.3 
 
The cultural function of social media 
Did social media also have a distinct impact upon cultural values during the 
Arab uprisings? In particular, did exposure to social media strengthen support 
for democratic values and dissatisfaction with regime performance, thereby 
reinforcing attitudes which encourage upheavals against autocracy? To un-
derstand this issue, this study builds upon the ideas of congruence theory 
originally developed by Harry Eckstein (1961) and expanded elsewhere in 
previous work (Norris 2011). Where citizens’ preferences match the type of 
regime in power, congruence theory predicts that institutional arrangements 
will prove long-lasting. A sense of popular legitimacy implies that the core 
institutions of the regime are widely regarded as appropriate. Even if citizens 
dislike specific leaders, feel unhappy with the regime’s policy performance, 
or disagree vehemently with certain government decisions, nevertheless due 
to feelings of legitimacy citizens still accept the authority of office-holders. 
Popular legitimacy helps autocracies to maintain control peacefully, for ex-
ample if citizens defer to rule by traditional monarchs, religious authorities, 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that in a survey was conducted by the Dubai School of Government in 
March 2011 among a small sample (N.231) of self-selected respondents using Facebook in 
Egypt and Tunisia. When asked about the main use of Facebook during early-2011, roughly 
one third of the respondents replied that that Facebook had been used to raise awareness in-
side the country on the causes of the uprisings, while one third thought that it had spread in-
formation to the world about the movements. By contrast 22% in Tunisia and 29% in Egypt 
thought that Facebook had helped organize actions and mobilize activists. Salem, Fadi and 
Racha Mourtada. 2011. ‘Arab Social Media Report: Civil Movements: The Impact of Face-
book and Twitter.’ Arab Social Media Report. 1(2). Dubai School of Government. 
http://www.dsg.ae 
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and ‘strong-man’ leaders. Legitimacy is not essential for repressive regimes, 
however, since the threat, fear, or actual deployment of coercive methods of 
control through the security forces are available to rulers. If strongly chal-
lenged by poplar unrest and maintaining the loyalty of the military, rulers can 
call the army out of the barracks. On the other hand, if there are marked dis-
parities between expectations and perception of regime performance, then 
this is expected to undermine regime support, to destabilize the state, and to 
provide the conditions most favorable to popular uprisings (Norris 1999, 
2011). Previous work has identified the phenomenon of ‘critical citizens’ 
(Norris 1999, 2011), a group likely to express strong support for the princi-
ples or ideals of democracy, and also relatively critical in their evaluations of 
how well their government performs in practice, thereby displaying a sub-
stantial ‘democratic deficit’ in their orientations. If those who use social me-
dia display an above average ‘democratic deficit’, this would suggest that the 
effect of the spread of social media in the region is not simply informational 
and organizational in collective action, but that it can also reinforce cultural 
values which are conducive to participation in popular protest movements.  
 
Table 4:  Disapproval of economic performance 
 Egypt Jordan Lebanon Turkey All 
Social media users 58 50 69 61 59 
Not users 75 64 73 56 67 
Difference -17  -14  -4 +5 -8 
Note: “Do you ever use online social networking sites like Facebook?” “How good a job is the 
(country government doing in dealing with the economy?” % ‘Somewhat bad’ and ‘Very bad’. 
(Source: The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project survey spring 2010. N.3,915.). 
 
Table 5:  Dissatisfaction with the future direction of the country 
 Egypt Jordan Lebanon Turkey All 
Social media users 51 56 85 66 64 
Not users 75 68 89 59 73 
Difference -24  -12  -4 +7 -9 
Note: “Do you ever use online social networking sites like Facebook?” “Overall, are you satis-
fied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the country today?” % ‘dissatisfied’. 
(Source: The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project survey spring 2010. N.3,915). 
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Table 6:  Attitudes towards democracy 
 Egypt Jordan Lebanon Turkey All 
Social media users 61 72 84 87 77 
Not users 61 72 84 87 77 
Difference   0   0   0   0   0 
Note: “Do you ever use online social networking sites like Facebook?” “Which of these three 
statements is closest to you own opinion? Democracy is preferable to any other kind of govern-
ment. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. For someone like 
me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.” % ‘Democracy ist preferable to any 
other kind of government’. 
(Source: The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project survey spring 2010. N.3,915). 
 
To examine the survey evidence available to test this proposition, we can 
draw upon the Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project survey in 
spring 2010 which asked a representative sample of the general population in 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey about their use of social media plat-
forms such as Facebook and several items monitoring political attitudes. The 
descriptive attitudes in Tables 4-6 provide an indication of whether the cul-
tural values of social media users in these countries differ from the rest of the 
population.4 The measures provide an indication of cultural attitudes in sev-
eral diverse countries from the region in spring 2010, before the events in 
Tunisia, including retrospective evaluations of the government’s economic 
performance, prospective expectations about the future direction of the coun-
try, and support for democratic principles. In Egypt, Jordan and the Lebanon, 
social media users proved to be slightly more positive in their evaluations of 
the performance of the economy (Table 4), and also more hopeful in their ex-
pectations about the future direction of their country (Table 5), although in 
Turkey social media users proved more negative on these issues. In all the 
countries under comparison in the Pew survey social media users and non-
users proved identical in their support for democracy as the most preferable 
form of government (Table 6). Thus far from the online population proving 
more disaffected, in fact overall they tended to be slightly more positive than 
the general population. Clearly both attitudes and the population using social 
media are likely to have changed during 2011, following the onset of the 
Arab uprisings, and further analysis is needed as events unfolded, but never-
theless the cultural attitudes of those who used social media prior to the up-
heavals was not one most conducive to reinforcing critical citizens. 
 
 
                                                          
4 It should be noted that because the socioeconomic variables contained in the Pew survey 
dataset are not internationally standardized across countries, it is not possible to use the 
data for multivariate analysis controlling for education, income and related characteristics 
of the online population. 
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The Internet and protest activism 
Unfortunately the Zogby and Pew surveys cannot direct evidence that users 
of social media were more willing to engage in protest politics. Here we can 
turn instead to broader characteristics of the online population by analyzing 
the 2005-7 5th wave of the WVS, which included measures of use of mass 
media, the Internet and personal communications, as well as a rich battery of 
items monitoring political values and experience of protest activism. Not all 
users of the Internet necessarily tap into social media, and vice versa. Never-
theless Internet use is a proxy measure for the impact of new technologies, as 
shown by the strong correlation (R2 = 0.688) in Figure 2 between Internet ac-
cess and Facebook penetration. The fifth wave of the WVS also surveyed 
several countries from the region, including Iran, Iraq, Morocco and Turkey. 
When data becomes available, the sixth wave of the survey, conducted in 
2010-12, will eventually provide more definitive evidence about cultural 
changes in the region and worldwide. 
The survey measures reported experience of some of the most common 
types of protest politics which are standard in survey research (Barnes/Kaase 
1979), including a scale monitoring joining a lawful demonstration, signing a 
petition, and boycotting consumer products. Factor analysis showed that these 
items formed one dimension (Norris 2011). The multilevel models entered the 
standard controls associated with use of the media, protest activism, and politi-
cal attitudes, including age, sex, household income, education, democratic 
knowledge (all at micro-level) and the society’s historical experience of de-
mocracy during the third wave era (at macro level). To monitor the effects of 
cultural attitudes, the models entered democratic satisfaction and democratic 
aspirations, as well as the indicators of use of newspapers, TV and radio news, 
and the Internet. The results in Table 7 show that the demographic characteris-
tics behaved in the expected fashion; today, following the normalization of pro-
test politics, older groups slightly more likely to engage in protest politics than 
the younger generation. As reported elsewhere, the greater propensity of the 
young to demonstrate has gradually faded over time, as protest politics moved 
mainstream (Norris/Walgraave/van Aelst 2004). There is still a residual gender 
gap, with men slightly more likely than women to engage in this form of politi-
cal expression. Education has a strong effect on protesting, confirming the pat-
tern reported in numerous previous studies. The cognitive skills, capacities, and 
information provided by formal schooling makes it easier for citizens to make 
sense of complex issues and government processes, and thus to follow public 
affairs and to become engaged. Education also strengthens organizational 
skills. Not surprising, in a related finding, those who were more knowledgeable 
about the principles of liberal democracy were also more likely to be protest ac-
tivists. Household income is also closely related to educational qualifications, 
as well as providing financial resources and flexible leisure which can facilitate 
engagement, and the results confirm that the more affluent sectors were also 
more likely to participate through these channels. 
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Table 7:  The impact of media use on protest activism  
(Source: World Values Survey 2005-7). 
 
The cultural indicators also performed in the predicted direction, with protest 
stronger among those with strong democratic aspirations, and among those 
who were less satisfied with the actual democratic performance of their re-
gime. This analysis provides further confirmation of the pattern in post-
industrial nations reported by Dalton (2004); adherence to democratic values 
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strengthens the propensity to demonstrate and to become engaged through 
unconventional channels. At societal or macro-level, protest politics was also 
far more common in countries with extensive experience of liberal democ-
racy. Democratic states with a long tradition of freedom of expression, free-
dom of association, and respect for human rights facilitate the peaceful use of 
demonstrations and other lawful forms of direct action as a regular part of the 
political process. After including all these controls, the models show that use 
of all forms of media communications were significantly linked with experi-
ence of protest politics. Moreover the strongest effects on activism were 
demonstrated from use of the Internet, while newspapers proved the next 
most important, and use of television and radio news exerted a weaker influ-
ence. Thus, contrary to theories of media malaise, use of the Internet encour-
ages political engagement through protest politics, as does use of the main-
stream mass media.  
2.4 Conclusions and Implications 
Several major findings emerge from this study. First, the evidence from 
Zogby surveys confirms that peoples in the region do draw upon social me-
dia for information and networking, but the role of social media in the Arab 
uprisings should not be exaggerated. This channel supplements personal 
communications and mass media; when asked about news sources used to 
follow the Arab uprisings, television broadcasts (especially satellite net-
works such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabya) emerged as more popular than 
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This pattern was evi-
dent in Tunisia and Egypt as well as the rest of the region. Moreover, in the 
societies under comparison, at least prior to the revolutions, the Pew survey 
data suggests that social media users were not particularly radical in their 
political orientations; instead users proved identical to non-users in their 
democratic aspirations, and social media users were less negative than non-
users in their evaluations of their government’s performance and the future 
direction of their country, not more critical. These findings need to be reex-
amined as events continue to develop, to see how attitudes evolve, but there 
is no evidence from the surveys examined that the culture of social media 
prior to the start of the uprisings was one particularly conducive towards re-
inforcing disaffection or discontent. Lastly, the World Values Survey 
(WVS) data in many societies worldwide suggests that general use of the 
news media and especially use of the Internet are significantly associated 
with engagement in protest activism, even after applying multiple controls 
for the prior social characteristics of the Internet population.  
The implications of these results need to be treated with caution; the 
Arab uprisings continue to unfold across the region so it would be premature 
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to draw any hard and fast lessons from events at this stage. The divergent 
outcomes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria suggest that 
many other factors need to be incorporated into any comprehensive under-
standing of these revolutions, such as the cohesion and unity of regime elites, 
the willingness of leaders to concede or to coerce, the loyalties and control of 
the security forces, the sequential timing of the uprisings across the region, 
the organization and resources of opposition forces, the role of the interna-
tional community, and many contingent factors which are specific to each so-
ciety. Multiple complex factors have led towards each of the uprisings and 
their aftermaths. Information flowed back and forth through diverse channels. 
The unique role attributed to social media, often highlighted by commenta-
tors, is probably exaggerated. Nevertheless in general, the evidence suggests 
that social media have contributed towards the revolutions shaking the re-
gion, by diffusing the exchange of information, networking activists and dis-
sident movements, and reinforcing the propensity towards engaging in elite-
challenging protests and acts of civil disobedience directed against autocratic 
regimes.  
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3. Social media                       
Jason Abbott                     
The capabilities, platforms, tools and websites we associate with the term social 
networks are now so ubiquitous and commonplace that it is hard to believe they 
are all less than a decade old. Myspace was founded in 2003, Facebook and 
Flickr in 2004 and Twitter and YouTube in 2005. In the short space of time 
since then social networking, video/picture sharing and ‘tweeting’ have become 
arguably the defining feature of contemporary Internet usage. Moreover tools 
that were designed to facilitate innocuous conversation and social interaction 
have had unforeseen political impacts. Nowhere was this more visible than dur-
ing the 2011 uprisings across the Arab World. From Tunis to Cairo, and Tripoli 
to Damascus, protest movements against authoritarian rule openly utilized so-
cial networking and file sharing tools to publicize and organize demonstrations 
and to catalogue human rights abuses (Norris in this volume). The Arab Spring, 
or Jasmine Revolution, as the events were dubbed, was an event that was both 
witnessed and played out in real time online. Six months later the same applica-
tions and tools played a pivotal role in the organization of worldwide anti-
capitalist protests. Beginning with Occupy Wall Street, the Occupy Movements 
galvanized an array of disparate social movements to thrust questions of in-
come inequality and government bail-outs of banks and other financial institu-
tions firmly onto the political agenda. Notable among the protestors were sev-
eral ‘veterans’ of the Arab Spring (Blumenthal, 2011) as well as displays of 
solidarity for Occupy Wall Street in Egypt’s Tahir Square (Gentile 2011). So 
what are social networks in the Internet? What are the principal characteristics 
associated with it? Is it transformative and if so how? 
3.1 Social networks: The Internet Reloaded 
Social networks (or social networks, SNS) are communities connected in the 
world wide web to communicate and collaborate (Kersting in this volume). 
Some refer to the social networks as web 2.0, a concept first coined at a software 
convention around 2004 to hype up a new range of products and applications 
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(O’Reilly 2005). Web 2.0 is used to be describe a marked sea-change or quan-
tum leap in the accessibility of the Internet that has seen the number of users 
growing from an estimated 45 million worldwide in 1995 to over a billion global 
users within a decade. Tim Berners-Lee, the man who first developed the ad-
dress protocols that created the now familiar www pre-fixes to nearly all web-
sites, has dismissed the notion of Web 2.0, however as nothing more than jargon 
(Anderson 2006). For Berners-Lee the web was always an interactive space de-
signed to connect people. What did change however was the development of 
javascript and Ajax software. The former enabled websites to be more dynamic, 
to include animation, streaming of video, to validate forms and so forth while 
the latter enabled applications to send and retrieve data from a server. Combined 
the two programs allowed websites to evolve from being mostly read-only to the 
interactive read and write format that has become the norm today. In other 
words the transition from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 came with the development of a 
much more participatory social, ‘user-generated’ Web. The result, to quote Tap-
scott and Williams (2010: 45), “is that the Web is no longer about idly surfing 
and reading, listening or watching, its about peering, sharing, socializing, col-
laborating and most of all creating within loosely connected communities” 
3.2 Here comes everybody – the rise of produsage and 
the produser 
One of the most striking features of the development and proliferation of appli-
cations, tools and services associated with this user-generated web is the trans-
formative effect that it is having upon the public at large. Some argue (Bruns 
2009, Rheingold 2003, Shirky 2008, Tapscott/Williams 2010; Toffler 1990) that 
the overall impact is a radical transformation of existing models of production 
and consumption away from the mass production and passive mass consumption 
model. The prominent futurist Alvin Toffler, dubbed the emergence of more 
flexible production and greater concern with customization prosumption, Bruns 
argues that in this model the consumer still remained subordinate in the process 
free merely to exercise “more advanced consumption skills” (Bruns 2009: 11).  
In contrast the rise of the Internet is radically transformative since consum-
ers can now, and are already, becoming active producers of content and dis-
tributors of information. Consequently consumers and audiences are no longer 
merely passive but now active and participatory, able to communicate opinions, 
express ideas and creativity. Coupled with the development of peer to peer and 
commons based production the consumer is transformed into what Bruns de-
fines as a hybrid user/producer role he calls produser. Already the Internet and 
social media are replete with examples of such produsage from open source 
software, of which Linux is the most famous, to the development of the online 
encyclopedia, Wikipedia and the California Open Source Textbook project. 
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Tapscott and Williams (2010) define this shift to peer production as one “that 
relies on self-organizing, egalitarian communities of individuals who come to-
gether voluntarily to produce a shared outcome ... [combining] elements of hi-
erarchy and self-organization and … meritocratic principles of organization” 
(67). Everywhere such produsage is challenging existing industries but no-
where more so than in the media and news industry. 
Under the earlier modes of production in the broadcast media consumers 
(as viewers, listeners or readers) had very little means of responding to what 
they saw and heard or even of accessing media on their own1. Today in the 
new ‘networked’ model producers and users are merely “equal nodes in an 
information network which empowers users to build their own communities” 
(Bruns 2009: 14). Traditional roles (the editor, the journalist, the columnist, 
the producer) and functions (e.g. gatekeepers), are now being transformed 
and overturned as blogs, podcasts, photo and video sharing sites, and live 
streaming now mean that “every new user is a potential creator and con-
sumer, and an audience whose members can cooperate directly with one an-
other, many to many, is a former audience” (Shirky 2008: 106-7). For the 
cheerleaders and evangelists of this transformation what we are witnessing is 
nothing less than increased democratization; both in terms of freedom to pro-
duce and the increased freedom of speech that accompanies that. 
In order to explore these impacts in greater detail this chapter will ex-
plore the social and political impact of the growth of this participatory revo-
lution. In particular it will focus on the developments and opportunities cre-
ated by new forms of individual and collective action. An analysis of all the 
applications, platforms, tools and services that comprise this user-generated 
web is well beyond the scope of a single chapter, thus for purposes of brevity 
and clarity the chapter will draw attention to the following: the impact of so-
cial media networking services such as Facebook and Twitter; the growth of 
blogging and the subsequent rise of Citizen Journalism; and collaborative 
knowledge production (epitomized in the phenomenon that is Wikipeida). Fi-
nally the chapter will address whether the cumulative impact of these is trans-
forming the nature of civic engagement and participation in such a way that it 
is leading to the emergence of mechanisms for deliberative democracy.  
3.3 Blogging and the advent of Citizen Journalism 
Of all the applications associated with social media the oldest is the weblog 
or blog as it is now uniformly referred to. Although it is difficult to be precise 
                                                          
1 In the sense that the common model of broadcast media was of a limited number of nation-
wide broadcasters (‘networks’) paid for by public spending, license fees, and/or commercial 
advertisements.  Choice was severely restricted until the advent of cable television which 
itself required sizable subscription fees. 
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when blogging first emerged, since tech savvy activists, scientists and stu-
dents began writing and publishing online diaries and adding hypertext links 
quite early in the development of the Internet, the term weblog was first 
coined in 1997 by Jorn Warden to describe a list of links that traced his 
online meanderings (Wortham 2007). In 2012 it is estimated that there are 
over 150 million blogs worldwide covering every conceivable topic, taste and 
interest. What facilitated this explosion was the evolution of tools to produce 
and maintain articles on the web that required minimal technological exper-
tise and thus meant that in practice they were accessible to all. Of particular 
importance were the creation of blog hosting websites such as LiveJournal in 
March 1999, Blogger in August 1999 and WordPress in 2003.  
The impact of this was to effectively lower the cost of publishing to zero, 
opening the way for anyone to publish their musings and thoughts online. 
The impact of this is still being felt but it is now widely acknowledged that 
the ‘mass amateurization’ of journalism and publishing (Shirky 2008) is hav-
ing profound effects on traditional models in those industries. But it is not 
only that the transaction cost of publishing has fallen. Another key distinction 
between blogs and conventional journalism is that the audience is no longer 
simply an active consumer of information. Since their inception blogs have 
incorporated links to other blogs and websites and provided opportunity for 
readers to leave comments and engage in dialogue with both the author and 
with other commentators. While cynics point out that the majority of blogs 
last less than a year, are read on average by only a handful of people, and that 
the blogosphere as a whole is “teeming with nationalism and xenophobia” 
(Morozov 2011: 83) others maintain that regardless of whether the blood-
thirsty or altruistic are empowered, the overall impact is an increase in free-
dom of speech and association (Bruns 2009; Shirky 2008).  
The precise origins of Citizen Journalism are unknown, although a case 
can be made that it far from a new phenomenon. From pamphleteers during 
the American Revolution, to the Zapruder film which famously captured the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy, amateurs have long been a feature in pro-
ducing and capturing news (Gillmor 2004). Nevertheless until the advent of 
desktop publishing, digital cameras, smartphones and the social media their 
number and influence were extremely limited.  
Most accounts of the rise of Internet driven Citizen Journalism usually 
cite the creation of the organization Indymedia – the Independent Media cen-
ter – in 1999 as marking the definitive origin of the phenomenon2. Indymedia 
was established during the anti-World Trade Organization protests that took 
place in Seattle as a protest against the perceived bias of the mainstream me-
dia in their coverage of the events. Combining passionate volunteers, basic 
                                                          
2 Though it should be noted that much of the inspiration for Indymedia came from the suc-
cessful use of Internet based email list servers and bulletin boards by the Zapatistas follow-
ing their uprising against the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992. 
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website coding and IT knowledge and shared equipment Indymedia created a 
participatory website, an Internet radio station, and a collection of photos and 
videos of the protests that allowed activists to publicize and share alternative 
coverage of the event (Issue 2005). The success of the center resulted in ac-
tivists worldwide setting up similar sites in over a dozen different languages 
across 40 countries. One of the most striking and innovative aspects of Indy-
media’s various websites is that they are open newswires where anyone can 
publish news from their own perspective. In addition the material published 
on the sites are deemed to be both open source and a creative commons and 
thus can be freely reproduced for non-commercial purpose. 
Alternative websites and blogging aside it was only with the mass ama-
teurization of photography and video that Citizen Journalism began to make 
its presence felt to a wide public audience. The rapid diffusion of lightweight 
portable digital cameras and their subsequent incorporation into cellphones 
now means that people on the scene of an event are able to share their images 
and story with a global audience alongside the professional reporter. This was 
first vividly and tragically demonstrated during the 2004 Asian Tsunami 
when hundreds of eyewitnesses and survivors were able to rapidly share their 
images and accounts largely by utilizing the blogging infrastructure that was 
already in place. The BBC was one of the first media organizations to recog-
nize the value of these first hand accounts providing survivors with locations 
on its website where they could email these accounts and share images and 
video (BBC News Online 2004). A year later the earliest photos and videos 
from the London bombings on July 7 were also taken by ordinary citizens 
with their cellphones many of which were subsequently broadcast by the 
mainstream media, in part because camera crews were prevented from reach-
ing the site quickly for security reasons (Dunleavy 2005). Since then main-
stream media sites worldwide have accepted photos, video and text reports 
from citizen journalists worldwide. 
On a more profound level, blogging and the phenomenon of Citizen 
Journalism fundamentally challenges and undermines the commercial and in-
dustrial model of journalism by challenging both commercial and profes-
sional norms as well as the gatekeeping role that have been a core feature of 
the industry. Gatekeeping here refers to the process by which journalists and 
editors determine what stories are worth investigating and what stories are 
worth publishing, with such selections primarily driven by commercial and 
normative considerations. As Dunleavy (2005) elaborates, 
“In modern times, society has come to depend primarily on trained professionals 
to report what constitutes the news. News, in this configuration, however, has 
values which reporters, editors and photojournalists learn to prioritize, classify 
and categorize. Information is placed in a hierarchical order based on values such 
as relevancy, consequence, proximity, prominence, novelty and other values 
(n.p.)” 
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Whereas in the past, “it used to be hard to move words, images and sounds 
from creator to consumer” (Shirky 2008: 59) today the development of blogs, 
videoblogs, podcasts and the sharing of files via social media now mean that 
the amateur has the same tools available to them as the professional journalist 
and the traditional media is challenged as never before by the mass amateuri-
zation of publishing. This is eroding the professional and thus societal role of 
journalists and editors as “the institutional prerogative” (Shirky 2008: 66) of 
news is transformed into a landscape and ‘ecosystem’ of a billion editorials.  
Furthermore as discussed earlier the Internet is also transforming the role 
of the public from passive consumers of information to active and interactive 
prod-users. In the media industry the exponential growth of information read-
ily available on the Internet has now created an environment in which the 
public at large is now increasingly accustomed to searching for information, 
analysis and opinion themselves. While, as Bruns notes (2009: 72), most may 
still not be ‘at the scene’, the Asian Tsunami and London bombings revealed 
that the audience as ‘user’ now has a much greater access to “a variety of first 
hand accounts of the scene”. Furthermore formerly passive audiences are 
now much more likely to ‘fact-check’ what is reported discerning omissions 
and contractions, whether they be driven by considerations of space or by the 
commercial interests of the proprietors of the newspaper or television station. 
In past ‘news’ meant both what the press considered newsworthy as well as 
what was actually covered by the press (Shirky 2008: 64). Today however 
while editors can still choose to ‘kill’ a story this no longer necessarily sig-
nals the death of it since the news can break into public consciousness with-
out the traditional press. A good illustration of this can be found in the con-
troversy surrounding the initially limited and largely negative coverage of 
the Occupy Wall Street protests in the United States during the autumn of 
2011. 
The Occupy movement began on September 7th 2011 in Zuccotti Park, 
New York with the Occupy Wall Street movement. Initially initiated by the 
Canadian anti-consumerist activist group Adbusters (Kaste 2011) to protest 
against economic inequality and the undue influence of the financial sector 
on Western democracies, similar movements sprang up largely spontaneously 
in cities across the United States and the rest of the world throughout Sep-
tember and October. Despite the success of the movement in mobilizing 
copycat groups on a global scale there was initially comparatively little main-
stream media coverage within the United States. Indeed five days into the 
protest controversial cable news commentator Keith Olbermann lambasted 
the mainstream media for ignoring the protests (Stoeffel 2011). Olberman’s 
voice joined a growing chorus of ordinary citizens and bloggers who be-
moaned not just the limited coverage of the “the greatest social-justice 
movement to emerge in the United States since the civil rights era” (Lasn/ 
White 2011) but the largely negative and pejorative nature (Bellafante 2011; 
Crovitz 2011; Weiss 2011) of what little reportage there was. 
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There was particular outcry for example when the Washington Post pub-
lished a front-page picture of a bearded protestor allegedly tackling a police 
officer accompanied with the headline “Obama looks to harness anti-Wall St 
angst”. Interviews with the freelance photographer who took the picture and 
subsequent footage of the incident from alternative angles clearly showed 
that the man in question was trying to come to the aid of another protestor, 
Felix Rivera-Pitre, who was punched in the face by NYPD Deputy Inspector 
Johnny Cardona (Elliot 2011). Critics argued that such misrepresentation was 
an attempt to demonize the movement by trying to radicalize what had 
largely been a non-violent protest movement (Shaw 2011). Such coverage 
only changed after an Iraq war veteran was hit by a ricocheting tear gas can-
ister that rendered him unconscious (Gabbatt 2011), and when police officers 
at the University of California Davis pepper sprayed students peacefully pro-
testing in support of the Occupy movement (Gould 2011). Nevertheless 
throughout it all concerned citizens were able to find alternative sources of 
information including the coverage of events by the British newspaper The 
Guardian3 and a 15 year old non-profit TV and radio program Democracy 
Now (Stelter 2011). In addition the Occupy protestors themselves used sites 
such as Indymedia and Democratic Underground4 to post first hand accounts 
from the occupations themselves as well as maintaining live web feed, and 
social media updates, from Zuccotti Park and other cities across North Amer-
ica. This notwithstanding some mainstream journalists expressed their frus-
tration at the uneven coverage including freelance journalist Natasha Lennard 
who resigned from working with the New York Times stating: 
“If the mainstream media prides itself on reporting the facts, I have found too 
many problems with what does or does not get to be a fact – or what rises to the 
level of a fact they believe to be worth reporting – to be part of such a machine. 
Going forward, I want to take responsibility for my voice and the facts that I 
choose and relay. I want them to instigate change” (Lennard, 2011).  
 
Lennard’s announcement came after she was dropped from the Times’s roster 
following her participation in a pro-Occupy Wall Street panel. However by 
way of indication of the changed landscape of the media in the era of social 
media, Lennard was subsequently hired as a columnist for the popular online 
magazine Salon.com. Nevertheless what the above case illustrates is how the 
                                                          
3 Prior to the Occupy movement traffic from the United States to the guardian’s webpage had 
already grown to over 8.5 million visits a month making it the largest audience for the 
newspaper outside of Britain. In response to this the paper made the decision in April 2011 
to relocate several senior staff to a New York desk as well as to launch a new URL and 
front page for its US readers (Adams, 2011). When the Occupy movement began visits to 
the Guardian jumped further to over 10 million visits. 
4 Democratic Underground is an online community of progressives and Democratic party 
supporters in the United States.  Besides the usual combination of stories, columns and 
links the site also maintains extensive discussion forums on which over 50 million mes-
sages have been posted since the community was founded in 2001 
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once passive audience has now become a monitorial citizenship (Bruns 2009: 
371), able, capable and willing to highlight examples of institutional bias and 
deliberate misrepresentations, while providing alternatives to serve as neces-
sary correctives. Moreover the phenomenon of Citizen Journalism speaks to 
the growing conviction that the mainstream media no longer enjoys a mo-
nopoly on knowledge and that collectively the audience knows more on a 
subject than a specific commentator, correspondent or reporter. Indeed one 
recognition of this is that an increasing number of media outlets are now har-
nessing their audiences by providing space for comments at the end of sto-
ries, accepting video and pictures taken by ordinary people or more innova-
tively by creating citizen journalist databases of contributors or sources. In 
addition the distinction between Citizen Journalism and professional journal-
ism is becoming ever more blurred as more and more professional journalists 
are now writing blogs and using twitter outside of the organization they are 
employed by. 
3.4 Social Media and Social Networking Services 
Arguably the most visible face of social network applications and tools today 
are the social media networking sites Facebook and Twitter. While neither 
were designed to facilitate social and political organization, “savvy opposi-
tion campaigners [have] turned social media applications like Facebook from 
minor pop culture fads into a major tool of political communication” (How-
ard 2011: 4). In other words while neither Facebook nor Twitter’s role is to 
create content, they do enable and empower others to share what they create 
on a scale that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. By December 
2011 the number of Facebook users had exceeded 845 million; Twitter, 465 
million (Messieh 2012). While the average number of friends a user on Face-
book has is approximately 120, studies of social connectedness have long 
shown how our social networks can connect extremely large numbers of peo-
ple with relatively few degrees of separation. Indeed while Stanley Milgram 
may have concluded in 1967 (Milgram 1967) that it only took six intermedi-
aries to send a message between two randomly selected individuals (the in-
famous six degrees of separation), Facebook concluded from its own research 
on the 70 billion friendships between in its users that the average distance be-
tween users was a mere 4.74 (Markoff/Sengupta 2011). Such connectivity, 
and the speed with which those connections can now be utilized has given 
rise to the phenomenon of going viral – a term used to describe when a piece 
of internet content is shared at such a rapid rate that it quickly becomes ubiq-
uitous, often crossing from the new media into the traditional media and the 
public consciousness. Thus although most social media posts get relatively lit-
tle notice, some capturing the zeitgeist, go viral and have an enormous impact.  
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One of the biggest problems in analyzing such impacts is that there have 
been few cross-country studies of this phenomenon to date and the majority 
of the ones that have been conducted have been done so by commercial or-
ganizations such as the US based media research company Nielsen. Data 
from such reports however does demonstrate that new social media is having 
a growing impact on the online population globally. Nielsen found for exam-
ple that 74 per cent of the worldwide Internet population has visited a social 
network or blogging site and that users spend an average of 6 hours a month 
on such sites.  
Shirky argues that one of the most revolutionary features of social media 
is that it creates a ‘shared awareness’ of the realities of public and private 
life. In addition while the state may have ever more sophisticated tools of 
surveillance ordinary citizens also now have the ability to use similar tools 
against the state. Nowhere does this have more impact than in autocratic re-
gimes where the state “accustomed to having a monopoly on public speech 
[now] finds itself called to account for anomalies between its view of events 
and the public’s”, anomalies that are increasingly highlighted by the growing 
legion of citizen journalists and bloggers. 
Skeptics of the political impact of social media such as Morozov (2011) 
maintain that technological-savvy authoritarian governments are still capable 
of censoring these new technologies directly, or indirectly by encouraging 
self-censorship and the complicity of corporate actors. Nevertheless both 
Shirky (2008, 2010) and Howard (2011) argue that while the above may be 
true, the technologies nevertheless do confer certain advantages to activists 
that ‘old’ communication technologies did not. Additionally the new com-
munication tools also confer significant disadvantages to autocratic regimes. 
Of the latter Shirky (2010) argues that social media now create what he dubs 
‘the conservative dilemma’. This dilemma comes from the fact that tradi-
tional methods of countering dissident voices: propaganda and censorship are 
now less effective. Since citizens can ‘fact check’ government narratives in a 
way that was impossible before, the value of propaganda is reduced, while 
censorship of the Internet can have adverse economic and commercial rami-
fications.  
This dilemma also provides a retort to the argument that the overwhelm-
ing majority of users of new information communication technologies are apa-
thetic, more likely to use the Internet to chat with friends, download music and 
play games. As Shirky (2010) contends, the problems for autocrats is that 
“[t]ools specifically designed for dissident use are politically easy for the state 
to shut down, whereas tools in broad use become much harder to censor with-
out risking politicizing the larger group of otherwise apolitical actors”. This 
has been dubbed by Zuckerman the cute cat theory of Internet activism since 
specific tools designed to counter censorship can be shut down but “broader 
tools that the larger population uses to … share pictures of cute cats are harder 
to shut down” (Shirky, 2010). Moreover as Zuckerman (2008) contends,  
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“cute cats are collateral damage when governments block sites. And even those 
who could not care less about presidential shenanigans are made aware that their 
government fears online speech so much that they’re willing to censor the mil-
lions of banal videos… to block a few political ones.” 
 
Furthermore Zuckerman (2008) argues that such action actually has the effect 
of radicalizing such users since blocking content effectively “teaches people 
how to become dissidents… [learning how] to find and use anonymous prox-
ies” which itself becomes a “first step in learning how to blog anonymously”. 
Indeed recent data by Pew on social media in the United States found that 
Internet users are more likely to be politically active than non-users with 
Facebook users in particular “more likely to be politically involved than simi-
lar Americans” (Hampton et al. 2011, n.p.). In particular Internet users are 
nearly two and a half times more likely to have attended a political rally, 78 
per cent more likely to have attempted to influence someone’s vote, and 53 
per cent more likely to have reported voting or intending to vote than non-
internet users. Additionally a Facebook user who visits the site multiple times 
per day is over five times more likely to have attended a meeting than a non-
Internet user, 2.79 times more likely to talk to someone about their vote, 
and 2.19 times more likely to report voting.  
Howard (2011: 12) echoes Zuckerman’s view arguing that while social 
networking and the diffusion of ICTs does not substitute for traditional po-
litical activism “in times of crisis banal tools for wasting time… become the 
supporting infrastructure of social movements”. Howard gives the example of 
the surge in traffic to political blogs in Iran during the failed Green Revolu-
tion, but a similar phenomenon was observed in Malaysia on the night of the 
2008 General Election results when traffic to the independent newssite Ma-
laysiakini surged when it became clear that the opposition had performed bet-
ter than anyone had expected and the mainstream media simply did not know 
what or how to report this (see also Abbott 2001) 
Declaring that Facebook campaigns and activists twittering where the 
next demonstration against a regime will take place does not mean that such 
tools themselves will cause regime change and political revolutions. Face-
book chief executive Mark Zuckerberg echoed this when he told the 2011 e-
G-8 forum in Paris that the social media site’s role in the Arab Spring had 
been overplayed and that “Facebook was neither necessary nor sufficient for 
any of those things to happen” (Bradshaw 2011). Despite this caveat Zucker-
berg did acknowledge that the tools for sharing photos and status updates 
were, “exactly the same tools… that enable broader changes” (Bradshaw 
2011). 
For revolutions and transitions to occur local actors, local processes and 
specific factors will be causal. However as examples from the Arab Spring, 
Burma, Iran and Russia demonstrate Facebook, Twitter and Youtube are in-
creasingly playing a role in assisting the coordination of demonstrations and 
protests and are enabling activists to get footage out to the global media au-
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dience even when foreign journalists are denied access. One means by which 
the latter is made possible is through the emergence of blogging and other 
forms of Citizen Journalism. 
3.5 Collaboration – Resolving the Collective Action 
Problem? 
Another feature of the rise of this so-called monitorial citizenry is that it ap-
pears to have significantly lowered the costs of collective action. Such costs 
should not just be measured in terms of the costs of producing and sharing in-
formation but more profoundly the costs of concerted social and political ac-
tion. As Tufecki (2011) argues with reference to the Arab Spring, the rapid 
spread of Internet applications, and Facebook in particular, lowered the cost 
of dissident in regimes where censorship and the control of public protest 
were the key means of autocratic control.  
While the most famous example of a collective action problem is Garrett 
Hardin’s (1968) treatise The Tragedy of the Commons, which explored the 
question of how we stop the overconsumption of scarce natural resources, po-
litical scientists and sociologists have pointed to the existence of similar col-
lective action dilemmas: the pursuit of self-interest at the expense of a public 
good, in multiple areas of social life. Such dilemmas have particularly inter-
ested game theorists who over several decades have tested repeated variations 
of collective action games and concluded a number of notable features. 
Firstly as Tufecki notes “game-theorists have long known that communica-
tion between participants dramatically alters the dynamics of these ‘dilem-
mas’”, secondly that small groups are more likely to cooperate than larger 
ones and finally, and most significantly that cooperation increases when the 
game are repeated (iteration) over and over again with the same participants 
(Olson 1965). Many early game theorists however were pessimistic that lar-
ger groups could resolve the core dilemma unless there was a form of coer-
cion or special device to make individuals act in their collective interest. It 
was of course such dilemmas that led philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes 
to thus argue for the necessity of a sovereign state a Leviathan that would 
prevent a war of all against all. However others (Estrom 1990: 27) noted that 
the collective action dilemma could be overcome where certain conditions 
could be met: group boundaries are clearly defined; rules governing the use 
of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions; most in-
dividuals affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules; the 
rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by exter-
nal authorities; a system for monitoring members behavior exists; a graduated 
system of sanctions is used who do not comply; there is low cost access to 
conflict resolution mechanisms. 
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One of the most interesting developments on the Internet with the explo-
sion of social media applications and tools is what appears to be an extremely 
successful mechanism for solving such collective action problems with re-
gard to social organization. This is the emergence of reputation and prestige 
systems more commonly referred to and known as ratings. From Ebay and 
Amazon to Facebook ratings and prestige have become not just ubiquitous 
features of social media but arguably crucial tools in maintaining collective 
public resources. 
For those not familiar, Ebay began life as an online auction site, although 
it has since become more and more like an online retail site. Begun in 1995 
by Pierre Omidyar, who listed a broken laser pointer for sale (Cohen 2003), 
Ebay works to bring buyers and sellers together making its money from a 
listing fee. Ebay does not guarantee that the transaction will occur, that the 
goods will be received, will be in the condition indicated, or that the seller 
will be paid. All of this relies on trust and of course the danger in any situa-
tion such as this is that free riders will exploit the situation to their advantage. 
And yet Ebay rapidly has become a hugely popular and successful site re-
cording over 85 million users by 2010 generating $62 billion in transactions. 
This was achieved by introducing a rating system for buyers and sellers. Sat-
isfied buyers and sellers were able to rate each other originally with a score 
of -1 (negative), 0 (neutral) or +1 (positive) and since 2005 with a score from 
zero to five. This rating as well as written text is publicly available. This en-
abled users to both punish and reward where appropriate and the system thus 
evolved into one where prestige became a sought after designation by buyers 
and sellers alike since buyers and sellers were more likely to trust engaging 
in a transaction with another user who had a high rating. As Rheingold com-
ments, “over time consistently honest sellers build up substantial reputation 
scores, which are costly to discard, guarding against the temptation to cheat 
buyers and adopt a new reputation” (2002: 125). As a result it is estimated 
that close to 99.99 per cent of all goods auctioned are completed successfully 
and that fraud on the site actually runs at rates much lower than shoplifting in 
conventional retail. Similar reputation systems are now a key feature of 
online retailer Amazon, where customers are also able to write lengthy and 
detailed reviews of the products they purchase, of hotels and other travel ser-
vices (Tripadvisor), of consumer goods (Eopinions), movies (Rotten Toma-
toes) videos (Youtube) and so on. On some sites ratings are little more than 
likes vs. dislikes, but over time the standard model has become a star rating 
out of five with the option to provide critical commentary. 
The Internet and social media tools have facilitated this solution to col-
lective action dilemmas partly because the Internet was designed from its in-
ception as an innovative commons. In terms of reputational capital what the 
Internet has done is “restored the shadow of the future to each transaction by 
creating an expectation that other people will look back on it.” (Resnick et al. 
2000). The shadow of the future, as expounded upon by game theorists, is 
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simply the probability that actors will meet again. Where that probability is 
high research demonstrates that this increases cooperative behavior. What 
makes reputation systems on the Internet of particular note is that the system 
has evolved despite the fact that most interactions are isolated and not them-
selves repeated. Instead users as a whole rely on a history of a seller con-
structed from past isolated opinions, thus “past isolated interactions assume 
the attributes of a long-term cooperative relationship” (Resnick et al. 2000). 
The sheer volume of interactions on the Internet and the ratings of these 
transactions have therefore changed the balance in the dilemmas of coopera-
tion. 
One of the best examples of this, and arguably the most famous collabo-
rative enterprise on the social media is the online encyclopedia Wikipedia. 
Wikipedia began as a project entitled Nupedia which Jimmy Wales and Larry 
Sanger envisaged as an online version of a traditional encyclopedia (Fletcher 
2009). In other words the product would be the creation of a team of experts 
who would be hired to write entries on subjects that they specialized in. 
However Wales and Sanger soon found that the process was taking much 
longer than originally envisaged with only 12 articles completed in the first 
year. In order to speed the process up Sanger and programmer Ben Kovitz 
suggested using a wiki, a piece of software that allows users to add, modify 
or delete content using a text (html) editor. The proposal met with wide-
spread opposition from those working on Nupedia so the wiki was given its 
own separate domain name, Wikipedia.com and was envisaged as feeder pro-
ject to Nupedia allowing collaboration on articles prior to the peer review 
process. Within a month of its launch on January 10th 2001, 1000 articles had 
been posted growing thereafter at a rate of 1500 articles a month during the 
site’s first year. The exponential growth of Wikipedia eventually led Wales to 
close Nupedia in September 2003 by which time Wikipedia had surpassed 
100,000 articles and had already spawned multiple non-English language 
versions including Chinese, French, German, Hebrew, Italian, Japanese, Rus-
sian and Spanish. Today Wikipedia is one of the most visited and influential 
websites on the Internet. Ranked 6th globally Wikipedia has become the most 
popular reference site on the Internet as well as the largest encyclopedia ever 
assembled in history. But what makes it truly unique is that the whole enter-
prise is the result of voluntary contributions and collaboration by an esti-
mated 100,000 regular contributors worldwide. In other words Wikipedia 
represents precisely the kind of collective public resource discussed earlier. 
Underpinning the entire Wikipedia project are the foundational beliefs 
that everyone and anyone can contribute, edit or start an entry, and that col-
laboration among users will increase the quality of content over time. While 
many challenge this assumption (Lawton 2006), the ethos assumes a Darwin-
ian-like evolutionary process of development “where content improves as it 
goes through iterations of changes and edits” (Tapscott and Williams 2010: 
73). Although acknowledging that misleading information can be inserted 
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into entries defenders of Wikipedia argue that through learning substandard 
edits will rapidly be removed. As Bruns (2009) comments the whole process 
is based on “a gradual appreciation in quality [that] is reliant on probabilistic 
approaches which assume the net dominance of constructive contributions 
over disruptive edits” (110). (In other words that there are more people who 
care about Wikipedia than there are vandals who would deface it). One way 
in which this is achieved is through the creation of a community of contribu-
tors and editors and a ‘sense of belonging’ which shifts “the balance between 
positive and negative contributions towards a ratio which enables a gradual 
improvement in quality” (Bruns 2009).  
What is interesting is despite the ability of anyone to edit Wikipedia 
pages the community is actually dominated by a tiny proportion of users who 
make frequent edits. Most contributions to the site are tiny with the signifi-
cance being that the site as a whole is able to aggregate these individual con-
tributions into the vast repository of data and information. Nevertheless 
Jimmy Wales the founder of Wikipedia estimates that some 50 per cent of 
edits are made by less than 1 per cent of users. Indeed data from Wikipedia 
shows that of the 16 million Wikipedia user accounts fewer than 2 per cent, 
approximately 300,000, edit Wikipedia every month, (Shirky 2008: 128). 
Among these a very select group of about 5,000 make more than 1000 edits 
with an even more active core of around 150 users responsible for over 
100,000 edits each since they joined the site. But why do people invest their 
time and effort into an enterprise that is largely anonymous? The most com-
mon motivations for edits are to correct mistakes and contribute to knowl-
edge by teaching something ‘to the world’ (sic). Data from Wikipedia itself 
appears to confirm this revealing that 69% of users edit Wikipedia to fix er-
rors, while 73% do so because they want to share knowledge. 
Much as in the debate over citizen journalism critics of Wikipedia 
(Goldman 2010), argue that the mass amateurization the project represents 
can only result in a product that is lacking in accuracy, quality and reliability. 
Statistics from Wikipedia, for example, show that only 19 per cent of its edi-
tors hold Masters degrees and less than 5 per cent doctorates. Nevertheless in 
a controversial December 2005 study that compared Wikipedia to Encyclope-
dia Britannica, the influential magazine Nature found that Wikipedia was as 
accurate as Britannica (Giles 2005). In a single blind study of 42 scientific ar-
ticles that included biographies, Nature found that both encyclopedias con-
tained only four serious errors. Similar studies in 2007 in Britain and Ger-
many comparing Wikipedia to commercially available encyclopedia pro-
duced similar results while a 2007 study by Stern magazine found that Wiki-
pedia was more accurate than the German Brockhaus Enzklopadie (Stern 
2007). Studies of drug entries on Wikipedia in 2008 and health risks of vari-
ous chemicals in 2009 also found that the entries were broadly accurate 
(Heilman et al. 2011) and indeed in the case of the latter far more reliable 
than traditional news media. Nevertheless in all such studies the most com-
Social media 91 
 
mon criticisms of Wikipedia were errors of omission rather than inaccuracy 
(Kupferberg/Protus 2011; Heilman 2011), poor structure, poor writing (in-
cluding spelling mistakes) and attention to trivial matters and useless arcana.  
The nature of Wikipedia means that it can be and often is subject to van-
dalism and susceptible to bias. In certain circumstances to avoid these pages 
can be and are locked to prevent this. However the numbers of pages that are 
locked to prevent extreme vandalism constitute less than 0.5 per cent of the 
total and are thus a miniscule proportion (Shirky 2008: 138). Moreover stud-
ies reveal that vandalized pages and inaccuracies are removed on average 
very quickly. On contentious subjects like abortions evidence shows that de-
letions are restored within 2 minutes (Shirky 2008: 36). While studies that 
have deliberately inserted erroneous information in order to test how quickly 
the Wikipedia community is able to locate and remove have shown that 42 
per cent are removed almost immediately. Tapscott and Williams for exam-
ple cite an MIT study that revealed that an obscenity randomly inserted into 
Wikipedia is removed on average within 1.7 minutes. (2010: 75). 
This notwithstanding, attempts to manipulate Wikipedia are common and 
were strikingly revealed in 2007, when as part of the process of self-cor-
rection and self-policing characteristic of peer-to-peer networking Virgil 
Griffiths created and introduced Wikiscanner to track the millions of anony-
mous edits on Wikipedia to IP addresses (Hafner 2007; Moses 2007). In so 
doing he discovered that manipulation was not the sole reserve of cyber-
vandals but that over 187,000 organizations had made at least one anony-
mous edit. These organizations included governments (Canada and Portugal), 
government agencies (the CIA, FBI, and the Australian Department of De-
fense), international organizations (the United Nations, Amnesty Interna-
tional, The Church of Scientology), political parties (the United States Re-
publican party, and the British Conservative party), newspapers (The New 
York Times and The Guardian), corporations (Apple, Disney, Sony, and 
Walmart) and politicians (including Vice President Joe Biden’s staffers). 
While embarrassing to the parties concerned, what these instances neverthe-
less reveal is that the site really is available to everyone and anyone but, 
unlike traditional encyclopedia, Wikipedia is not a finished product but an 
ongoing process. In this sense like much of the content of Wikipedia is built 
on ‘publish then filter’ model rather than on the traditional media model of 
filter first before publishing. Much as most blogs facilitate a dialogue with 
their audience in which the author acts as publisher, commentator and mod-
erator, on Wikipedia every edit and change is tracked and all discussion and 
debate concerning entries is visible via its history. As Bruns remarks (2009), 
“Wikipedia resembles the historical palimpsest: a repeatedly over-written 
document which on closer investigation shows the traces of this “process of 
content creation and collaboration” (139). The result is not just a new 
‘knowledge space’ but a deliberative and participatory process that poten-
tially has application and ramifications for social and political action itself. 
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3.6 Social Media, deliberative democracy and increased 
participation 
While examples from the Arab Spring and the Occupy movements demon-
strate how social movements have taken advantage of many of the new tools 
of social media to campaign, organize protest and disseminate alternative in-
formation, it is too early to determine whether the social networks lead to a 
significant reinvigoration of citizen participation in the democratic process as 
a whole. Nevertheless there are many Web evangelists who claim that much 
in the way that the Internet is eroding traditional media models, so democra-
cies may also move from ones that are merely consumed or “acted out in 
front of citizens”, to ones “that are enacted by them” (Bruns 2009: 359) 
Across the globe democracies remain largely wedded to forms of repre-
sentation and processes of deliberation that emerged alongside processes of 
industrialization and mass consumerism. Unsurprisingly then for the most 
part politics resembles such an industrial-era process (Bruns 2009: 360) in 
which we can discern clear distinctions between the producers of politics 
(principally politicians and lobbyists), distributors of politics (the traditional 
media) and the wider electorate which, aside from infrequent mass exercises 
of their collective will in periodic elections, acts mostly as consumers of poli-
tics. So far this model remains rather robust although already the social net-
works are beginning to have an impact even if to date that has largely been 
by providing both an alternative site of media coverage of campaigns as well 
as of organizing those campaigns (Boehlert 2009). However it should not be 
inconceivable that the Web’s impact could eventually be much more pro-
found and transformative, and if it is to be then it should mirror the develop-
ments we are witnessing in other ‘industries’, namely the transformation of 
electorates from passive consumers of political information to electorates of 
prod-users.  
What emerges in its place is not yet clear, but one of the key features of 
nascent political web communities is that they are much looser communities 
in which new communication technology facilitates greater dialogue and dis-
course. In particular, unlike in traditional political parties or established so-
cial movements such communities “do not amalgamate their members into a 
movement unified by a single common vision for society (Bruns 2009: 362). 
Much for example has been made of the seemingly spontaneous nature of the 
Occupy movements in 2011, their lack of leadership (Hawley/Caruso 2011) 
and most significantly the lack of concerted, well-defined goals (CBS News, 
2011) Such criticism however misses the point of these movements. What 
makes them ‘new’ and distinct is that they operate in a fluid manner in which 
patterns of behavior emerge largely without the creation of hierarchy or ob-
vious leadership struggles. The fact that there was no single message uniting 
the Occupy movements speaks to the fact that these movements brought to-
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gether disparate groups with shared grievances against the present capitalist 
system. People did not have to sign up to a pre-agreed manifesto but instead 
came together in concordant and cooperative patterns of behavior, they were 
free to join and match their interests to communities and to sub-groups within 
them.  
The Occupy movement also reflects the fact that in any large community 
of collaborators there will need to be both enhanced understanding of opin-
ions, and mechanisms to construct consensus from the bottom-up. Commen-
tators thus speculate on how the growth of tools for social participation may 
facilitate such consensus building (Leighninger 2006). Blogs, agglomeration 
sites, and tools for sharing within social networking services, such as Face-
book and Twitter, are all tools for collective participation; in fact a key fea-
ture of social networks is the explosion in virtual communities. Robert Put-
nam (2000) may have bemoaned the decline of social capital in America in 
his landmark text Bowling Alone, pointing to the precipitous decline in the 
numbers of Americans joining established social groups (including bowling 
teams), but a decade later more Americans, and indeed more people world-
wide than ever before, have joined and continue to join dozens of online 
communities catering to almost any and all topics and tastes. These commu-
nities Scott and Johnson found (2005: 13) “can support rich, compelling, and 
sustainable social settings and genuine, sustainable communities”. Such com-
munities are conversing, exchanging ideas, and are already impacting upon 
existing modes and media of political discourse. 
Indeed recognizing this, many governments have sought to incorporate 
such deliberative processes into open government strategies that have been 
launched in the past decade (see Wojcik in this volume). Of these the most 
common were petition websites whereby ordinary citizens could build peti-
tions and collect signatures online on almost any subject with petitions reach-
ing a certain minimum threshold guaranteed to receive an official govern-
ment response including in some cases eligibility for debate in the legislature. 
3.7 New forms of participation and deliberation 
Another purported impact of the development of social media on participa-
tion in politics is that roles are becoming much more fluid. As tools for col-
laboration, discourse and participation proliferate citizens are becoming 
much more actively engaged in the process of policy formation and policy 
acceptance. One example of this that appears in the literature is the creation 
and development of the non-profit, liberal, progressive group MoveOn.org. 
MoveOn was originally founded in 1998 in response to Republican efforts to 
impeach then United States President Bill Clinton. Founded by IT entrepre-
neurs, Joan Blades and Wes Boyd, the organization’s initial goal was to end 
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the partisan rankling over the impeachment process by hosting an online peti-
tion that stated that “Congress must Immediately Censure President Clinton 
and Move On to pressing issues facing the country” (Zetter 2004). The peti-
tion quickly garnered over half a million signatures. Post 1998 MoveOn de-
veloped a number of programs including online fundraising against candi-
dates that had voted for impeachment, an online petition against the build-up 
for the 2003 war in Iraq and in 2003 a virtual primary between Democratic 
candidates Howard Dean John Kerry and Dennis Kuchinich (Reid 2003). In 
January 2004 it called on its members to create their own 30 second televi-
sion advertisement criticizing the Bush Presidency. Dubbed “Bush in 30 sec-
onds”, MoveOn promised to air the winning entry during the Super Bowl.5 
The group received over 1,500 entries and over 100,000 people then voted to 
select 14 finalists from which a winner would be chosen by a panel of celeb-
rity judges including controversial US documentary filmmaker Michael 
Moore (Goldberg 2004). 
Today the group boasts over 5 million members and conducts major 
campaigns mostly on social issues (healthcare, social security, green issues 
etc). Its website and social media pages share millions of hours of political 
video advertisements, and it has raised over $138 million since its inception, 
mostly from small donations averaging $40-50 (MoveOn 2012). While the 
organization is clearly left-leaning, and has contributed resources to Democ-
rat campaigns, it is officially non-partisan. Members and ‘friends’ are not re-
quired to commit to a manifesto of policies, and are free to contribute donate, 
share and volunteer on an issue-by-issue basis. Most recently MoveOn has 
launched an online petition tool called Sign-On which allows individuals to 
set up their own petition to campaign for causes within their local communi-
ties (Eng 2012). Bruns argues that much as in the same way that Citizen 
journalism has begun to undermine the gate-keeping role of traditional jour-
nalism, so groups like MoveOn are “shifting the pressure points of the politi-
cal system” (Bruns 2009: 369). In particular he argues that the projects of 
such forms of organization must be seen as  
“Inherently unfinished [opening] the pathway to a political structure in which 
there are constant, small, granular, incremental, evolutionary changes to policies 
and political change rather than lengthy periods of limited change punctuated by 
political paradigm shifts” (Bruns 2009: 367). 
 
Although unique in its organization the evolution of MoveOn does not seem 
to suggest a radical break with the existing mechanisms of representative 
democracy in the United States. While extremely tech-savvy the group seeks 
to influence politics in conventional ways by lobbying, petitioning, running 
campaign advertisements and donating to progressive causes and candidates. 
                                                          
5 CBS would reject the ad stating that it was too controversial.  Nevertheless it was broadcast 
on CNN during the half-time break in the Superbowl and it also went viral on several video 
sharing websites including Youtube. 
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It seems therefore premature to argue as Bruns does that the example of 
Wikipedia, Facebook and MoveOn points to the development of non-re-
presentational forms of deliberative democracy. Indeed early in its history 
MoveOn did launch an online discussion forum designed to allow users to 
address complex policy issues and potentially provide a useful mechanism 
though which the future agenda of MoveOn as a whole could be set by its 
supporters and members. Rather than a simple discussion forum MoveOn in-
corporated a rating system that would allow members to rank the comments 
they respected the most. This they believed would encourage civility, com-
promise and dialogue which accompanied by the requirement that users had 
to provide real names, addresses, and emails, would mitigate for accusatory, 
explicit and inflammatory posts since much as reputation confers status on 
Ebay, the ability to agree with, and rank comments, would confer status 
based upon proven merit as a contributor. In contrast however the forum be-
came notorious for a growing tirade of anti-Semitism, anti-Israeli and anti-
Bush diatribes which eventually led to the suspension of the forum in 2006/7 
(Washington Times 2006).  
Another case that raises questions about how political activity will 
evolve on the social networks is the example of Americans Elect. Again os-
tensibly a non-partisan non-profit organization, Americans Elect was founded 
in April 2010 with the goal of using online media to nominate a ticket for the 
2012 US Presidential election (Romano 2011). Touted as a participatory and 
deliberative exercise ordinary US voters are able to register as delegates, 
choose the candidates for an online national primary and decide the key is-
sues that the top six candidates must engage with as they are eventually whit-
tled down in successive rounds of voting. Americans Elect’s goal is not to 
create a ‘traditional’ 3rd party but instead to nominate a non-partisan candi-
date in a manner that is not reliant on ties to existing political parties, politi-
cal organizations or lobby groups. While the ticket is open to candidates as-
sociated with existing political parties, in order to ensure non-partisanship 
Americans Elect’s rules require that if the winner is a Republican or Democ-
rat that they must select a Vice Presidential running mate from the opposing 
party.  
As of February 2012 Americans Elect by collecting almost 2.5 million 
signatures had succeeded in gaining ballot status in 15 states and had raised 
over $22 million. While receiving favorable coverage in several major US 
print media outlets, and glowing praise from among others New York Times 
columnist and author Thomas Freidman, critics argue that the whole process 
is much less deliberative and participatory than it first appears. The group 
was started with a $1.55 million donation from Peter Ackerman (Vo-
gel/Phillip 2012), the organization’s chairman, who made his millions as a 
financier for Drexel Burnham Lambert in the 1980s, a company that was 
forced into bankruptcy in 1990 as a result of illegal activities in the junk bond 
market (Foroohar 2012). Since then the bulk of the $22 million that Ameri-
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cans Elect has raised has come from a small group of 55 anonymous donors 
who have given in excess of $100,000 each. Fuelling concerns about the 
transparency of this process is the fact that while the organization was ini-
tially registered as a tax-exempt political organization, in October 2010 it 
changed its designation to a social welfare organization. The switch (from a 
527 group to a 501(c)(4)) enables the organization to legally withhold the 
identity of its donors. Further concerns surround the nomination process it-
self. Although the public will be able to nominate candidates the organization 
itself will ‘appoint’ an independent committee to certify and ‘vet’ the candi-
dates. While Thomas Freidman (2011) may have proclaimed in July 2011 
that Americans Elect would “remove the barriers to real competition, flatten 
the incumbents and let the people in” the lack of financial disclosure, the 
mechanism for the selection process, and links to controversial consulting 
company Arno Political Consultants raise concerns that the whole project 
may be less an example of grassroots pressure for change than an attempt by 
conventional advocates and lobbyists to ‘astroturf’ – to give the appearance 
of a bottom-up movement. 
The future of political action and participation then remains, at this junc-
ture, unclear. Clearly the development of social media do lower the of costs 
collective action and facilitate new forms of political action and mobilization. 
Equally it does have the potential to be both used and abused by govern-
ments, corporations and traditional lobby groups. Perhaps then it is best not 
to look at the development of any new politics as being either top-down (in-
vited space) or bottom-up (invented space) but something more complex, in-
terconnected and dialectical (see Kersting in this volume). As Leighninger, 
(2006: 226) observes,  
“[c]itizens and officials are becoming frustrated with each other, and trying to 
find new ways to work together… The ripples are extending far beyond local 
politics, into the realms of the media, the Internet, Presidential campaigns and 
foreign policy. It may be a little misleading to call this an “evolution” of democ-
racy since that implies we are moving inevitably toward some better, more ad-
vanced realm of public life… [but] at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it 
is different in a lot of places.” 
3.8 Conclusion 
While it is too early to deliver a conclusive assessment of the overall political 
impact of the social networking, the evidence to date suggests that they are 
playing a crucial role in broadening participation. Furthermore if we define 
democratization as a dynamic process that recognizes and includes the ways 
in which democratic norms, institutions, and practices are disseminated, as 
well as a process in which the aggregation of public opinion serves to chal-
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lenge and level existing hierarchies, then we can also argue that the social 
media also have clear democratizing effects.  
In addition social networks are changing the notion of voters as merely 
an inert audience that exercises it democratic muscles infrequently. As both 
the Arab Spring and the Occupy movements separately demonstrate the evi-
dence from the use of social media during the late 2000s across both the de-
veloped and developing world certainly points to a citizenry that is becoming 
more active, creative and innovative in political life. There are also signs of 
enhanced deliberation and participation though it is also too early to deter-
mine whether these will fundamentally reshape the ‘industrial-era’ model of 
representative democracy.  
Academic scholarship often struggles to keep pace with the rapid devel-
opment and diffusion of technological changes. Given the developments we 
have witnessed in the last decade it would not be surprising to find that the 
same is true for this chapter. To conclude then I will tentatively speculate on 
what might happen next. Prior to the emergence of social media applications, 
programs and tools commentators differentiated between the ‘real’ world and 
the ‘online’ world, which was commonly referred to as cyberspace. This con-
ception (popularized in Science Fiction) conceived of the two as clearly de-
marcated ‘spaces’ with users ‘escaping’ the real world to enter a ‘virtual real-
ity’ online. Today the term cyberspace has largely disappeared as the division 
between reality and virtual reality has blurred. As Scholz and Hartzog (2008) 
point out “we are facing the death of cyberspace … [with] the whole off-
line/online distinction ... less useful as a framing metaphor”, Instead what we 
are seeing is “the information world ... layered onto the physical world” 
(Scholz and Hartzog 2008). In other words, rather than the Internet being a 
separate and separated world, today Internet-enabled devices have prolifer-
ated to such an extent that they have become ubiquitous. With GPS systems 
in cars, televisions that connect to the Internet by wifi, game stations that also 
allow users to stream movies and connect to social networks, and applica-
tions in smartphones that allow users to search based on pictures taken by 
cameras built-in to the handsets we now increasingly talk of augmenting real-
ity rather than of an alternate reality. Indeed the subsequent iterations of the 
Internet may indeed result in the ‘disappearance’ of the computer. As Mark 
Weiser commented in 1991, “The most profound technologies are those that 
disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they 
are indistinguishable from it.” (Weiser 1991: 94-104). This disappearance re-
fers both to the minaturization of devices and their integration into everyday 
artefacts, as well as mental disappearance as we begin to no longer discern 
the artefacts that connect to the Internet as computers. As Streitz and Nixon 
(2005) argue “the rate at which computers disappear will be matched by the 
rate at which information technology will increasingly permeate our envi-
ronment and determine our lives” (33). We currently stand on the cusp of this 
further transformation, a moment that already is being referred to as marking 
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the evolution of the Internet towards higher mobility (cloud). One can only 
begin to imagine what the social and political impact of this iteration will be. 
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4. Electronic political campaigning           
Andrea Römmele                      
Does your Member of Parliament tweet about his/her work and passion for 
your constituency? Is there an online platform that connects childcare institu-
tions in your neighborhood? Chances are that you might find all those things 
to be true for the community you live in. However, there are questions re-
maining. Do you follow your MP on Twitter, or would you rather rely on 
your local newspaper to tell you about his/her political record? Do you look 
for childcare online, or would you rather ask your neighbor or colleague if 
they had any advice on the matter? 
It might be hard to answer these questions for many people since modern 
media usage is all about mixing and matching what best suits your lifestyle, 
your budget, and your needs. This notwithstanding, the story of the omni-
presence of the internet prevails. Experts of all kinds argue that the internet is 
soon to become the dominant media, outnumbering the classic media like 
television, radio, and newspapers. Accordingly, it seems to be increasingly 
important for everybody who wants to get attention to go online – and this 
seems to be true for parties and politicians, companies and lobbyists, NGOs 
and activists alike. If spreading your message is the goal, social media seems 
to be the means through which you can achieve it. But, why so? 
This paper aims at providing an overview of the operating principles of 
social media, their potential for campaigns1, and the related communicative 
challenges. The introductory part outlines basic mechanisms and shows how 
the e-factor might or might not shape modern campaigning. In the following 
chapters different types of e-campaigns will be examined. Taking a look at 
the spheres of politics and civil society – instead of focusing on one of them 
– seems especially important since modern campaigning techniques emerge 
in all different parts of society. Business campaigns cannot be analysed here, 
but experiences are included in the analysis of political actors. In the era of 
the Cold War, which is often seen as the beginning of modern politics, new 
                                                          
1 Election campaigns are the prototype situation of political communication (Pfetsch/ 
Schmitt-Beck 1994) – we see the interaction between the actors involved in a very exposed 
manner. Key to this definition is that political actors (media, parties, candidates, citizens, 
NGOs) do not communicate differently in off-campaign times.   
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campaigning strategies were typically developed by corporate advertising and 
marketing specialists, and got adapted by political parties, non-profit organi-
zations and the like (O’Shaughnessy 1990). Nowadays, however, the causal 
chain is not as simple any more. Oftentimes, political strategies find their 
way into the corporate world (see e.g. the issue of personalization, Bret-
tschneider/Vollbracht 2011) while it is difficult to even establish the origins 
of many campaigning techniques (cf. the idea of guerilla marketing, Levinson 
1984). 
In order to systematically analyze the use, potential, and limitations of e-
campaigning, both spheres mentioned above will be examined using survey 
data as well as case studies. The last part of the paper includes concluding 
remarks as well as a brief outlook. 
On a general level, the rationale of social media comprises three key fac-
tors: targeting, virality and responsiveness/interactivity. Targeting means 
that, contrary to mass media like television, social media can be used to iden-
tify distinct target groups and send them tailored messages. This technique 
has first been developed in the political sphere in the mid-1990ies when Bill 
Clinton was the first presidential candidate to address certain audiences such 
as the famous “soccer mums” (Penn 2007). This being said, the potential ef-
fect of targeted campaigning has multiplied since. People are constantly or-
ganizing and reorganizing themselves online which helps campaigners to 
identify the groups they are looking for.  
Virality means that social media allows a proliferation of information 
cascades. Within these groups – which can consist of people following a cer-
tain blogs, visiting certain websites, interacting in facebook groups or in cha-
trooms, to name just a few – a special dynamic kicks in: people are not only 
addressed by messages, ads and all sorts of information, but actively share 
these pieces giving them even more attention. The concept of virality is key 
to many campaigns and ads are explicitly designed to get shared and, thus, 
“go viral” (Berger/Milkman 2009). 
Responsiveness and interactivity focuses on the ability of social media to 
allow one-to-one communication but also one-to-many communication and 
many-to-many communication. So, from a campaigner’s perspective social 
media allow for new ways of addressing target groups and they create a cer-
tain kind of buzz themselves. In addition to that, they also enable recipients 
to close the circle of social communication by sending feedback and interact 
with the sender of the message who, in turn, can respond to questions, criti-
cism, appraisal etc (Smith 2010). 
 This matters for all the spheres mentioned above: politics and civil soci-
ety (for corporate and business communication, see e.g. Mangold/Faulds 
2009), since they all share fundamental principles of communication which 
lead to certain criteria for modern campaigning. These criteria include, but 
are not limited to: organization, mobilization, professionalization, personal-
ization, and crisis communication. All of these topics will be closely looked 
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at throughout this paper in order to determine the power of the “e-factor”. 
What does the possibility (and need) to use targeted, viral, and responsive 
communication do to professional standards? How does it affect the way in 
which politicians or CEOs deal with crises? Is there a new way of mobilizing 
people to engage in civil society movements – and, if so, do these new ways 
appeal to new participants? 
Before tackling these questions, however, we must establish the arena we 
are dealing with. Much has been said and written about the “digital divide”, 
for instance (see Kersting in this volume; Norris 2002). The question that fol-
lows from this thesis is this: Are we ready for e-campaigning (and an ICT-
oriented lifestyle in general) or will more traditional ways of political adver-
tising still be dominant throughout the next years due to limited Internet ac-
cess or limited online literacy or flat-out skepticism towards the quality of 
online information among citizens?  
4.1 E-readiness 
It is difficult to determine if, or to what extent respectively, a society is ready 
for means of e-campaigning (see Kersting in this volume). Many variables 
are important in this regard and they all can play out very differently within 
different cultural contexts. The shape of the media system as such, for in-
stance, plays a crucial role. In the liberal systems of the Anglo-Saxon type, 
the reception of alternative news sources such as the social media might dif-
fer considerably from the way they are perceived in the corporatist systems of 
Northern Europe or the pluralist polarized ones of Southern Europe (Hal-
lin/Mancini 2004; Swanson/Mancini 1996). Thus, the preliminary analysis of 
e-readiness will take into account all three types. 
The first question one should address is the one that has been mentioned 
above: Is there a digital divide? Data2 from the European Social Survey show 
a mixed picture with Northern European countries and the UK being a little 
more advanced regarding both access and usage than Southern European 
countries (European Social Survey 2009). 
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004: 11), the orientation of the media 
towards either a political or market-oriented logic is key to the distinction of 
the three media systems mentioned here. While liberal systems tend to be 
market-oriented, corporatist systems historically developed a co-existence of 
                                                          
2 It should be mentioned that there is a general caveat to consider when using data on media-
related issues: Since the access to new media spreads fast while thorough scientific analysis 
deserves a lot of time, datasets like the ones used in the study mentioned here can be out-
dated almost right after publication. Nevertheless, they may give us an idea about a coun-
try’s relative performance in comparison with its peers. 
106 Andrea Römmele 
 
commercial and political media, and the media in systems of the pluralist po-
larized type lean towards a political rationale. 
Given the fact that most of the up-and-coming social media mentioned so 
far are private rather than public or affiliated with political parties, there 
seems to be strong evidence, that a look at the liberal media system might be 
especially promising. With regard to political campaigning, the PEW institute 
asks respondents about their preferred news sources on a regular basis, and 
the latest results are quite telling: while most “traditional” news sources 
strongly lost influence among citizens, the Internet could not considerably in-
crease its share either. It hence seems as if the internet is not capable of fill-




So far we looked at two components of “e-readiness”, access and usage. All 
in all, the data shows that the new ICTs have not lived up to their full poten-
tial, yet. While Internet access is quite high – and keeps improving – and 
numbers of members of social media platforms increase day by day, usage 
with regard to campaigns develops rather slowly. This is all the more reason 
for a close-up investigation of the theory and practice of e-campaigning 
which is presented in the following chapters. 
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4.2  E-campaigning and political parties  
Campaign research was under-developed for a long time. In 1987, Harrop 
and Miller stated: “The study of election campaigns, as opposed to elections, 
is a major gap in the literature” (Harrop/Miller 1987: 240). The major reasons 
campaigns were not researched and gained little academic attention is be-
cause they had little or no effect. Two factors account for this:  
1. On the macro-level, election results can be predicted from a small set of 
variables (incumbency, duration in office, satisfaction with government) 
(Gschwend/Norporth 2000). 
2. On the micro-level, party identification and voters’ predispositions made 
election outcomes predictable and campaigns were seen as a purely mo-
bilizing exercise.  
However, these forecast models have failed a number of times. In addition, 
we observe decreasing party identification in almost all established democra-
cies and an actual decrease in party membership (Dalton et al. 2011, 
Mair/van Biezen 2001), combined with a high level of voter volatility. Fol-
lowing the Ann Arbor Model, a decrease in party identification puts more 
emphasis on issues and candidates having an influence on electoral behavior. 
Issues and candidates are communicated in campaigns and as a consequence 
thereof, campaigns have become more and more important and – of course – 
are now a subject of the social sciences. Campaigns have been considered in 
electoral research, party research, and communication research, but it was 
only in the early 1990s, with campaigns gaining in importance, that the true 
sub-discipline of campaign research emerged at the interface of these above-
mentioned research fields, fuelling a new sub-field of social scientific re-
search that unites formal election studies, parties, and political communica-
tion scholars. 
An attempt was made to describe different campaign types from a his-
torical perspective with the emphasis on change. In the first or pre-modern 
campaign era (1920-1945), political communication was based on the 
strength of the local party organization and face-to-face contact. Such a strat-
egy presupposed citizens’ extreme willingness to participate in organizations, 
as well as the existence of intact and socially homogeneous groups. The ori-
entation of parties to their electorate is one of nearly lifelong loyalty. Hence, 
in this campaign era, parties need to mobilize their people. The second wave 
of campaigning, in contrast, saw a shift from communication via the party 
organization to mass media communication between parties and voters. “Dur-
ing the post-war era, political campaigning has been transformed by the de-
cline of direct linkages between citizens and parties and the rise of mediated 
linkages” (Norris et al. 1999: 22). Citizens do not receive their information 
directly from party meetings or rallies, but through the mass media. With the 
mass media, parties can communicate their message to a broader audience. 
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Because party identification and party attachment have declined, parties not 
only have to mobilize their electorate, they also have to convince the unde-
cided voters of their party program. With the party organization, more and 
more power is shifted to the party headquarters, which assumes responsibility 
for overall campaign strategy (Gibson/Römmele 2001: 32f).  
Over the past two decades, a new mode of election campaigning has 
emerged in post-industrial democracies. Key traits of the professionalized 
campaign include the use of new communication tools, such as the Internet 
and email, along with intensive use of direct mail, telemarketing, opinion 
polls, and focus groups to better target potential voters. A growing body of 
literature has developed on changes to political campaigning with varying 
terms being used to capture the changes such as ‘Americanization’, ‘post-
modern campaigning’, and ‘professionalized campaigning’ (Norris 2000; 
Römmele 2005). Increasingly, such accounts have included reference to the 
role of new information and communications technologies (ICTs) and social 
media in campaigns (Chadwick/Howard 2009; Gibson/Römmele 2009).  
What are the key characteristics of professionalized campaigning? Or-
ganizationally, national party leaders and staff, along with external media 
advisors, have become increasingly important in driving the campaign (Ne-
grine/Papathanassopolous 1996; Norris 2000). These changes in campaign 
operation have led some political scientists to question professionaliza-
tion’s democratic effects, arguing that it may be responsible for the increas-
ing disaffection displayed by electorates around the world. As parties and 
other political actors become more reliant on technology, and begin to 
function more as commercial entities driven by ‘consumer’ or voter de-
mands, it becomes harder for them to sustain their grass-roots support and 
linkage to civil society (Lilleker 2005; Franklin 2004). These and other 
studies have revealed some interesting insights into the causes or incentives 
for parties to adopt professionalization and its consequences for these or-
ganizations and voters, particularly with regard to the use of new ICTs. 
This renewed emphasis on voter canvassing, combined with the use of new 
technologies for identifying and reaching out to potential supporters, can 
mobilize people and thus strengthen the links between parties and voters 
that have been weakened over the last few decades. This development ap-
pears to have emerged in the 2004 US presidential primaries, when candi-
dates began actively involving supporters in their campaigns by means of 
new ICTs (Trippi 2004).  
4.2.1 ICTs and campaigning 
ICTs as a new campaign medium were discussed in various ways and dimen-
sions. From a party’s perspective, one can differentiate its usage according to 
the key functions political parties have in established democracies, namely 
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opinion formation, interest mediation and organization of elections (Röm-
mele 2003: 9f)3. 
 
Opinion formation  
New ICTs offer political actors direct contact with citizens and thereby an 
advantage over existing media. Parties are able to control the content and 
“dosage” of political information that they emit via the Internet and so can 
offer unfiltered information to the public and also to more specific target 
groups. This is particularly useful for smaller and less established parties, 
parties that do not receive much attention, do not have a high newsworthi-
ness-factor for the media, and have a difficult time obtaining the financial 
means necessary for direct mailing and telemarketing. In the early days of the 
Internet, parties were largely content to put advertising material on the Web, 
with websites serving as a broad information board for citizens as well as 
journalists. Much of the information provided on the homepages of parties 
was taken from the parties’ standard, official material, e.g. the party charters 
and the party history (Löfgen 2000: 63). While retaining some of these more 
basic characteristics, many party sites have moved on to offer more of an 
“online magazine” with news updates and personalizing options. Most parties 
now have “political web portals” which serve as a broad entry point for users 
into politics online. These activities lie in the hand of party and campaign 
headquarters and are to fit the overall campaign strategy. Although it has 
clear participatory elements it can by and large be seen as a top-down infor-
mation tool with the media being its main target (Harrison 2000).  
 
Interest mediation 
The strongest hope at the very beginning of the ICT-discussion certainly was 
that political participation via the Internet would gradually bring more people 
into the democratic process, a process believed to be particularly important 
for groups currently disengaged from politics and from political discussion, 
i.e. the younger generation. Some scholars put forward a “mobilization hy-
pothesis:” these new forms of participation via new ICTs would widen the 
pool of political participants. Others were more pessimistic and stood for the 
so called “reinforcement thesis,” putting forward the argument that those who 
are already participating in politics also do so via ICTs. This notion was 
based on the evidence about the role of the Internet in US elections (Bimber 
                                                          
3 The web campaign literature can easily be related to the functionary distinctions we have 
shown to be discussed in party research. In their monograph on web campaigning, 
Foot/Schneider (2006) distinguish between the Web being used for informing; involving, 
and connecting. Informing is seen as “foundational to and part of all other Web practices. In 
other words, all online structures present information” (47). “We define Web Campaigning 
as those activities with political objectives that are manifested in, inscribed on, and enabled 
through the World Wide Web. Various actors engage in Web Campaigning in a range of 
sociopolitical contexts” (Foot/Schneider p. 4). 
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1998; Corrado 2000, Kamarck und Nye 1999). “Far from remaking American 
politics, the development of cyberspace and particularly of the World Wide 
Web, seems more likely to reinforce the status quo” (Margolis and Resnik 
2000: 54). However, new ICTs were seen as a vehicle especially for small 
and minor parties, those not in parliament and hence not receiving as much 
media attention due to less newsworthiness, to present their views to the pub-
lic. Pippa Norris (2003) demonstrates this for European parties on a broad 
empirical basis, noting the “widening of information available about minor 
and fringe parties, allowing them greater voice and visibility than coverage in 
traditional news media … This is important in principle for communication 
pluralism and the preconditions for effective party competition.” (Norris 
2003: 42f)  
 
Organization tool  
The new communication technology, of course, has also been discussed in re-
lation to party organization. In the early days of new ICTs, they have been 
regarded as simplifying administrative processes, as told to more effectively 
coordinate different party branches and be able to “stay on message” through 
these new orchestrating tools. Above all, during election campaigns, the 
Internet constitutes a strategically important tool because not only is it an ad-
ditional channel for the distribution of material and a medium for campaign 
management, is also enables region-wide mobilization of the active party 
base. For new parties in particular, such developments provide the means to 
building an organizational infrastructure that avoids the usual costs of re-
gional headquarters and physical participation in the party organization.  
4.2.2 (Old) mass media and news media – mediated versus 
unmediated news 
The campaign typology, which very nicely presents a historical “tour de 
force” through campaign history, also describes the relationship between the 
media and the political actors (Römmele 2005). In the pre-modern campaign 
phase, the media was dependent on politics; very often media was even 
owned by politics. It was the political elite and the campaign headquarters 
that had full control over media content. This picture has changed in the 
modern campaign phase; the media grew into an actor of its own and we can 
observe semi-dependencies between media and politics. Whereas the media 
is dependent on access to and the content of politics, politics on the other 
hand is dependent on the media; they need good stories, good reporting, etc. 
In the era of professionalized campaigning, the media has more and more be-
come an independent actor with its own interests in politics. 
As Cappella and Jamieson describe the shift, “the Seventies and Eighties 
were a time of fundamental change in the distribution of media coverage 
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from issue-based stories to ones that emphasize who is ahead and behind, and 
the strategies and tactics of campaigning necessary to position a candidate to 
get ahead or stay ahead” (1997: 33). Today, by any standard, analysis of the 
candidates’ strategies and reports on the state of the horserace are the domi-
nant themes in news coverage of campaigns. 
“Against this backdrop, technology at least makes it possible for voters to bypass 
or supplement media treatment of the campaign and access information about the 
issues that affect them. Rather than waiting for news organizations to report on 
the policies they might care about, voters can take matters into their own hands 
and visit candidate websites to examine their positions on the issues. This form of 
motivated exposure is hardly an impediment to deliberation: paying attention to 
what the candidates have to say on the issues facilitates issue-oriented voting and 
paying attention to the media circus does not. Thus, there is some reason to hope 
that the spread of new forms of unmediated communication will eventually pro-
vide a better way to inform and engage voters” (Iyengar 2011: 7) 
 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the relationship between politics and the 
media also depends on the respective environment in a given society. As 
mentioned earlier Hallin and Mancini (2004) identify three types of media 
systems: the liberal, the corporatist, and the pluralist polarized. Modern cam-
paigning as described above features “the horserace” rather than political is-
sues, and tends to do so independently from any political or social actors. It 
thus could be argued that the environment of modern campaigns increasingly 
follows the logic of the Anglo-Saxon liberal model while the Northern and 
Southern European media systems incrementally adapt. Evidence for this hy-
pothesis can be derived from two case studies from Northern and Southern 
Europe respectively. 
In Germany, which can be seen as a representative of the corporatist 
model, the media’s new role as an actor rather than an arena became evident 
in course of the events leading to the resignation of former President Chris-
tian Wulff. Prior to this case, both supporting and opposing certain German 
politicians was rare among media such as newspapers and TV stations. They 
would rather focus on policy initiatives and feature the politicians behind the 
respective bills than endorsing candidates (which is very common in liberal 
media systems) or criticizing them on a personal level. There have been some 
exceptions to be true. Gerhard Schröder, the social democratic party’s front-
runner in 1998 got endorsed by the magazine “Stern”, and German media in 
general, of course, always closely observed politicians’ actions and reported 
any potential misbehavior. Nevertheless, the degree of negative coverage of 
the former President’s business relations in early 2012 was extremely high 
given that his misdoings seemed rather small with none of them being con-
firmed as law violations at that point in time. 
One of the reasons for the intense coverage of this case surely was that 
Mr Wulff held the highest office in the country. Another reason might have 
been that he attacked the media itself and even tried to intimidate journalists 
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in order to prevent stories about him from being published. However, on a 
more general note, the new media culture might have played a role, too. With 
new ICTs – and especially social media – a politicians personality became 
more visible. Hence, “liking” or “disliking” politicians on a personal level 
was not a matter of private opinion any more but became part of public dis-
cussions about political decisions and the respective decision-makers.  
A few months prior to the German case, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi resigned in the course of the debt crisis which shook the whole 
Eurozone, but especially countries like Italy with a huge public debt. The res-
ignation of Berlusconi was seen as the end of an era regarding the interplay 
of media and politics.4 In Italy, a media system of the southern type, media 
are closely related to politics and often serve as communication platforms of 
certain political parties or groups. It will sure take some time for this system 
to change – the more so since Berlusconi, as a politician and owner of a large 
media network, personally embodies a connection between politics and the 
media which might prevail another couple of years. 
However, during the decline of the Berlusconi government, another de-
velopment took place which might be just as telling regarding the new shape 
of the Italian media system. Comedian Beppe Grillo, who gained lots of at-
tention through criticizing the Berlusconi government, founded a political 
party which gets most of its support through Grillo’s website, http://www. 
beppegrillo.it/. Here, along with his fans, influential politicians endorse 
Grillo’s agenda making his initiative (which started as comedy) a serious po-
litical contender. This again is more typical for liberal media systems where 
people like Michael Moore or Stephen Colbert regularly cross the borders be-
tween politics, business, the media, comedy, and the arts, than it is for sys-
tems of the Southern European type. 
Sure enough, none of the events described above were caused by the me-
dia alone. However, they both show steps towards a new self-image of the 
media in those countries. At the same time, with social media entering the 
market, there seems to be evidence that the more traditional media try to turn 
to their new challengers by adapting some of their techniques such as the “I 
like”-culture introduced by Facebook. 
4.2.3 From tool to strategy? 
Without a doubt, the social media have the potential to empower citizen-
driven campaigning and to challenge or even shift the campaign-power map 
from party headquarters to citizens. The term citizen-driven campaigning was 
generated from the observation of the new web-enabled participatory prac-
                                                          
4 Provided that Mr Berlusconi will not have managed a successful comeback by the time this 
paper is published. 
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tices the social networks offer, but of course also implies activities that are 
not necessarily new (like political discussion, contacting, donating, etc.) and 
can be performed offline. However, the key difference to party campaigning 
is that citizens themselves take the initiative to engage in a political cam-
paign, to spread the word themselves, producing a new, more self-directing, 
spontaneous, and socially embedded (rather than institutionally/organizatio-
nally driven) layer of political action during a campaign (see also Gibson 
2009). In contrast, party-driven campaigning is initiated and conducted by 
party organizations rather than party members.  
The mother of citizen-driven online campaigns is surely Howard Dean’s 
primary campaign in 2003/04. Although he was not nominated by the De-
mocratic Party, his rise from unknown governor of a small northeastern state 
to front-runner status in the primaries marked for many a “coming of age” 
story of the Internet as a political medium. Central to his campaign and the 
campaign success were the “Dean for America” blog and email lists, which, 
according to its national director Joe Trippi, were critical in personalizing re-
lationships with supporters and developing a sense of joint-ownership of the 
Dean candidacy. The Obama campaign in 2008 was the first campaign oper-
ating in the social media era and “took it to new and dizzying heights” (Gib-
son 2009: 292). The key characteristic of Obama’s campaign surely was the 
widening of the campaign’s organizational base to encompass a host of ordi-
nary citizens through the new forms of social media.  
First empirical results on the role of social media in election campaigns 
in the 2009 German federal election give us an overall estimate on the poten-
tial impact of this new medium (Römmele/Einwiller 2012) How many citi-
zens actually read campaign material through this channel and how many ac-
tively post campaign information on these platforms? And what social deter-
minants predict citizen-driven campaign activity?  
Do parties/campaign headquarters face a loss of (power and message) 
control, given that the use of social media is on a remarkably high level, and 
steadily increasing? The findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
– 15% of the electorate read campaign material on the social media at least 
once a week.  
– With 4% of the voting population, the number of citizen-driven cam-
paigners is still limited. However, they origin from a different social 
group that citizens engaging in party-campaigning: citizen-driven cam-
paigning is conducted by young people (education is not a predictor) 
with a strong party identification. 
– A key characteristic of those young campaigners is outreach. They are 
connected to a heterogeneous environment and serve as so-called “bridg-
ing hubs.” Therefore, they are ideal ambassadors to broaden one’s politi-
cal base. 
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Against this background, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. Party-
oriented participation is likely to further decline in the next few years, while 
citizen-driven campaigning could increase. Hence, parties have to think of 
ways to activate supporting citizens and include their activities in the overall 
campaign strategy. This, however, could be quite difficult to implement, as 
citizen-driven campaigners operate in heterogeneous environments, which 
are quite different from the homogeneous scene a party provides. 
Nevertheless, parties could benefit from further reaching out to the online 
world not only regarding external support but also in terms of their internal 
democratic culture. While operating in homogeneous environments, party-
driven campaigners may lose touch with the outside world and could be 
prone to the phenomenon of “groupthink,” i.e. supporting the party program 
and candidates’ views without questioning them (Janis 1972). In this regard, 
connections to online forums, where issues of all kinds are discussed most 
controversially, could add to the party’s ability to respond to certain trends 
and demands instead of simply staying on (the same) messages. 
This said, however, one should not forget that social media is a brand 
new player in the political arena, which has so far not proven to be a sustain-
able source of political support. There is a fair chance that the social media 
scene turns out to be too dependent on short-term trends to serve as a reliable 
sounding board. Moreover, the online community has developed stances to-
ward certain political issues like internal security and consumer protection 
that are not necessarily shared by the majority of the population. Hence, the 
dynamics of agenda setting and opinion making within social media requires 
further research in order to estimate their value for professionalized cam-
paigning. 
4.2.4 New media and the personalization of politics 
Personalization of politics has been a highly debated issue over the last 
twenty years – not only in the context of campaigns. This development is 
normally judged negatively; individuals and grandstanding would displace 
content and substance. In this debate, three aspects of personalization are to 
be distinguished: first, the personalization of the campaign strategy – i.e. the 
focus of the party on its top candidate. Second, the personalization of media 
reporting on politics – i.e. personalization via the mass media. And thirdly, 
the personalization of the voting behavior – i.e. the impact of personalization 
on the behavior of recipients.  
Such assumptions may be popular – but the personalization of politics 
cannot be detected in all aspects of campaigning and is often less dramatic 
than claimed. Parties have always concentrated on the best candidates in the 
election – so this is certainly not a new phenomenon. Of course the extent of 
this form of personalization varies depending on the political system (person-
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alization is clearly more strongly developed in presidential systems as in par-
liamentarian systems) and of course it also varies from election to election. 
Yet a dramatic increase in overall personalization cannot be claimed (Brett-
schneider 2010: 134).  
However, the personalization of media reporting is clearly increasing – 
media reporting thus focuses more on candidates than on parties. Römmele 
(2005) empirically demonstrates that it is above all an increase in media re-
porting on ministers, as well as the shadow cabinet, rather than an increase in 
reporting on the main candidates. Election research has clearly empirically 
shown that despite the personalization of media reporting, the decision of 
voters, now as before, remains tied to long-term identification with a party – 
rather than to an isolated assessment of the candidate (e.g. Brettschneider 
2010; Franklin 2004).  
With the rise of new ICTs, parties and other political actors were able to 
escape the logic of the media; while above all television was focused on indi-
viduals, i.e. on personalized communications, it was now possible through 
new media to directly put forth and make accessible stronger content, sup-
porting information, and arguments. But more and more, personalization was 
entering communications through new media. In the age of Web 1.0, candi-
dates had their own homepage, in which home stories, etc. increased in im-
portance.  
As was just put forward, in the age of Web 1.0, information stood in the 
foreground. The media and interested citizens were thought to be able to ac-
cess a more comprehensive and above all more personalized picture of the 
candidates. In the era of social media, in which dialogue and communications 
of the supporters play decisive roles, personalization has an additional impli-
cation: now, not only the candidate is important, but also those who spread 
information about the candidate and his or her campaign within their personal 
network – the so-called citizen driven campaigning, also alluded to above. 
Here, campaigners very often function as opinion leaders.  
The concept of opinion leaders (and the two-step flow of communication) 
was first developed by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944). It is a micro-concept emphasiz-
ing the importance of the opinion of trustworthy persons in the formation of 
one’s own opinions. The trusted others are often characterized as opinion lead-
ers, since to a certain degree they determine the development of others’ opin-
ions. One can also attempt to identify opinion leaders from the responses of 
others (Klingemann/Römmele 2001), as opinion leadership is based on “soft 
power” which requires a certain degree of conviction among followers. In the 
words of Joseph Nye, “soft power relies on the ability to shape the preferences 
of others to want what you want” (Nye 2009: 319). He further argues that mak-
ing others want what you want by means of conviction and attraction may even 
turn them into “entrepreneurs” who actively spread the word themselves. Be-
sides that, studies on organizational management point out positive effects of 
“inspirational leadership” on the commitment of others and, thus, process ef-
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fectiveness (Bass 1993; Gill 2006). In sum, “inspired” opinion leaders may 
have an enormous impact on campaign dynamics. 
The question empirical research has addressed is: in what kind of environ-
ments do these opinion leaders actually communicate? Do they communicate 
in groups with a wide variety of ideological perspectives, i.e. in heterogeneous 
networks? Or are they at the center of homogenous networks of people who 
share similar perspectives? This relates to the ongoing discussion on the bridg-
ing and bonding role of online communities (Norris 2002) and has its roots in 
Putnam’s discussion on bridging and bonding groups. In Putnam’s words 
(2000), “bridging social capital refers to social networks that bring together 
people of different sorts, and bonding social capital brings together people of a 
similar sort […]”. And, secondly, can we make a statement about the role these 
citizen-driven campaigners play within their networks? The preliminary results 
for Germany, the USA, and Canada show a clear trend towards heterogeneous 
networks, i.e. citizen-driven campaigning via social media has an outreach into 
societal groups that traditional party-driven campaigning does not have.  
4.3  E-Campaigning and civil society 
Civil society might be the most diverse sphere (compared to politics and 
business) when it comes to e-campaigning. There is a huge variety of actors 
ranging from independent activists to highly professionalized lobby groups. 
Accordingly, their resources and toolkits vary as well as their strategic goals, 
and discussions about the success criteria of NGOs and potential trade-offs 
have been going on for many years (Miller 1994). While grassroots move-
ments mostly care about the activation and mobilization of supporters, NGOs 
and pressure groups also try to lobby decision-makers on a professional level 
that might be detached from their groundwork. 
However, one general principle remains: public support is the most im-
portant resource for a civil society movement’s legitimacy and, thus, is essen-
tial for all their operations. So, in terms of campaigning, the big question is 
how to generate visible support, i.e. getting citizens to participate. Two ex-
amples illustrate that the future of civil society campaigning might be a mix 
of offline and online activism. 
4.3.1 Citizens taking to the street I: The German 
“wutbürger” 
To estimate the extent and power of civil society campaigning in the digital 
age, let’s start with a case from Germany – a country that is usually seen as 
rather satisfied with its (representative) political system. 
Electronic political campaigning 117 
 
In 2010, German civil society was on the move. A type of citizen that has 
existed for many years is, all of the sudden, receiving attention: the “wutbür-
ger” (“angry citizen”). They first publicly appeared to protest against a far-
reaching school reform in the city-state of Hamburg (http://www.wir-wollen-
lernen.de/), then showed up in Bavaria, where they urged the government to 
strengthen the existing law to protect non-smokers (http://www.nichtrauch-
erschutz-bayern.de/), and had their most important appearance in Stuttgart 
opposing the plan to expand the city’s railway network and move the central 
station underground (http://www.kopfbahnhof-21.de/). It was during this pro-
test against that the term “wutbürger” was coined. It has since made its way 
into German dictionaries, and the German Language Society named it the 
word of the year in 2010. 
What is newsworthy about the phenomenon is not the fact that they pro-
test, but rather their attitude towards protesting and the way in which they or-
ganize. Contrary to other activist groups, the initiatives mentioned above do 
not stem from cleavages that have shaped the German political discourse for 
decades. One of the most prominent examples of the latter would be the de-
bates on the use on nuclear power or on a general minimum wage. These de-
mands have been closely connected to certain political camps right from the 
start and were either pushed forward by established actors like parties or un-
ions, or developed some kind of institutional framework on their own. The is-
sue of nuclear energy was even key to the birth of a new party, the Greens. 
As of today, all these movements have an agenda and an ideology which goes 
beyond the policy measures they protest for. 
The wutbürger however do not pursue any overarching goal or mission. 
They rather feel that pointing to shortcomings in policy making is one of 
their civic duties. Accordingly, they acknowledge that the government’s 
scope is limited, and try to offer feasible alternatives along with their criti-
cism. This notwithstanding, the crucial question remains: when – and how – 
did their activism turn into a phenomenon? One possible explanation goes as 
follows: the increasing number of protests and the intensity of the arguments 
led to widespread media coverage, and “wutbürger” is therefore merely a 
term coined by the media. However, there have been intense and well-
covered protests before. So how could the new wutbürger movements attract 
a broad range of citizens which exceeds the groups who have been involved 
with traditional NGO or party politics before? 
Social media seems to be key to understanding this phenomenon. All the 
movements mentioned above offered people to participate online and offline 
in order to include as many people as possible. This helped these initiatives – 
all of which were regional issues rather than national ones – to travel around 
the country and to gain support among people living hundreds of miles away 
from the actual site of the railway project. Moreover, participation as such 
was a major goal, and awareness was created for the fact that citizens want to 
actively engage in shaping their living conditions. 
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Meanwhile, political leaders acknowledging these efforts have begun to 
offer ways for citizens to give input on certain topics. In the case of the Stutt-
gart railway project, citizens even had the chance to state their arguments 
face-to-face with politicians, in sessions broadcasted on national television. 
So, above all, the movement of the “wutbürger” led to substantial changes in 
the way governments think about participation. 
This, in turn, led to a referendum and a majority of voters backed the 
original plan. The anti-Stuttgart 21 coalition has partially dissolved, with 
some of the activists returning to the streets after their televised mediation, 
while others accepted the settlement. This clearly shows that a huge presence 
online and in the streets is not necessarily representing an actual majority of 
the population. 
4.3.2 Citizens taking to the street II: The Occupy Movement 
in the US 
It is not easy to tell the story of the Occupy movement, since no one can pre-
cisely pinpoint where it all began. In July 2011, an independent, anti-con-
sumerist group called “Adbusters” came up with an idea, and since the Inter-
net is the medium of the day, they sent it out via emails and tweets tagged 
“occupywallstreet.” The group however, was not responsible for the move-
ment that followed: independent activists created a website and spread the 
word even before Adbusters could follow up on their own idea. At one point, 
September 17 was suggested as the official starting date, since this was Con-
stitution Day, an American federal observance. Sure enough, many people 
showed up in Zucotti Park, a small area in New York’s financial district, 
making this the first day of a movement that has since travelled across the 
globe.  
In the beginning, there were no leaders but only a few random people help-
ing to organize the event. And even though the movement became quite well 
structured, connected, and organized, there is still no real leadership in place. 
There are powerful online platforms like MoveOn.org, but they again serve as 
facilitators rather than guides or leaders – the more so since Occupiers repeat-
edly claimed that moveon.org should not try to co-opt the movement but let it 
develop independently. This is the typical story of social movements in the 
digital age: they are not initiated by anyone. They simply emerge.  
Right from the start, social media was key to the success of the move-
ment. All relevant information was distributed online, everything they said or 
did was up for discussion via platforms like Facebook, Twitter, etc. So, in 
contrast to many other existing social movements, which step by step discov-
ered social media as a means for their actions (activation, mobilization, etc.), 
the Occupy movement is truly shaped by its medium: the social media are 
part of Occupy’s DNA. 
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This does not mean, of course, that Occupy would not include offline 
activities. On the contrary: they adapted the toolkit of earlier movements in 
many ways. People in Zucotti Park and elsewhere often felt reminded of the 
Civil Rights Movement: there were sit-ins, teach-ins, sing-alongs. Some 
people camped out, others donated food, clothes, or sleeping bags. Every-
thing within the camp was shared among all, nothing was charged for. So 
basically, the flower power movement of the ‘60s is also part of Occupy’s 
DNA.  
This is not to say that all occupiers were hippies. Nor were they all te-
chies, nerds, and geeks. But at some point these two lifestyles merged and 
contributed to a rather unique movement with one major goal: raising 
awareness. The addressing of some major economic issues, especially in-
come inequality, is what will be commemorated in history books. The slo-
gan “We are the 99%” was a brilliant way to frame the fact that the top one 
per cent of the population has gathered an enormous share of the country’s 
wealth.  
This has been a major irritation to many, to be certain. Given that the 
United States always considered itself to be the country of unlimited oppor-
tunities, the idea of structural inequality, “glass ceilings,” and other obstacles 
that systematically deprive certain people of their chance to make a living on 
their own came as a shock. Even among supporters of the movement there 
was no real consensus on this diagnosis and they certainly did not agree on 
how to combat the crisis. 
Here, again, the very nature of the movement prevented it from getting 
torn apart. Occupy Wall Street, as well as all of its international sister move-
ments, was – and still is – not about solutions, but about questions. The Inter-
net, especially social media, made it possible for everybody to participate 
and, thus, feel included. In contrast to many other movements, which have 
clear demands (“no war!”, “stop the use of nuclear energy!”, “free Ai Wei-
wei,” etc.), people of the Occupy movement simply shared concerns and 
were keen on discussing them and making them visible among society, poli-
tics, and corporations. This is the Internet’s strong suit: fostering exchange, 
spreading ideas, connecting people. So, in the case of the Occupy movement, 
the medium and the message truly became one. 
4.3.3 Civil society’s e-factor 
The two cases clearly show the potential and limitations of the e-factor in 
civil society campaigning. Once pushed forward by some sort of movement, 
the messages spread quickly and reached and involved many people through 
the means of virality and interaction.  
This, however, does not mean that the audiences involved could repre-
sent the population. So even if the degree of public awareness might be simi-
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lar, the buzz created through targeted messages is not comparable to the at-
tention resulting from an event that affects the whole population. 
Moreover, both cases show that offline groundwork is also essential and 
the case from Germany also indicates that traditional media also need to in-
volved to increase awareness. Hence, future e-campaigning activities need to 
be embedded in a broader communication strategy. 
4.4 Conclusion 
At the beginning of our chapter, we pointed towards the potential of e-
campaigning. How well can politics, and civil society organizations use com-
munication via www to target its messages? How viral are these campaigns 
and to what degree does social media enhance the responsiveness and the in-
teractivity between senders and recipients? Those were key questions we 
posed and we were able to present some answers.  
There is empirical evidence that these new communication tools are in-
stalled to target specific sub-audiences with tailored messages. We know that 
organizations use a different tone and spin in those messages, but the core posi-
tion being communicated remains the same (Römmele 2005) – they are „on 
message“. However, chances are that recipients spread the message (“virality”) 
and/or give feedback to the sender (“interaction”). This matters to campaigners 
in two different ways: First of all, communication in the digital age is not a one 
way street. Consequently, every modern communication must not only include 
but essentially focus on what happens after a message has been sent out. How 
will people react, what kinds of feedback will you get, and who else will become 
aware of what you said? The potential and pitfalls of strategies which do or do 
not take this effect into account could be demonstrated by the examples of Ger-
man ex-president Christian Wulff who incautiously threatened the media, and 
Beppe Grillo of Italy who transcended the borders between comedy and politics. 
Secondly, these new ways of interaction might create a new type of pub-
lic sphere. It has been argued before that television might lose its role as a 
leading news source, and recent studies find that among young adults this is 
already the case.5 The media landscape is likely to further diversify, making 
it actually more difficult for information to travel across different parts of so-
ciety. This might bear the risk of segregation. The public sphere, in a Haber-
masian sense, defined as the realm for public discourse (Habermas 1989), is 
likely to split up into an indefinite number of smaller arenas where like-
minded people meet. 
                                                          
5 http://www.people-press.org/2011/01/04/internet-gains-on-television-as-publics-main-
news-source/ 
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On the bright side, however, social media enable organizations to reach 
into audiences they have little or no connection to in the offline world. Em-
pirical research has clearly proven the “bridging character” of online com-
munities – information and messages are communicated via citizen-
campaigners into their respective networks. Parties could benefit from further 
reaching out to the online world not only regarding external support but also 
in terms of their internal democratic culture, while operating in the offline 
world only could make them prone to the phenomenon of “groupthink”, i.e. 
supporting the party program and candidates’ views without questioning 
them (Janis 1972). In this regard, connections to online forums where issues 
of all kinds are discussed most controversially could add to the party’s ability 
to respond to certain trends and demands instead of simply staying on (the 
same) messages in homogeneous environments, party-driven campaigners 
may lose touch with the outside world. 
The multiplier-factor and outreach potential of viral campaigning is im-
mense, however, especially when looking at civil society and the use of so-
cial media here it has shown that the medium and the message alone is not 
sufficient. At some point a clear structured organization and leadership are 
required to have sustainable impact.  
This notwithstanding, the biggest challenge for organizations is the loss 
of control over both the message itself and the direction in which it is com-
municated. Without a doubt, social media has the potential to reship the cam-
paign power map form party or corporate headquarters to citizens. As a con-
sequence it seems almost impossible to frame a message in a way which truly 
reaches and appeals to groups as diverse as television viewers back in the 
1980s and 1990s. Back then, TV access was highly developed in most mod-
ern societies while the number of options (i.e., channels) was still limited, 
making TV the ideal campaign medium of that time. As of today, it seems 
unlikely that any other media channel will have an outreach comparable to 
TV regarding both, the pure numbers and the diversity of its audience.  
This is backed by the important observation that despite their high level 
of public support, social movements like the wutbürger or Occupy were not 
necessarily backed by a majority of the population. This distinction between 
visible and actual support might be among the most crucial ones that will 
frame the discussion about e-campaigning. And it might be the very reason 
why, even five years from now, many grocery stores or local politicians or 
neighborhood initiatives will still not be available via social media. 
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5. Open government and open data      
Stephanie Wojcik            
In recent years, face-to-face participatory instruments have become more and 
more popular as an object of study in the social sciences. This is because they 
are considered to possess the potential to renew existing modes of public ac-
tion and to further the legitimization of those political systems within which 
they are applied. Participatory instruments intend to establish environments 
for inclusion and dialogue to enable higher levels of citizen participation. Re-
search on their origin and functioning is ongoing and has already yielded 
very interesting information on possibilities and limits. Many such studies 
have been in response to questions raised with respect to forms of political 
awareness, citizen participation and their effects on public action (Blondiaux 
2008; Bacqué/Sintomer 2011). In the same vein, the use of digital participa-
tion – whether initiated by public authorities or the citizens, collectively or 
individually – has attracted a great deal of academic attention. 
“The role the Internet plays as a watchdog, and an instrument of dissemination 
and of mobilization (circulation of information and an increase in online petition-
ing) is becoming more and more central in the functioning of democracy…” 
(Haegel 2009: 52). 
Normalization or mobilization 
However, an increasing number of studies now question the links between 
political participation and the Internet, based on an interpretation of its poten-
tial benefits and the reality of how people use it. Different approaches have 
examined the links between off-line and multiple forms of online political 
participation.  
Normalization, examined in a study by Margolis and Resnick (2000), 
posits that the Internet in fact mostly mobilizes people who are already politi-
cally active off-line (Norris 2003). Furthermore, following a logic already 
identified (although disputed) in the sociology of media, which says that a 
person selects from all available information according to her pre-existing 
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personal interests, the politically active Internet user would then tend to fre-
quent only online sites where she can interact with people who share the 
same opinion. Thus, far from favoring confrontation between a diversity of 
opinions, these online discussions do no more than reinforce the initial con-
victions of the participants (Sunstein 2001). This polarization of opinions is 
particularly problematic as it leads to a “balkanization of the political dis-
course” (Flichy 2008: 168). In an even more radical version, the public sphere 
could simply disappear because of the exponential increase of individual dis-
courses, more often juxtaposed than interconnected. 
The second approach, called mobilization, considers that the Internet 
lowers the cost of participating and can thus be useful for all those whose 
family or professional constraints do not allow for civic engagement in its 
usual traditional and time-bound forms. Furthermore, through research en-
gines, discussion forums and the diverse applications that the social web of-
fers, the Internet allows people with common interests to interact beyond 
their usual and inevitably restrained social circles (family, friends, colleagues 
etc.). It can thus facilitate mobilization and would seem to be particularly ef-
ficient for the defense of specific causes, such as anti-war movements, or 
world causes, such as climate-warming. 
Lastly, certain researchers are less concerned by electronic participation 
in itself than by the social dynamic changes that it is presumed to reveal (Ve-
del/Ward 2006; Barboni/Treille 2010). We could consider these practices as a 
sort of field of experimentation intended for a better comprehension of new 
trends. For example, political engagement seems to be characterized today by 
distanced practices: militants seem to be less inclined to make a long-term 
commitment to political groups that function in a traditional way (section 
meetings, public meetings, flyer distribution during campaigns etc.). New, 
more fluid, ephemeral practices of political engagement have become possi-
ble via the Internet, and they allow the user to express his ideological prefer-
ences more freely (sign an online petition, become friends with a candidate 
on Facebook etc.). 
These three approaches are still more or less the framework for current 
research, but they are being re-evaluated or refined (Wright 2010) according 
to the different evolutions and the diversification of digital forms of expres-
sion or collaboration (Proulx/Millerand 2010). Thus, while in 2006 Ward and 
Vedel concluded that, on the whole, empirical studies confirmed the idea of 
normalization, by 2009 the general consensus seemed to be emerging that the 
Internet had small but nevertheless positive effects on political engagement 
(Boulianne 2009). Depending on the user, certain possibilities such as online 
voting lead to modulating the intensity of their effects (Hirzalla et al. 2011). 
One potentially negative impact of information and communication tech-
nologies on democratic practice refers to a return to an authentic, direct de-
mocracy in which traditional representative organizations would be over-
shadowed by a direct connection between political leaders and the citizens. 
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This would be the advent of a surveillance society in which citizens are sub-
mitted to social control (see the critique in Chambat 2003). There have been 
several attempts to find theoretical correlations between democracy and the 
Internet, subsumed in the expression of electronic democracy (for example, 
Chadwick 2006; Fuchs 2007; Dahlberg 2011; Monnoyer-Smith 2011), to try 
to categorize the multiplicity of political experiences and practices that de-
pend wholly or partly on information and communication technologies. 
For example, Lincoln Dahlberg (2011) distinguishes four major concepts 
of electronic democracy: liberal-individualist; deliberative; the counter-
public; and the Marxist-autonomist. These categories cannot be analyzed in 
detail here. Suffice to say that each of these depends on a different concept of 
democratic subjectivity as well as the kind of democracy at hand. Thus, for 
example, in the liberal-individualist concept of electronic democracy, digital 
technologies are simply an effective way to transmit information and view-
points between individuals within the representative process of decision-
making. The citizen is seen as a rational and calculating subject, who wants 
his own interests to be taken into consideration, although he can also act out 
of empathy and consideration for the needs of others. 
Other authors have highlighted the main axes around which have been 
built the discourses and projects on electronic democracy. Thus, Thierry Ve-
del has highlighted three axes echoing one of the main difficulties of modern 
political systems: informing the citizen so as to make up for the lack of trans-
parency in politics; debate and discussion to try to make up for the smallness 
or even closure of the public sphere; and public deliberation and decision-
making to try to fight the phenomenon of cutting the citizen out of the deci-
sion-making process (Vedel 2003). In a very similar way, Rabia Karakayat 
Polat (2005) sees the Internet as a source of information, a communication 
medium and a virtual public sphere, and she examines the links with political 
participation in terms of these facets. 
Other studies have also used this categorization (for example, Breindl 
2010; Wojcik 2010) in order to criticize participatory instruments for institu-
tional debate that are based exclusively on an orderly and linear approach to 
online participation (i.e. informing, debating, deciding), reinforced by an ide-
alistic concept of “democracy as a rational space founded on the primacy of 
the discursive regime” (Allard/Blondeau 2009: 3). 
The notion of electronic democracy refers to the idea of developing po-
litical participation through the electronic networks, for citizens to communi-
cate either between themselves or with their representatives. Here, open gov-
ernment and open data play an important role: “Open government is seen 
here as a government strategy which includes citizen participation in the 
process of political decision making and which allows open access to public 
data to enhance transparency and to assist policy making processes. Open 
data strategies are defined here as the access to relevant government data and 
statistics under freedom of information acts” (see Kersting in this volume). 
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Open government and open data rely on an invited space where government 
allows broader information and participation. Depending on their degree of 
freedom, these initiatives can contribute to the autonomy and independence 
of the participatory instruments.  
Thus we can find here a variety of initiatives, instruments, and practices, 
all dependent to a greater or lesser degree on the information and communi-
cation technologies used to further the democratic process of representation 
(Hacker/Van Dijk 2000). Also evident are the political experiences based on 
information and communication technologies, which allow people, either in-
dividually or collectively, to express themselves freely with no constraint 
from public authorities. This leads to a reshaping of the traditional public 
sphere (Cardon 2010). 
Such a definition of electronic democracy obviously raises a broad ques-
tion – how do the Internet practices used by both politico-administrative in-
stitutions and citizens lead to a re-examining of the mechanisms of produc-
tion and appraisal of public decision-making and public action? Faced with 
the immensity of the theoretical field thus opened, our aim is, comparatively 
modest. In order to look at the question of online political participation, we 
propose an overview of the above-mentioned practices, which will highlight 
the different controversies raised by such practices in relation to the existing 
theories, specifically those in political science and the sociology of the me-
dia. 
In an intentionally restricted way, two questions will structure this pa-
per. Firstly, how does the production and mass dissemination of information 
by institutions, media, and citizens affect the functioning of democratic po-
litical regimes that encourage political participation in one way or another? 
Secondly, does the multiplicity of online public spaces that allow for self-
expression and discussion, both initiated and used by individuals and per-
haps belonging to the institutional sphere, lead to widening the role played 
by citizens in the definition of the political stakes and decisions that concern 
them? 
5.1 Producing and disseminating information. Between 
public management and citizen empowerment 
The discourses as well as the governmental practices that use ICT (Informa-
tion and Communication Technologies) are based on the idea that “putting 
into circulation news (and not information), i.e. carefully constructed, se-
lected and well thought-out data, has become a new imperative of good gov-
ernance” (Lascoumes 2001: 307). This imperative is a result of both an ad-
ministrative need (public services need to be facilitated for users) and a need 
for greater ‘transparency’ in the activities and functioning of the state.  
Open government and open data 129 
 
In France, following the 1978 Nora-Minc report (1978), the ICT (first the 
Minitel, then the Internet) were considered by the public authorities as a 
means to facilitate informing the public of government initiatives at different 
levels of the State activities. After 1994 and Gerard Thery’s report on infor-
mation highways, the digital networks began to interest politicians who very 
rapidly saw the potential uses of the ICT to combat administrative complex-
ity. This interest can be seen in the multiplicity of reports that linked the dis-
semination of public data – collected by public agencies, – and modernizing 
of the state (Vedel/Wojcik 2008). Since 2008, public action for ICT seems to 
be clearly directed towards protecting producers of content and especially 
towards the potential economic profits these technologies can bring, with the 
creation of a Secretary of State for Prospectives and Development of the 
Digital Economy, directly under the control of the Prime Minister. 
In short, whatever their political leaning, the successive governments all 
share the same preoccupations: extending electronic administration, protect-
ing personal data, reducing the digital divide, using ICTs to develop the 
economy, while the theme of electronic democracy only raises very moderate 
public interest and appears first and foremost to be reduced to e-voting (Ve-
del/Wojcik 2008). 
As a result, as well as all the laws and bills, parliamentary debates, offi-
cial reports and speeches by government officials available on the specialized 
websites such as vie-publique.fr or legifrance.fr, most institutions, at what-
ever territorial level, have their own Internet website, with varied content 
concerning their functioning, mission and major public initiatives. To this 
content can be added all the information and practical services for the public, 
certain aspects of which also have their own specifically dedicated websites, 
run by the government (for example, service-public.fr, impot.gouv.fr). On a 
local level, in 2009, 84% of French cities had a website (99% in towns of 
more than 10 000 inhabitants, and 82% in smaller towns and villages), which 
shows a very large increase over the last few years1. 
The politico-administrative institutions can also set up websites dedi-
cated to one or several sectors of activity that they deal with or that are aimed 
at a specific portion of the public. Furthermore, because of the diversification 
of access to the Internet, both institutions and authorities are developing mo-
bile versions of their website content, as well as applications linked to gen-
eral public services that are accessible from mobile terminals connected to 
the Internet2 such as smartphones, and tablets. 
To this now well-established presence of institutions on the Internet can 
be added an increasing use of the different applications, hubs and services 
(e.g. geo-localizing) now available on social networks. For example, out of 
                                                          
1 http://www.orange.com/fr_FR/collectivites/presence/partenaires/sondage.jsp 
2 http://www.proximamobile.fr/ 
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the fifteen ministries in the French Sarkozy government, six have a Twitter 
profile with a total of 11 accounts.  
This official use of Internet technologies, particularly the applications 
available through social media that aim for greater transparency in state ac-
tivities, can, in fact, lead to further blurring of the already tenuous borders be-
tween public information and communication of the politicians themselves. 
The political use of social media could accentuate the already visible aspects 
of a political communication that plays more and more on the levels of affect, 
of personalization or of proximity between the political leaders and the citi-
zens. How else can we consider the Twitter account opened by Nicolas 
Sarkozy, not in his own name but in that of the Elysée, during the Copenha-
gen Summit (December 2009)? Such an account allowed for the relaying of 
official information about decisions taken, with the President’s intentions and 
personal opinions being made clear without his name being attached directly 
to them.  
The Open data movement: between accountability and public 
management 
More profoundly, these evolutions on the technical modes and formats used 
to publicize government action question the status of the information itself 
and how it is used, with a two-fold intention to evaluate and assess the action 
taken by those who govern and the democratization in defining public 
choices. In this way, Barack Obama’s Transparency and Open Government 
program combines transparency with the necessity for representatives to be 
accountable for their actions. It encourages citizens to participate in order to 
improve the efficiency and the quality of the decisions, in such a way that the 
decisions are founded on widely disseminated knowledge within the society, 
rather than on the expertise of a few top civil servants. Such a program is 
based principally on academic theories which underline the complex nature 
of the decision-making processes within a context of public action defini-
tively placed under the sign of incertitude, particularly in the field of sciences 
and health. By mobilizing the possibilities of the digital networks, govern-
ments need to be able to take and include the knowledge and know-how of 
lay citizens, without their institutional or professional status becoming a cri-
terion of evaluation for the relevance of their contribution. We have a model 
of this kind of cooperation and collaboration in the online encyclopedia 
Wikipedia (Noveck 2008). Such a program led to a multitude of initiatives, 
among which was the ‘open data’ policy, thanks to the implementation of the 
website www.data.gov, which made available to the public, in formats that 
facilitated their sharing and reuse, a selection of data produced by govern-
ment agencies. This data had hitherto been kept in the agencies’ computer, 
and could range from statistics produced by the federal health agency on the 
number of overweight people to data relative to the State budget. To make it 
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easier for the citizens, new forms of collaboration were set up between the 
government authorities and developers, engineers and open-source software 
designers. The idea was to supply, produce and create both applications and 
usability tools, such as those which allow a user to visualize large quantities 
of cartographical, graphic or statistical data and to link up data coming from 
different sources. 
Whatever opinion we might have of the truly democratic or innovative 
nature of this program, it is nonetheless true that many diverse national and 
regional governing bodies around Europe (Spain, Denmark, Norway, The 
United Kingdom, etc.) have all opened up their data bases, using strategies 
that are more or less well defined (Huijboon/Van den Broek 2011) and within 
frameworks that are not always born of a true desire to promote a greater par-
ticipation of citizens in public decision-making.  
In France, since February 2011 the data website gouv.fr was set up 
through an inter-ministerial committee called Etalab. Until 2011 different 
public initiatives aiming to open up data bases came from a small group of 
local authorities, for example, the Rennes urban area. Rennes Metropole 
made public all the data of its public transport network Keolis, and its city 
centre, especially the services dealing with geographic information, and in 
particular the urban environment (e.g. the location of flowerbeds, parking 
meters or playgrounds). For the moment, the section called Citizenship only 
gives information on where to find the voting offices and the way the city is 
divided up into districts3. The aim is clearly to produce services for the users 
of public services and the improvement of the daily lives of city-dwellers, 
with, for example, the possibility for a Rennes resident, if he is connected, to 
be informed in real-time of the availability of self-service citybikes. 
In fact, it is possible to see at work, in this movement of open data, evi-
dence of one of the features of the neo-liberal, public management system i.e. 
the taking over by private providers (companies, developers, computer scien-
tists) of public services, which could then become profit-making. Indeed, the 
raw data, whether it is statistical or geographic, does not, in itself, have any 
economic, social or political implication. Its economic value depends entirely 
on the applications to which it can give birth, and that can only be developed 
by those who have a certain level of technical skills in information, content or 
services. Companies such as Data publica can, as a result, benefit from public 
financing (Chausson 2011). 
However, companies are not the only ones to make the most of the de-
velopment opportunities that the open data policy has created. For very dif-
ferent reasons, private individuals or civil society organisations can also un-
dertake to collect, compile, exploit and render visible data produced by pub-
lic agencies. Organizations such as the Open Knowledge Foundation or My-
Society in the UK, or LiberTIC or Regards Citoyens in France all work on 
                                                          
3 http://www.data.rennes-metropole.fr/les-donnees/catalogue/ 
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collecting and displaying such data through a number of visualization proce-
dures and techniques so as to make it available for political interpretation. We 
can thus find a number of vigilant citizens who watch government actions very 
closely. In other countries, such initiatives exist, particularly to publish the 
budgets of government authorities and especially to show the link between 
taxes paid by the tax-payers and the financing of different public initiatives  
http://whatwepayfor.com/ (United States); http://wheredoesmymoneygo.org/ 
(United Kingdom) – or to show where the funds come from that are used by 
political parties and candidates during election campaigns  http://www. 
followthemoney.org/ (United States). In France the best example of this vigi-
lance can be seen on the website nosdeputes.fr which claims to be a citizen 
observatory of parliamentary activity. This site, created by Regards Citoyens 
and fed by volunteers, monitor the activities of French members of parlia-
ment. For each MP the site has graphs to show a set of data about his or her 
activity, such as the number of times he or she has attended Parliamentary 
sessions, the number of spoken or written questions he or she has asked, 
which projects s/he partakes in, and what parliamentary reports s/he has pro-
duced in a particular domain. 
Even though the increased visibility of the behavior and choices of our 
representatives could lead to an assessment of their actions, it is possible to 
find, amongst the multitude of initiatives based on a desire for transparency 
in public affairs, a certain number of operations linked to raw data that have 
paradoxically weakened public confidence in the political system. Lawrence 
Lessig talks about projects intended to reveal the influence lobbies have on 
members of the American Congress, linking the money that Congressmen re-
ceive to the votes they make (Lessig 2009). He talks about the maplight.org 
report, which shows that, between 2003 and 2008, the Congressmen who 
contributed to watering down the extent of the climate bill all received an av-
erage of 37.700US$ from the coal, gas and nuclear industries (Calhoun 
2009). And yet, according to Lessig, it is difficult to prove that a financial 
contribution definitely played a decisive role in the deputy’s vote, other pos-
sible factors automatically being lessened or eliminated by the juxtaposition 
and the link made with independent data. Furthermore, spending time de-
nouncing the behavior of individual representatives means not spending this 
time making a bigger, overall criticism of the institutional system in place. 
The general public: production and consumption of online 
information  
Alongside the public information supplied by politico-administrative institu-
tions and the production of news or analyses by professional journalists and 
experts, there is the recent phenomenon of information produced by citizens, 
amateurs, witnesses or simply members of the general public. In a completely 
spontaneous way, an individual can participate in the production and dis-
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semination of images of events or phenomena that the media have left aside, 
or that public authorities have watered down or ignored. 
These amateurs can look at such news items from a different angle. Be-
yond just disturbing traditional journalism they question the roles that it nor-
mally plays. If not a direct criticism of the established government, it is at 
least a different approach to the reported facts and discourses. These new 
practices make the Internet a field of experimentation on which alternatives 
to the most criticized media practices could be built. Examples encompass: 
Ohmynews international (http://english.ohmynews. com), a newspaper writ-
ten by citizens, which was first launched in South Korea; Wikinews 
(http://fr.wikinews.org/wiki/Accueil); AgoraVox etc. These are examples of 
using the Web to cover themes that do not particularly interest the main-
stream media, since it was created in order to give a voice to the anti-WTO 
protests in Seattle (Cardon/Granjon 2010). These platforms could be in the 
form of intermittent counter-expertise, such as websites and blogs used by 
individuals (such as Etienne Chouard and his very critical analysis of the 
European Constitutional Treaty, rejected by referendum in France, in 2005), 
or by civil society organisations. The Web abounds with all sorts of opportu-
nities for self-expression in various forms (texts, video-streams, sounds, edit-
ing, mixing etc), and a part of which could consist of reacting, commenting, 
analyzing, criticizing and assessing the choices, decisions and behavior of 
public authorities. It offers increasingly superior possibilities compared to the 
broadcast media, of which certain programs that bring together political pro-
fessionals and anonymous participants, have already contributed to a “wider 
definition of politics, beyond the categories, status and processes that we 
normally find in the institutional sphere” (Lefébure 2008: 72). Furthermore, 
the increasing appropriation of the Internet and particularly the different 
modes of communication that it allows and hosts within the population (so-
cial networks, etc.) leads us to more profound questioning of the role played 
by the digital media in the process of politicization of people (Dolez 2009). 
Political awareness refers here to the capacity of people to “maintain a practi-
cal interest for regular participation in activities that are specifically political” 
(Lagroye et al. 2002: 311). Such activities are not limited to those formally 
linked to the institutional or political sphere (voting, party membership etc). 
More precisely, the observations of the producers and consumers of political 
information online come face to face with the approaches of normalization 
and mobilization mentioned in part one of this paper. 
Even if information practices online have definitely displaced the fron-
tiers between the expertise and power of certain individuals such as journal-
ists, consultants, editorialists and political leaders or public initiative agents 
to decide what is worthy of public attention or not, and the ‘amateur’ knowl-
edge of the multitude of Internet users, we still need to admit that the hierar-
chies or inequalities in traditional media have not been eliminated. Firstly, 
new forms of collaboration have formed between the traditional gate-keepers 
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(journalists) and people or groups that originally intended to give either an al-
ternative viewpoint to the one shown by the principle media or to give raw 
data to the general public, without any kind of commentary, which means 
that, once opened, it can be interpreted in many different ways by those who 
have access to it. For example, the written press can team up with those who 
practice data-journalism; the best example of this is, without a doubt, Wiki-
leaks, which gave a gripping image of the reality of fighting in Iraq, and the 
cost in human lives. Leaked data from the American Army is crossed with a 
map of the Iraqi territory, and all this information was displayed on the 
Guardian website (Rogers 2010). 
Secondly, and from the normalization aspect, information exuberance 
goes hand in hand with a growing difficulty to find and organize relevant in-
formation, which seems to lead inevitably to a ‘social divide’ between citi-
zens. In other words, those who are already motivated and interested in poli-
tics will benefit fully from the Internet as a resource for information but for 
those who have very low motivation, this gain is minimal, and they get very 
little from it (Delli-Carpini/Keeter 2003). In France, the 2009 survey by CE-
VIPOF and CARISM shows that the Web gives more resources and space for 
expression to those citizens who are already a part of the political system. 
The dominant role of television as the main medium for information for most 
of the population is linked with significant differences in the knowledge that 
people have on a particular item of political news4, depending on their socio-
professional standing or their level of education. Thus, 62% of people with 
no diplomas use television as their primary news source, compared with 34% 
of people with higher education, who tend to seek information from other 
sources (including Internet). The examples given were the minaret referen-
dum in Switzerland, the History and Geography reform in the final year of 
French high school education, and the new tax on bankers’ bonuses in 
France. 
Another study in 2009, although limited to a representative segment of 
the Breton population, showed that people with higher education are also 
those who make the most use of the services and information resources made 
available online by the public authorities. To give just one example, 69% of 
respondents had already looked for information on the administration’s sites 
(Social Welfare benefits, Tax Office, municipalities etc), but there was a 37-
point difference between those with and those without higher education di-
plomas (Tremembert 2010). 
To confirm the idea of a social divide in people actively looking for in-
formation because of an unequal distribution of skills, whether that is objec-
tive or not, we can find a second idea, developed by Markus Prior (2007), 
which posits that the mass and digital media contribute to maintaining, or 
even increasing, civic apathy. If we go by declarations and statistics of the 
                                                          
4 http://www.cevipof.com/fr/mediapolis/rapport/ 
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technical and political skills of Internet users, it is possible to underline, if 
necessary, the gap that exists between the reality and the feeling of incompe-
tence that certain categories of the population have. As Hargittai and Shafer 
point out, “Some users – and our findings suggest these are more likely to be 
women – may not be looking for certain types of material on the Web be-
cause they do not think they would be successful. Consequently, women may 
be less likely to take advantage of online content that may improve their life 
chances such as enrollment in online courses, accessing government services 
or informing themselves about political candidates” (Hargittai/Shafer 2006: 
16). According to Prior (2007), the fragmentation of the media, the fact that 
as well as the digital sources of information there is now an abundance of 
television channels that offer particular themes and a personalized content, 
allows people who prefer entertainment to choose to avoid exposure to any 
form of politics. If we also consider that people will filter the information in 
relation to their pre-existing interests, we can see that the fragmentation of 
the media is a sign of a new era of “minimal media effect” (Bennett/Iyengar 
2008), which would not be favorable to the civic engagement of a very seg-
mented public. This public would lack even a basic level of political knowl-
edge. 
Several studies, however, particularly those collected by Andrew 
Chadwick (2010) seem to contradict these theoretical proposals, and empha-
size, in contrary, that the characteristics of online political information, its 
quantity, its richness, its relevance and its accessibility instead create a media 
environment that is beneficial to the acquisition of the knowledge and skills 
necessary to comprehend political stakes, and perhaps to go even further by 
participating in online political discussions (Mossberger et al. 2008: 47-66). 
This, as well as the kaleidoscope nature of online information – diffracted in 
different places in diverse forms – can help us to understand the flexible in-
tensity of its effects on Internet users, in relation to their own personality and 
classic factors (such as age and gender), as well as their preferences for cer-
tain types of digital instruments rather than others. For the moment, a number 
of empirical studies, mostly carried out by American and British researchers 
and often during election campaigns, show that certain categories of the 
population that are traditionally considered as having a low interest in poli-
tics, particularly young people, tend to privilege the Internet as a means of 
finding information about their political representatives (Coleman/Spiller 
2003). Pasek et al. (2009) showed that young people, more than other catego-
ries of the population, get more out of the political information they find 
while visiting and participating in certain social networks (Facebook rather 
than MySpace), which appeared in correlation to a stronger civic engagement 
in users than in non-users. 
Whether they are examples, evaluations or counter-expertise, based or 
not on information and data produced by government instances or media, the 
different ways that citizens use digital technology for civic engagement seem 
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to echo the notion of counter-democracy as developed by Rosanvallon 
(2006). The Web would seem to be a privileged space for those represented 
to exercise a critical vigilance of their representatives and their actions. Once 
this is accepted, the possibility of rethinking the concept of representation 
opens up, and goes beyond the dichotomy between representative democracy 
and direct democracy, a dichotomy that was already present in the very early 
reflections on electronic democracy. Stephen Coleman and Jay G. Blumler 
(2009) put forward the notion of direct representation as a democratic system 
that rejects paternalistic methods of government inherited from the Welfare 
State. This direct representation goes beyond formal consultations on pre-
established political agendas. It levels where citizens are no longer simply 
tolerated or patronalized (see invented space Kersting in this volume). In fact 
it considers citizen as equals, and the politicians are permanently subjected to 
the exercise of accountability. From this perspective, ICT are no longer used 
simply as tools for voting or opinion polls or sporadic consultations, but to 
maintain a basis of permanent dialogue.  
If we look at the increase in digital spaces of expressions, whether initi-
ated by the institutional sphere or not, we could ask whether political choices 
are more open to participation and discussion with a greater number of citi-
zens than before. 
5.2 Expressing oneself and discussing online: between 
institutional reality and widening the public sphere 
The question here is about giving tools to the traditional organizations of po-
litical representation and mediation, based on the principle that certain char-
acteristics of online instruments allow categories of the population, hitherto 
considered as both disinterested in politics and yet capable of making the 
most of the digital advantages of participation, to express themselves. Be-
cause they can minimize the constraints of face-to-face participation, such as 
geographic distance, a lack of time or a fear of speaking out in public, online 
communication could allow those who do not dare to speak out face to face, 
to begin to express themselves (Gastil 2000; Witschge 2004). This is even 
more evident in the case of public meetings where the assemblies are mixed, 
i.e. made up of people of different hierarchical status or of very clearly estab-
lished authority (Monnoyer-Smith 2011). And, for those from the institu-
tional sphere, using digital tools is generally seen as a complement to the 
conditions of speaking out face to face. 
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Digitizing representation? Institutional projects and their limits 
In a consultative manner, it is firstly about allowing freedom of expression or 
ideas on a subject that has been pre-defined by the public authority as being a 
subject of common interest or on a theme of public policies, using more and 
less well-established procedures, which could be a system of simple ques-
tion-answer5 or just an idea box6, or an online questionnaire7, a ranking sys-
tem or voting on a proposal in order to rank or weigh up preferences8 or per-
haps a citizen panel9. More recently, and following the development of new 
functionalities linked particularly to cartography and geo-locating, instru-
ments such as collaborative maps now allow the inhabitants of a town to 
share their ideas of urban development at a particular place or portion of ur-
ban territory that has been mapped and put online, and where just a click on 
the map shows the suggestion they would like to make. 
Secondly, with the intention of co-elaborating proposals or political texts 
(perhaps even laws), different possibilities are currently observable. Some of 
them seem to be deliberative. The discussion forum is one of the oldest in-
struments, particularly on a local level (Wojcik 2003), and the earlier, some-
what basic versions soon gave way to more animated, moderated spaces, 
where the contributions were soon synthesized so as to grasp the principle 
ideas and themes that were in debate. For example, the public debate in 2003 
on the Avenir de l’Ecole organized by the Ministry of Education, where 24 
forums were opened up to the public and 19 chat-programs were organized. 
The official intention was to allow citizens to participate in the drawing up of 
the recommendations to then be submitted to the government by the Com-
mission in charge of the report (Moscarola et al. 2007). Because any new-
comer to the discussion has great difficulty in getting his bearings among the 
huge number of contributions, as well as the now inevitable and enormous 
number of accompanying tags, forums can now be improved by modules or 
                                                          
5 In France, the public consultations on questions concerning territory development, led by 
the National Committee on Public Debate (CNDP), combine public meetings with different 
online participatory instruments: blogs, questions and answers,  distance interaction during 
face-to-face meetings. 
6 For example, the website for local democracy in the 3rd district in Paris: http://www. 
democratieparis3.fr/boite-a-idees/ 
7 In Bordeaux, the website http://jeparticipe.bordeaux.fr/ which functions by membership al-
lows inhabitants to reply to questionnaires on a number of municipal projects. 
8 For the renewal of the members of the neighborhood councils, and in order to draw up a 
charter of their role and functioning, Lens (middle-size town in the North of France) asked 
the outgoing councilors to examine 90 proposals. They expressed the level of their support 
for each proposal using a voting system based on colors, green showing full agreement and 
red total disagreement. The physical meetings linked to the consultation proposals could 
then be organized around the ten or so subjects that were obviously a question of debate. 
9 Since 2011, Issy-Les-Moulineaux (http://survey.newpanel.com/gkws/cgi-bin/issy_sit/cgi.pl); 
since June 2010, Valenciennes (http://www.valenciennes.fr/fr/minisites/vie-municipale/ 
votre-mairie/panel-citoyen.html) 
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software that allow for visualization of the principal themes of the debate or 
its hot topics, as well as their commentaries. All this becomes, thanks to 
graphs and diagrams, much more readable than the classic piling-up of con-
tributions, one after another, that we could observe in the early versions of 
discussion forums. Furthermore, voting systems on certain contributions de-
veloped progressively. They can be marked simply by a preference marker, 
which allows the most popular postings to be the most visible, thus establish-
ing a ranking or presentation of the postings that is neither chronological nor 
decided by the moderators, but that is based on choices made by the contribu-
tors and readers themselves. Or the voting could also be part of a wider pro-
cedure, where the proposals that received the most votes could, for example, 
lead to initiating face-to-face discussions (Wojcik 2011). Public authorities 
interested in treating proposals or utterances can also use Wiki type software 
or modules for development projects or to write up documents used in the 
functioning of certain organizations (for example, writing up the consultation 
charter for Paris on Wiki, an experiment in April and May 2009). 
Finally, citizens can also express collective demands through online peti-
tion systems promoted by governments, parliamentary assemblies, local au-
thorities, or political leaders themselves.  
In Britain at the local level a number of cities such as Bristol used e-
petitions (see Baldersheim/Kersting 2012). In France, only Paris, among all 
the local authorities, offers a system of e-petitioning: http://www.paris.fr/ 
politiques/ participez/lancez-et-signez-une-petition/p9130). 
On the national level, e-petitions legislative debates are no longer initi-
ated by parliamentary MPs or ministers’ initiatives (according to the political 
system in place) but by the citizens themselves. One of the most comprehen-
sive of such experiments was launched in 2006 in collaboration between the 
British government and an open-source project launched by UK Citizens 
Online Democracy, a group founded in 1996 to explore ways in which the 
Internet could be utilized to allow people to become informed about politics 
and more engaged with the political process. The project produced the No 10. 
Petitions website, which between 2006 and 2010 (when the pilot was ended) 
was one of the largest non-partisan democracy sites by volume of users ever, 
with over 12 million signatures from over 5 million unique email addresses, 
approximating 10 per cent of the UK population (MySociety, 2011; http:// 
petitions.number10.gov.uk/). The single largest petition during the pilot oc-
curred in 2007 when over one million signatures were collected for a petition 
that directly challenged a key plank of the then Labor government’s plan to 
introduce road pricing to reduce congestion in the UK (BBC, 2007). In Au-
gust 2011 a new version of the petitions website was introduced in Britain 
which for the first time outlined a mechanism whereby a petitioner receiving 
more than 100,000 signatures could result in parliamentary time being tabled 
for a debate on the issue (Guardian Professional 2011). In Britain there has 
been a swathe of petitions calling for the restoration of the death penalty, 
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stricter controls on immigration, and the withdrawal of the UK from the 
European Union.  
As a frontrunner and kind of best practice the Scottish Parliament set up 
a system of electronic petitioning10, run by a parliamentary commission ad 
hoc (the Commission of Public Petitions) who select the petitions likely to 
lead to a decision or to a public policy. It allows one to visualize the petition 
text, to read all the accompanying relevant information, to join an incorpo-
rated discussion forum, and thus to add commentaries to the petition under 
consideration. It also allows the MPs to use an analysis of the geographic dis-
tribution of the petitioners to see how many of their own voters have signed 
the petition. Furthermore, a summary of the discussion forum highlights the 
main arguments for and against. This system, which can lead to the amend-
ment of texts under discussion and the revision of policies in use, has been 
adopted in 2008 by other parliaments such as the Welsh Assembly (http:// 
www. assemblywales.org/gethome/e-petitions.htm).  
The Scottish system has also been adopted by other countries. Online pe-
titioning was tried from September 2005 in the German Parliament (https:// 
epetitionen.bundestag.de) and was assessed in 2007. The system continues 
today (see Jungherr / Jürgens, 2010).  
Following suit, in September 2011 the Obama administration in the 
United States launched a platform that similarly allows ordinary Americans 
to create and sign petitions on the White House web server. Petitions that col-
lect 25,000 or more signatures within 30 days will be reviewed by the Ad-
ministration and an official response will be issued (Snider 2011). In the 
United States, initial guidelines that a petition would warrant a response once 
it received 5000 signatures was revised after 12,000 people signed a petition 
in October 2011 asking for the White House to reveal whether it had contact 
with extra-terrestrials (Moskowitz 2011). Other current examples that have 
generated responses cover topics as diverse as: legalization of marijuana (Hill 
2011); pet homelessness; ensuring the humane treatment of horses; food 
safety of raw milk; changes to US coinage; the NASA space program; Stu-
dent Debt; the official motto of the United States; gay marriage; the Keystone 
oil pipeline; and working to conserve and sustainably manage shark popula-
tions! 
Critics of such measures raise many objections (Snider 2011). Firstly 
they argue that the process is far from a deliberative exercise. Most such e-
petition websites represent little more than a public relations exercise by gov-
ernments to appear to be more responsive to its citizenry. The sites are insti-
gated, managed and moderated by government bureaucrats; the process of 
review is at best opaque, at worst arbitrary; and responses are often little 
more than an opportunity for governments to tout their achievements or to 
                                                          
10 http://epetitions.scottish.parliament.uk/ based on the generic model: http://www.e-petitioner. 
org.uk/ 
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proclaim that they have ‘noted’ the public’s concern. Other criticisms point to 
the fact that a large number of such petitions are often at best for frivolous 
causes and at worst for nationalistic, populist or extremist policies.  
 
Moreover, certain instruments try to digitize the whole decision making proc-
ess for example, electronic participatory budgeting instruments (see Kersting 
2008). A participatory budget allows citizens who are not elected to partici-
pate in the conception or distribution of public finances. For it to be truly a 
participatory budget, the budget and/or financial aspect must be discussed 
openly and include the whole town. It must also be repeated regularly and in-
clude certain forms of public deliberation or specific forums, and it must lead 
to feed-back on the results of the discussions (Sintomer et al. 2008). Al-
though generally confined to the informative aspect of any process, such dig-
itization can also affect the more crucial aspects, such as the deliberative di-
mension. For example, Hamburg in Germany invited its citizens to make 
proposals online using a budget-planning software program combined with 
discussion forums (Lührs et al. 2009). A further example would be Belo 
Horizonte in Brazil, which has a system that is largely dependent on online 
voting intended to rank priorities (Peixoto 2008) or Parma in Italy where, 
over a pre-determined period of time, the inhabitants can participate in two 
decisions, one related to a neighborhood project and one related to a project 
that concerns the entire urban development plan11. Such initiatives, hybrid in 
nature because they combine face-to-face situations with one or several of the 
above-mentioned digital participation, have greatly multiplied recently. How-
ever, although they are instigated by different public authorities, their impact 
on the real decision-making is often very difficult to evaluate accurately 
(Tournadre-Plancq 2010). In spite of their often low decision-making nature, 
one of the most important effects of digital instruments designed to favor dis-
cussions between Internet users is the acquisition by the participants of 
knowledge on the debated subject (Talpin/Wojcik 2010). 
Nevertheless, two different types of criticism are generally aimed at these 
tools. Firstly, that they generally cannot mobilize people who are not already 
present in the normal consultation procedures, and they are struggling to be-
come a permanent fixture among the different means of participation. Sec-
ondly, those that go beyond being simply a means of expression are, never-
theless, based on a limited concept of discussion in the sense that they try, in 
vain, to (re-)produce the same conditions as the production of a rational, 
well-argumented and respectful discourse. In doing so, they probably exclude 
categories of the population that do not master these forms of expression. 
Considering the vast number of virtual spaces and formats that Internet users 
use to express themselves, they could perhaps ‘talk politics’ more often in 
                                                          
11 http://www.bilanciopartecipativo.comune.parma.it/progetti/vota.asp 
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spaces normally used for leisure activities than in spaces institutionally in-
tended for politics (Wojcieszak/Mutz 2009). 
Thus, different conceptualizations have been found to try to grasp what 
happens online in these spaces that authorize self-expression, speaking out 
publicly, and exchanging views, that are created or used by individual people, 
and that could be dependent on politico-administrative authorities or not. We 
come back to these different conceptualizations and the problems that they 
raise regarding the question of political participation, in particular the perma-
nent tension we find between the promise of inclusion that certain instru-
ments offer and the deliberative quality that many consider as an unreachable 
objective. 
Beyond the divide of deliberation and fragmentation 
Online discussions are frequently analyzed using Jürgen Habermas’s delib-
erative model, which quite naturally leads to incorrect conclusions. Sche-
matically, digital spaces do not allow for a deliberative ideal, based on a rea-
soned exchange of arguments, that will lead to a consensual position of all 
the participants, who are considered as equals (for a summary of these stud-
ies, see Greffet/Wojcik 2008). Already criticized outside of any operational 
practices, the Habermasian theory is particularly incapable of accounting for 
the plurality of experiences on the Web. Certain authors suggest amendments 
to the deliberative theory, and emphasize the fundamental contradictions be-
tween participation and deliberation (Cohen/Fung 2004; Mutz 2006). Ac-
cording to Wright (2010: 229), we need to consider online discussions in a 
more flexible manner, for example, by exploring the mechanisms that par-
tially make up deliberation (Kies 2010; Gonzalez-Bailon et al. 2010). In a 
more radical version, and if we look at the characteristics of political expres-
sion online, particularly the material characteristics, we can see that such a 
viewpoint obviously leads us to taking into account all the forms of expres-
sion that go beyond the rational-critical discourse theorized by Habermas 
(Monnoyer-Smith 2011), forms which are less socially and culturally de-
manding and which make way for emotions. We see the arrival of a series of 
studies on the emergence on the Web of counterpublics. This can materialize 
through, for example, e-petitions and ‘flashmobs’ – gatherings of people in a 
particular place kept secret until the last moment, and co-ordinated by text 
messages. Zizi Papacharissi (2002) estimates that online debating constitutes 
different public spheres that co-exist and form counterpublics, to use Nancy 
Fraser’s expression (1990), rather than resembling the conceptualization 
given by Habermas. They, in fact, form mini public spheres that serve differ-
ent interests and collective preoccupations. 
The underlying criticism of Habermas’s work is double. Firstly, contrary 
to what most of the research on electronic democracy seems to be saying, de-
liberation is not necessarily a value in itself, and secondly, the production of a 
142 Stephanie Wojcik 
 
common good can take place through channels or contexts other than delibera-
tive ones. This literature has recently been supported by a renewal in the inter-
est for analyzing the digital practices of ordinary sociability (Arnaud/Guionnet 
2005). Such practices seem to have been left aside by researchers who have 
been obsessed with tracking any major shifts in the functioning of representa-
tive political systems. Such shifts are probably induced by the digitalization of 
some or most of the relationships maintained by the politicians and the citi-
zens. Thus, Lance Bennett considers that it is dangerous to pay too much at-
tention to government-implemented electronic democracy projects, as, in fact, 
the traditional representation systems (unions, political parties and govern-
ments) simply adapt technologies to suit their particular projects and already-
existing agendas (Bennett 2003 quoted by Coleman/Blumler 2009: 116). So, 
perhaps we should not look for deliberation (in the Habermasian sense of the 
word) where it cannot be found. Neither should we consider that what is not 
deliberative is necessarily conceptual rubbish. The majority of what is said on 
the Web is, in fact, not deliberative but could nevertheless have political effect 
(Dahlberg 2007). Thus, as Josiane Jouët points out, new modes of civic ex-
pression have appeared, characterized by a mix of private conversation and 
public speeches and discourses, which combine all the multimedia resources 
of the Web, i.e. textual, sound and video content) (Jouët 2009: 70-71). This 
new ecology of words can be seen in multiple spaces or in both static and dy-
namic online instruments where the public nature (in the sense of what con-
cerns the general interest) of a discourse is no longer indexed on its visibility, 
and vice versa (Cardon 2010). Nevertheless, there is still the main problem of 
the disconnection between the informal public sphere, made up of ‘culturally 
mobilized publics’ (Habermas quoted by Cohen/Fung 2004: 29), supported by 
activists, and the decisions that are actually taken by the legislative body, ad-
ministrative agencies, and/or political authorities. 
So, two different perspectives are possible. One insists on the framework, 
context, and configuration of the instruments that house the discussions, 
while the other that sees the Web as a space for the confrontation between 
differing opinions. The first perspective considers that, irreducibly, the 
bridges between political interests and people’s preferences and values can be 
built only within protected institutional spaces, designed specifically to facili-
tate deliberations transversally (Coleman et Blumler 2009: 136), or at least 
certain of their characteristics. Such a position does not, however, contradict 
the results of observing online communities that are not tied to any institu-
tion, and yet who can clearly be considered as instrumental, as we can see in 
the analysis of the forum Slashdot by Gonzales-Bailon et al. (2010), where 
the authors were partly motivated by the desire to find ways to evaluate and 
redesign government projects.  
Thus, studies on the procedures of face-to-face debating emphasize the 
importance of framing the discussion, meaning its thematic, the formal rules 
that govern the debate and also the materiality of the procedure, for example 
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the symbolic use of the space within a public meeting. Concerning online de-
bates, the software chosen and the type of interaction that it allows, the nature 
of the moderation used and the appropriation of the interface by the users 
(Wright/Street 2007; Bonaccorsi/Julliard 2010) play an equally important 
role in the extent to which a participant gets involved and the way that he or 
she expresses him or herself, and even the repertory of arguments that he/she 
puts forward (Cappella et al. 2002; Desquinabo 2009). Furthermore, consid-
ering the materiality of the tools used by Internet users to express themselves 
implies paying more attention to the facilitators of the debate, especially 
when the site has been initiated by a public authority, and to the very central 
role that these facilitators play in the dynamics of the discussions within such 
channels (Wojcik 2007). 
In parallel, the appropriation of the materiality of these procedures by in-
dividual users opens up the possibility of diverting them, for example by con-
testing their actual functioning or by using them in ways not intended by the 
site-designers or by refusing to submit to the themes and word formats ini-
tially imposed by the site-organizers (Monnoyer-Smith 2011; Wojcik 2011). 
Thus, the configuration of the instrument obviously affects both the nature of 
the debate, whether it is deliberative, conflictual or polarized etc., and which 
different publics would be likely to participate. Let’s take one of these pub-
lics, for example, young people, whose relationship with online politics is a 
subject of study for both public authorities and academic research. The regu-
lar surveys on the range of Internet within French society always highlight 
their familiarity with the ICT (for example text messages on their cell 
phones) and other diverse applications of the social network. In 2009, in 
France, almost 16 million Internet users were members of at least one social 
network (15,9 millions) (Facebook, MySpace, etc.). The members of a com-
munity website are principally young people, even if this trend is changing. 
The under-35s represent around two thirds of the members (62.9%) although 
they represent less than half the total number of Internet users (45,8%) ; this 
is even more obvious in the 16-24 age group (29,2% of members although 
they are only 18,1% of all Internet users) and to a lesser extent the 25-34 age 
group (25,3% for 19% of Internet users) (see Médiamétrie, « Les internautes 
toujours plus fidèles aux sites communautaires », 18 August 2009).  
The screen culture, an expression first used ten years ago to describe to 
what extent technology plays a very important role in youth culture, is often 
linked to a context where screens affect the relationship that adolescents have 
with culture and the written word, and it brings important modifications in 
the way that the sociability of young people/teenagers is structured. In a simi-
lar way to sociability, the civic engagement of these generation x, generation 
y, and digital natives also seem to be affected by screen culture, which leads, 
for instance, to a lesser interest in television or the written press. This civic 
engagement is embodied in a large range of practices that are characterized 
by expressiveness and/or creativity. To illustrate this, the enquiry that we car-
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ried out on the website concerning the participatory budget for French high 
schools (BPL), set up by the Poitou-Charentes region, underlines the funda-
mentally different approaches to digital media of the politicians, adults or 
young high-school students who participated. The regional authorities created 
a website that does not truly fulfill its mission as an information-giver to the 
high-school audience that it wants to address and who, in fact, makes very lit-
tle use of the possibilities for expression that the site offers. The somewhat 
limited use made of the website by the high-school students is linked to their 
general lack of interest in the BPL plan as a whole, and probably more to 
their own forms of politicization and civil and political engagement as well as 
to the lack of coherence between the face-to-face procedures and the website. 
These practices are also partly dependent on the diverging expectations about 
the functionalities that a website must offer if it is to provoke or increase the 
interest in politics of adults or young people. For instance, while half of the 
adult participants wish to receive the minutes of the meetings by email, this 
functionality is much less important for high-school students who are primar-
ily interested in the possibility of voting online for projects (Wojcik 2010). 
The second perspective leads us to a more thorough exploration of one of 
the conditions of deliberation, i.e. the confrontation between individuals with 
antagonistic viewpoints (Manin 1985), and its degree of reality on the Web. 
Thus, certain researchers have tried to determine to what extent Internet users 
find themselves confronted with differing opinions. Does the Web allow for a 
plurality of conflicting viewpoints, and do Internet users find themselves 
truly exposed to them? Until recently, people tending to frequent spaces 
online where they can discuss with people who have the same ideology has 
been the dominant orientation. It is supported by the works of Cass Sunstein 
(2001), using studies on social psychology and based empirically on studies 
of the political blogs used during election campaigns in the United States 
(Adamic/Glance 2005) or in France (Fouetillou 2008). This theme is further 
reinforced by the technical functioning of the Web, as Manin and Lev-On 
(2006) have stated, and particularly by the search engines (Hindman 2009). 
In this way, a series of mechanisms have been highlighted, such as the se-
mantic logic that governs requests formulated on the search engines, which 
then directs the user towards blogs or websites that share the same vocabu-
lary and the same way of formulating questions, or, and this is beyond any 
technical dimension, the fact that the links of one website send users to other 
websites that belong to the same ideological universe (Vedel 2008). 
A contrario, other studies have shown that participants find a social and 
geographic diversity, a heterogeneity of profiles and viewpoints in the Inter-
net discussions that they would have more difficulty finding offline (Stromer-
Galley 2003). Recently, and seeing the diversification of online activities, it 
is possible to be exposed accidentally to politics, thanks to certain instru-
ments, such as Facebook, which mix information on people’s private lives as 
well as on their opinions of the political sphere (Bode 2010 quoted by Chad-
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wick 2010). Furthermore, a recent study has shown that ‘ideological segrega-
tion’ online is less strong than it would be in face-to-face interacting (Gentz-
kow/Shapiro 2010). Internet users spend more time visiting websites than they 
do interacting with people who have different viewpoints from their own. 
These controversies on the more or less adequate character of the models 
and counter-models of deliberation and the contribution made by Internet on 
the fragmentation, (based on either an information bulb or on ideological seg-
regation), of the public sphere, have been widely discussed in a plethora of 
scientific studies. Today, such studies are attempting to take the question be-
yond these controversies. Considering that the approaches to online political 
discussions have focalized almost exclusively on either a restrictive concep-
tion of deliberation or on conceptualizations of multiple mini-spheres with 
characteristics that are difficult to generalize, Deen Freelon (2010) proposes a 
different way to analyze these approaches, by identifying three distinct mod-
els of democratic communication that they could refer to. According to Dahl-
gren (2005) it is no longer a question of knowing that the Internet can support 
democracy in the singular, but to see how the social practices based on the 
different uses of the Internet can support the multiple forms of democratic 
communication, and which members of the public actually participate. Con-
sequently, it is necessary to break up the Web into a range of activities that 
can take place within an online environment, and which is more complex 
than that of a unidirectional medium such as television (Chadwick 2010). 
5.3 Conclusion 
The political and social practices of the Internet invite us to question both the 
possible reconfigurations of the different principles that make up democratic 
regimes, i.e. the principles of representation, participation, competition and 
limiting power, and the reality of the opportunities offered to citizens to make 
themselves heard. 
The imperative for transparency that we are witnessing in almost all 
western governments can be seen in the varying uses of the information and 
communication technologies in order to spread public information and data 
through a vast number of websites and a progressive use of the different ap-
plications in the social media. The availability online of an almost infinite 
and sometimes anarchic quantity of information was motivated in France, in 
the beginning at least, more by a desire to modernize the administration 
agencies and to render a service to users than by the intention of giving in-
formation resources to a public that would then participate in decision-
making processes. This availability has led to new modes of appropriation by 
internet users, modes that the political and administrative authorities can nei-
ther foresee nor control. Thus, the re-using of ‘official’ information or raw 
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data by individual people or collective groups confirms the idea of a renewal 
of the forms of vigilance of government activities. Such initiatives might 
seem to come from individuals or groups that are already politically active, or 
at least who have a certain degree of familiarity with politics, and yet we can 
also see the development of different forms of Web engagement by internet 
users, which could range from simple dissemination of political content to the 
mini-mobilization of different audiences that had previously been non-
receptive to institutional politics. These initiatives may be difficult to grasp 
with the existing categories of political participation in the ‘physical’ world, 
but they are, nevertheless, proof of shifts between the roles and knowledge of 
the different protagonists of the political and media arena, such as political 
leaders, journalists, experts and citizens. 
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6. Electronic voting  
Thad Hall                       
When the Internet came into mass use with the advent of the easy-to-use 
browser, there were immediate thoughts that the Internet could become the 
big idea that would change democracy.1 The premise here was simple: the 
Internet would connect people at a new level and spread information in revo-
lutionary ways. And, in fact, the Internet has lived up to most of its initial 
hype. The connections that people make through social media – from Twitter 
to Facebook to Google+ to blogs – are changing the ways in which people 
connect with other people, as well as how they share and get information. 
Many corporations, for example, have discovered the power of “mommy 
bloggers” (Lopez 2009) in shaping how people view products and shop. A 
good word from these moms on their blogs can make a product while a nega-
tive review can break one. These social media exist alongside and compli-
ment the traditional websites that have always provided the backbone of the 
Internet. 
In the area of elections and voting, the Internet has also been seen as a 
tool for revolutionizing democracy. In addition to the information dissemina-
tion that can be done through websites and social media, the Internet has been 
viewed as creating an opportunity to lower the cost of voting to almost noth-
ing. In an Internet voting world, a voter would be able to gather information 
at almost zero cost from the Internet and then cast a ballot from the privacy 
of their own home, at the time of their convenience, with the information that 
they may need to cast an informed ballot right in front of them. On the Inter-
net, there would be no more voting at a polling place – one could be an ac-
tive, participatory citizen without having to trudge outside when it is cold or 
snowy or raining. 
The theory of Internet as revolutionizing politics has come to fruition in 
many ways. The Internet has created new opportunities for organizing voters 
– using simple tools like meetup.com or twitter – and for communicating in-
formation using websites, youtube.com, and social media. In countries where 
                                                          
1  I thank Lucy Williams, graduate student in the Lawand Political Science Department at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, for her contributions. 
154 Thad Hall 
 
the public can contribute money to political campaigns and political parties 
online, the Internet has proved an easy and effective method for fundraising. 
It has changed the media as well, with reporters now often posting updates to 
stories multiple times over the course of the day and bringing the 24-hour 
news cycle to the print media. Thanks to the internet, campaigns have had to 
change the way that they communicate to the public, using multiple media to 
put out and then reinforce messages during campaign season. 
However, when it comes to voting, the transition to Internet voting has 
been quite slow. Although there have been trials in numerous countries around 
the world to test the efficacy of Internet voting in their elections, only one 
country – Estonia – has adopted Internet voting as a part of their regular voting 
processes and procedures. There are several reasons why Internet voting has 
not been adopted more broadly, including legal and technological barriers to its 
adoption in some countries and a broader concern about the security associated 
with voting on the Internet. At the same time, Internet voting remains of inter-
est in many countries and demand for such voting is also rising. 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for thinking about Internet 
voting. It starts with a consideration of the demand-side issues associated 
with Internet voting, including the desire for convenience in voting by both 
voters and election officials, the role that globalization plays in the need for 
remote voting, and the demographic changes that have made Internet voting 
of broad interest. Then, the Estonian experience with developing Internet vot-
ing is examined, with a focus on the legal, technological, and political con-
siderations associated with their transition to this new voting mode. The Es-
tonian case is compared to trials of Internet voting that have been conducted 
in other countries around the world. Finally, we consider barriers to broad 
adoption of Internet voting, with a focus on the legal and security issues as-
sociated with Internet voting, as well as the concerns that computer scientists 
have raised about this technology. 
6.1  Demand-side Interest in Internet Voting 
In an article titled “Security Aspects of Internet Voting” (2004), Guido 
Schryen lists the benefits and drawbacks of Internet voting. According to 
Schryen, Internet voting is promising for several reasons. First, Internet vot-
ing increases voter turnout rates, “especially for the older, handicapped, or 
sick people or those who cannot go or travel to their polling station.” 
(Schryen 2004: 1). Second, Internet voting reduces the cost of elections and 
decreases the number of invalid votes. Third, Internet voting utilizes crypto-
graphic coding and other mechanisms which make election fraud difficult, 
thereby reducing electoral scams in young and endangered democracies. Fi-
nally, Internet voting supports basis democracy: “As soon as an Internet-
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based poll infrastructure is built up,” Schryen writes, “basis-democratic vot-
ing processes become more feasible” (Schryen 2004: 2). 
Given the potential benefits of Internet voting, many countries have been 
eager to implement and test online voting systems. In the following sections, 
we analyze the claim furthered by proponents of online elections that Internet 
voting reduces election costs. We then discuss the ways in which several na-
tions have tested or implemented Internet voting in several nations. Specifi-
cally, we evaluate the success of Internet voting in Estonia, the United King-
dom, Switzerland, Norway, and the United States. 
6.2 The Costs of Voting 
Internet voting has been touted as a revolutionary tool in elections in part be-
cause it can be viewed as the killer app for addressing one of the factors that 
limits participation in elections: the costs associated with actually voting. As 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) noted more than a generation ago, voting has 
certain inherent costs, one of which is the cost of actually going out to vote 
(Riker/Ordeshook 1968). In some countries, like the United States and the 
United Kingdom, those costs include working the action of voting into a 
regular weekday workday, where employment, kids, and other obligations all 
have to be balanced. In other countries, voting occurs on Sundays but can 
nonetheless be costly. A person may be away on holiday during voting week-
end or it could be snowy, icy, and well below zero Fahrenheit on the day citi-
zens have to vote. The person may have a physical or emotional disability 
that makes going to a polling place difficult. Even in the United States, where 
laws govern polling place accessibility and building modifications ensure 
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, some voting locations 
are still not accessible or lack voting equipment that is truly accessible to 
voters with physical disabilities (U.S. GAO 2009). In short, there are many 
reasons why a person may not want to or be able to venture out to a polling 
place on Election Day to cast a ballot. 
One alternative to polling place voting is to allow some form of remote 
voting and the most common form of this is postal voting. With postal vot-
ing, the ballot is sent to the voter by the election official before Election Day; 
the voter then completes the ballot and mails it back to the election official. 
The official then counts the ballot and the voter has participated meaningfully 
in the election. However, postal voting too has problems. First, voters often 
make mistakes on their postal ballots that lead to their vote not being 
counted. They don’t fill in the bubble on an optical scan ballot correctly, 
don’t “X” the box on the ballot appropriately, or otherwise make a mistake 
with the ballot that leads to their vote not being counted (Alvarez/Stewart/ 
Beckett 2011). Postal voting also has a second problem, which is that the bal-
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lot may not get back to the election official in time to be counted or the voter 
may fail to complete the absentee process correctly so that they ballot is not 
counted. On the latter point, a voter may not sign their ballot to verify that 
they are the person who voted the ballot or otherwise fail to complete the 
steps associated with completing the ballot. On the former point, there are of-
ten deadlines by which time a postal vote has to be received in order to be 
counted. Postal ballots are often disqualified because the ballot is received af-
ter the deadline (Alvarez/Hall/Sinclair 2008). 
6.2.1 Internet Voting and Cost Reduction 
Given the costs associated with election day voting and the problems that can 
be associated with postal voting, Internet voting has been seen by many as the 
way forward with voting. Using technology, Internet voting can overcome the 
two problems associated with postal voting. Internet voting platforms can pro-
vide voters with information so that they will not make an error in voting; if a 
voter skips a race they will be told and the voter can review their vote choices 
before casting a ballot, allowing them to make changes to their choices. The 
Internet also walks the voter though the steps required to authenticate the ballot 
so that the voter does not skip a step. The timing issues associated with Internet 
voting are also especially helpful. As with postal voting, an Internet voter can 
cast their ballot at any time that is convenient for them, even if that is on the 
last day of voting. Additionally, unlike postal voting, the Internet voter can also 
cast their ballot in the middle of the night; they do not have to wait for the mail 
to pick up their ballot and deliver it to the election officials. Data from the Es-
tonian National Electoral Committee show that as Internet voting has become 
more routine for the Estonian voter, individuals are more likely to wait until the 
last days of Internet voting to cast their ballot.2 
6.2.2 Does Lower Voting Costs Bring Increased Turnout? 
Obviously, lowering the costs associated with voting could also potentially 
increase turnout in the election. Lowering the costs of voting do not necessar-
ily increase turnout. As Berinksy (2005) has noted, sometimes lowering the 
costs of voting just makes it easier for habitual voters to vote but does not 
bring new votes into the electoral process. With Internet voting, it has often 
been suggested that Internet voting would increase turnout most among 
young voters or marginal voters. Part of the logic for it boosting turnout 
among young people is that these individuals expect voting to be as easy and 
convenient as online banking or the other online transactions that they com-
                                                          
2 See Figure 1 in www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics  
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plete. Alvarez and Hall (2008) start out one of the chapters in their book on 
electronic voting with a story in the Los Angeles Times written by a young 
woman who compared the current voting process as being like the Pony Ex-
press and questions why she can do bank transfers online but cannot vote that 
way. For these young people, Internet voting brings elections into the world 
that they are familiar with – digital, fast, online. 
The data on whether Internet voting does boost turnout is mixed. In most 
of the small pilots that have been done, Internet voting has not been found to 
increase turnout (Alvarez/Hall 2004, 2008). However, in Estonia, where 
Internet voting has been used for some time and there have been numerous 
surveys done of the implementation and use of Internet voting, there is some 
evidence that marginal voters – people who might not have voted in the elec-
tion otherwise – did vote using the Internet because it was convenient (Trech-
sel et al. 2010). Given that there are other, more important factors related to 
voting other than convenience – such as campaign effects, candidate quality, 
and the issues in the election – it should not be surprising that the turnout ef-
fects related to Internet voting are not exceptionally large. 
6.3 Internet Voting for Expatriates 
Perhaps the least understood population of voters who can benefit from 
Internet voting are true remote voters – expatriates and military personnel 
deployed away from their homes and their country. It is estimated that the 
population of civilians live overseas (either as expatriates or as dependents of 
government and military personnel) and military personnel deployed away 
from their home base in any given year is approximately 6 million. In 
Europe, it is estimated that 2% of workers in any given country are from a 
different European Union (EU) country (Krieger 2009). For some countries, 
the percentage of the population who may be away at any given time – such 
as those working in seasonal jobs – can be relatively high. 
For individuals who are expatriates, there are generally three ways to 
vote. First, expatriates can vote in person at a designated location, such as 
their nation’s embassy in the country where they are living. The obvious 
downside to this is that it requires traveling to the designated embassy voting 
location, which may not be convenient for a person not living in the capital 
city (or other major city with a consulate) of the country in which they reside. 
Second, individuals can proxy vote, where they designate a person – a 
spouse, family member, or similar trusted person – to cast a vote for them at 
the polls in their home country. This voting method obviously requires high 
levels of trust between the voter and the proxy that the vote will be cast as re-
quested by the expatriate voter. Third, a voter can vote via postal voting 
mode. This method is the most effective means of remotely enfranchising 
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voters but still carries potential problems related to the delivery of mail and 
the time it can take to get a ballot from the country’s election officials to the 
voter and back. This so-called ballot transit time problem can be very trou-
bling for voters in those countries where laws that strictly govern when bal-
lots must be returned to election officials in order to be counted.3 
Several nations, including the Australians, British, Dutch, Estonians, 
French, Swiss, and United States have conducted Internet voting trials that 
were, at least in part, focused on enfranchising expatriate voters (Alvarez/ 
Hall 2008). In each case, the pilot countries allowed certain voters to cast bal-
lots from abroad. However, the most effective expatriate voting experiences 
have been in Estonia and Switzerland. Voters in these two countries can have 
confidence that this mode of voting will be reliable and is worth investing in 
learning about, given that the system will be used in election after election. 
The cost of voting in an Internet voting trial can actually be somewhat high, 
given that the voter has to learn about the pilot, learn how the system works 
and make a judgment about the value of voting using this mode, and then use 
the system. These costs were relatively low for the Estonians and Swiss, es-
pecially after the first election.  
6.4 The Digital Divide 
As it is discussed at the end of this chapter, the legal and security issues associ-
ated with Internet voting are one of the primary barriers associated with the 
broad adoption of this voting method. A second key concern associated with 
Internet voting is the digital divide that exists between those individuals who are 
online and those individuals who are not online. Although there is a large focus 
often by the media on the explosion of Internet connectivity and the usage of an 
array of digital devices, such as smart phones, and digital services, like Face-
book and Twitter, there are large segments of the population in western coun-
tries who are not online. Recent statistics from Internet World Stats shows that 
over 41% of Europeans, and one-third of the population of EU member states, 
are not online or not online regularly (Internet World Stats 2011). 
Data from the United States shows that just over 20% of the population is 
not online (World Bank 2012). A recent analysis of e-government usage in 
the United States found that there are very strong educational and income bi-
ases associated with e-government use (Hall/Owens 2011). Compared to in-
dividuals with a college degree, those people with only a high school educa-
tion or less are more than 15 percentage points less likely to be online and 15 
                                                          
3 See http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/initiatives_detail.aspx?initiative ID=42722 for 
discussions of the issues associated with voting from abroad in the American electoral con-
text. 
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percentage points less likely to be e-government service users. Even if we 
consider just people who are Internet users, people with less education are 
much less likely to be e-government users compared to people with a college 
degree. The findings are similar for income; those individuals with incomes 
of $40,000 and less are less likely to be online and less likely to be e-govern-
ment users compared to those with incomes over $40,000. Given that educa-
tion and income are correlated, the overall digital divide effects have the pos-
sibility of being pronounced. 
Although there are digital divide effects that exist throughout Europe and 
the United States, there are also mechanisms that can mitigate these prob-
lems. For instance, broad public access to computers, at government facilities 
and the like, can help to minimize digital divide problems. In the Estonian 
case, several studies of the usage of Internet voting have found that there is 
not a digital divide problem in the implementation of Internet voting. The di-
vides that one would expect between Internet voters and non-Internet voters – 
that Internet voters are wealthier and better educated – have not turned out to 
be true. Instead, Internet voting in the Estonian context is one where there are 
not biases that come from these factors, or from political factors. Internet vot-
ing does not favor certain types of voters over others in the process. 
6.5 The Estonian Experience 
Estonia – a European Union and Eurozone member states – is the only nation 
that has effectively integrated Internet voting into their national electoral 
laws, policies, and processes (Alvarez, Hall, and Trechsel 2009). the Estoni-
ans used a number of procedures at this stage to mitigate some of the threats 
commonly associated with Internet voting systems. First, the url of the web-
site from which they could access the Internet voting applications were pub-
lished, and voters were urged to go to the website by typing the url into their 
browser themselves – not to go to the website by clicking on a link in an 
email. Second, the server certificate was publicly available, and e-voters were 
urged to check the certificate of the server they were using with the published 
version. Finally, Estonians were urged to make sure that the computer they 
were using was free of viruses and other malware before engaging with the 
Internet voting application.  
Since 2005, Estonians have been able to vote using three different modes 
of participation for its local, national and European Parliamentary elections. 
As in all countries, Estonians can vote on Election Day (a Sunday) and like 
most OSCE countries, they can also vote in person in early voting, which is 
held between the tenth day before the election through the fourth day before 
the election. In these two modes, voters write in the number corresponding 
with the candidate that they support in a box on a paper ballot. The ballots are 
160 Thad Hall 
 
then hand-counted by the precinct workers after the polls have closed, after 
which all ballots and tallies are transmitted both electronically and by hand to 
the National Electoral Commission. 
The process of Estonian Internet voting can be explained as follows (see 
also Madise and Vinkel 2011; Madise 2008; Madise/Martens 2006). Internet 
voting must be done during the early voting period. The voter downloads the 
voting application from the National Electoral Commission’s voting website 
(www.valimised.ee) and is prompted to insert their national Identification 
card – which contains a digital identification chip – into a simple smart card 
reader attached to the computer and to type in their Personal Identification 
Number (PIN). These card readers are inexpensive (approximately $8 US) 
and are often given away by banks and other entities, because the cards are 
used to authenticate Estonians in a range of governmental and private trans-
actions. In addition, card readers are available on computers at many public 
locations. The card and PIN together serve to authenticate the voter, allowing 
them to obtain a ballot and begin the process of voting. At this point, the 
voter’s identity is authenticated by a server containing the Estonian Popula-
tion Register; the voter is then sent to a page that provides their candidate list. 
From this page, voters can select their candidate and confirm their choice. At 
this point, they provide their second PIN, which serves to digitally “sign” the 
ballot, and the voted ballot is encrypted. The signed ballot is sent to the vot-
ing server, which verifies that the voter’s digital signature is correct. Once it 
is verified, the voter receives message on their browser confirming that their 
ballot has been received. The encrypted ballot is then stored on a server until 
it is time to be tabulated. If a voter wants, they can vote in-person early and 
this in-person ballot would invalidate the Internet vote. This process is in-
tended to provide a fail-safe for voters who may feel intimidated or coerced 
to vote a certain way online, or decides that they are unsure about the Internet 
voting process. 
The NEC tabulates Internet votes during the last sixty minutes of polling 
place voting on Election Day in a specially designated space in the Estonian 
Parliament building. Because Internet voters can cast multiple Internet votes 
(only the final vote counts) or can cast a paper ballot in early voting, the first 
step in the tabulation process is sorting out the eligible ballots – the final bal-
lot cast by Internet voters who did not also vote early in-person. These ballots 
are then decrypted using a process that requires multiple members of the 
NEC entering in an identification card and private key into the decryption 
system. The decrypted ballots are then placed on a compact disc and physi-
cally transferred from the ballot storage system to a tabulation system, and 
the vote totals are revealed. This process is transparent, with observers, the 
media, and a third-party auditor hired by the NEC checking the process.  
What is it that makes Estonia an international leader in Internet voting? 
Alvarez, Hall, and Trechsel (2009) identify four characteristics of Estonia 
that provide a favorable environment for Internet voting: (1) a high level of 
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Internet penetration, (2) a legal structure that incorporates Internet voting, (3) 
a digital identification system that allows for online authentication of a per-
son, and (4) a political culture supportive of Internet voting. First, the Internet 
penetration rate in Estonia In 2011 was 75%, higher than the rate in France. 
Second, the Estonians have developed a legal system that supports and facili-
tates Internet voting (Drechsler/Madise 2002). Three laws – the Local Gov-
ernment Council Election Act, the Referendum Act, and the Riigikogu Elec-
tion Act – were passed in 2000, each of which allowed for Internet voting in 
specific types of Estonian elections and specified the way in which the proc-
ess would be administered. The time frame during which voters could vote 
online, the mechanism for authentication, the process for reconciling ballots 
at the end of the election, and other facets of election administration with 
Internet ballots were all specified in these different laws. These statutes have 
been upheld by the Estonian courts as meeting all constitutional electoral re-
quirements.  
Third, perhaps the most important legislation related to Internet voting is 
the Digital Signature Act (DSA) of 2002. It is the DSA, and related adminis-
trative legislation, that allows individuals to use their government-provided 
digital signatures as proof of identity and authentication in online transactions 
like voting. Having a strong digital identity statute provides a critical frame-
work for allowing remote transactions to be secure and authenticated, which 
is critical for having a strong Internet voting system. In practice, the DSA is 
significant because Estonia actually has implemented a process of producing 
and requiring citizens to have an identity card that has a digital certificate 
embedded in the card that can be used, when combined with a unique PIN, 
for authentication in online transactions. 
Finally, Estonians have confidence in the Internet voting process. Several 
surveys have found that Internet voting enjoys high levels of support among 
the Estonian citizenry. Voters typically have confidence in online activities, 
including voting, and they recognize that they have options for how to cast a 
ballot, which makes it possible for a voter to cast a ballot in the way in which 
they are most comfortable – either in-person (early or on election day) or 
online. 
6.6 Other Internet Voting Experiences 
Although Estonia has a very advanced record with their implementation of 
Internet voting, they are not the only nation that uses Internet voting consis-
tently. Several Swiss cantons have used Internet voting for their direct de-
mocracy initiative elections, and the United Kingdom and Norway have be-
gun conducting Internet voting pilot tests in hopes of implementing the prac-
tice permanently. This section discusses the use of Internet voting in these 
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three countries (see Alvarez/Hall 2004, 2008, Reniu 2008; Treschel/Mendez 
2005).Internet Voting in Switzerland 
Beginning in 1998, the Swiss federal government invited the cantons of 
Geneva, Zurich, and Neuchâtel to develop Internet pilots (Auer/Trechsel 
2001). Swiss officials cited several reasons for launching an Internet voting 
project (Republique et Canton de Geneve 2003). First, Switzerland functions 
under a direct democracy system, meaning that any parliamentary vote can be 
challenged by the Swiss people; accordingly, Swiss citizens often have to 
vote several times a year. The Swiss government pursued Internet voting 
largely as a way to make these voting experiences more convenient for Swiss 
citizens. Second, Swiss voters are fairly receptive towards remote voting 
practices. Starting in 1995, citizens living in Geneva were permitted to vote 
via postal mail; by 2003, nearly 95% of Genevan voters utilized postal voting 
methods. Because the citizenry had already accepted and adjusted to remote 
voting, Swiss officials though implementation of internet voting was appro-
priate. Third, Swiss studies on postal voting found that many of the security 
concerns inherent in internet voting (such as vote buying or coercion) were 
not problems for Swiss postal voters. Fourth, the Swiss Federal Statistics Of-
fice found that a majority of the Swiss population had internet access, making 
internet voting a practical option for Swiss citizens. Finally, Internet voting 
was implemented in an attempt to provide easy voting access to disabled citi-
zens or those living abroad. 
Swiss pilot tests of Internet voting were highly successful. A November 
2004 internet voting trial in Geneva found that 43.6% of municipal voters in 
Anieres used the Internet to cast their ballots; this figure is especially impres-
sive considering the total turnout rate in Anieres was only 63.8% 
(Auer/Trechsel 2001). Trials in other cantons yielded similarly high results. 
Nearly 90% of Internet voters suggested that they would use the Internet to 
vote again in the future. Interestingly, Internet voting drew voters in Geneva 
away from the popular postal voting method; nearly 17% of those who tradi-
tionally used postal voting opted to use the Internet instead (Gerlach/Gasser 
2009, Braun/Brändli 2006). 
Since introducing Internet voting, Geneva has held the most online elec-
tions of any jurisdiction in the world because of the number of referenda 
elections they conduct. As is the case in Estonia, there is strong support for 
Internet voting in Switzerland (Kies/Trechsel 2001, Trechsel/Mendez 2005, 
Trechsel et al. 2007). The Swiss have developed a strong regulatory system 
to support Internet voting and, although they do not have digital identity as a 
part of their national identity cards, they do have a sophisticated process for 
providing all voters with a means of authenticating themselves online. 
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6.6.1 Internet Voting in the United Kingdom 
The Swiss and Estonians have effectively implemented Internet voting into 
their electoral laws, processes, and cultures. Other nations have attempted 
experiments with Internet voting, with varying degrees of rigor and success. 
This is not an exhaustive list but is intended to provide a more detailed over-
view of certain efforts. Consider first the United Kingdom, which conducted 
several trials of Internet voting and other remote voting methods between 
2002 and 2004. These trials were conducted under the auspices of the UK 
Electoral Commission (EC) and the Office of the e-Envoy. Unlike some 
Internet voting trials, which have been focused on increasing turnout, the EU 
was interested in studying how Internet voting affected several aspects of the 
voting process. As the EC stated in Modernising Elections,4 
The pilots took place against a backdrop of seemingly irreversible declining par-
ticipation in local government elections and the substantial drop in turnout in 
June 2001 general elections… However, turnout was not the only, or even pri-
mary, goal of the pilot schemes. Some were looking for administrative efficiency 
gains; others wanted to be involved in the state or the process of developing elec-
tronic voting mechanisms robust enough to win public credibility. 
 
Given the various facets of the voting process that were being studied, the EC 
developed a multi-pronged evaluation process that included voter surveys, 
cost-benefit analyses, efficiency studies, and similar analyses. As Alvarez 
and Hall (2008) note, one of the greatest benefits to come from these pilot 
programs was the strong publication and evaluation component they had. The 
broad dissemination of these reports meant that policy makers worldwide 
could learn about their efforts. 
The UK conducted three sets of voting pilot programs between 2002 and 
2004 and various types of electronic voting methods were tested. These 
methods including voting over the Internet, voting on precinct-based touch-
screen machines, voting via text messaging systems, voting via the telephone, 
and voting using interactive digital television services (Alvarez/Hall/Trechsel 
2009: 498). An interesting result from these trials was that focus group re-
spondents stated that “voting using the internet is tacitly accepted by most as 
‘the way forward’ (at least in conjunction with other methods). Some see it as 
a logical, and perhaps even inevitable development, especially in the context 
of the younger generation’s perceived preference for communicating elec-
tronically.” (Alvarez/Hall 2008, see also Electoral Commission 2003) The 
trials found that, when voters were given a choice between paper ballots and 
the new electronic modes of voting, the electronic modes won out.  
                                                          
4 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/63870/Modernising-
elections---Executive-summary.pdf (2002, 15) 
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The evaluations also provided important data regarding the relative effi-
cacy of Internet and electronic voting modes compared to traditional voting. 
First, the electronic and Internet modes of voting did not result in a large 
boost in turnout. This may have been for a variety of reasons, including vot-
ers not being familiar or comfortable with the new technology, the lack of 
permanence to the voting mode – knowing that investing in learning would 
pay off in getting to use this voting mode in the next election – or because 
these were small tests and turnout differences were hard to capture. The trials 
did show that postal voting, a low tech remote voting method, did boost turn-
out and this is the technology that the EC adopted most readily moving for-
ward (Alvarez/Hall 2008). 
The trials in the UK also illustrated several important issues associated 
with the implementation of Internet voting generally. These include the roles 
of third party vendors in these efforts, as well as associated issues related to 
contract management, quality assurance, and project management. The trials 
also illustrated that there are potential cost savings associated with using 
technology on a larger scale; high cost technologies need many users to have 
a reasonable return on investment.  
6.6.2 Internet Voting in Norway 
Like the United Kingdom, Norway has recently experimented with the possi-
bility of Internet voting. During a 2003 trial of electronic voting, Norwegian 
voters were asked how they felt about the possibility of Internet voting. Ac-
cording to a report released by the Norwegian government, six out of ten vot-
ers said they would prefer to vote over the internet. Younger voters and more 
educated voters were more favorable towards Internet voting than their older, 
less-educated counterparts (Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development 2006). Based on these positive responses, the Norwe-
gian government launched an Internet voting trial during the September 2011 
municipal and County Council elections. The trials, which were conducted in 
10 Norwegian municipalities, allowed voters in Norway to cast their ballots 
online for the first time. 
Norway’s Internet voting trials copied the Estonian Internet voting model 
(Goldsmith 2011). Online voters were permitted to cast multiple votes during 
the Internet voting period. Internet voters were also permitted to cast a paper 
ballot – which superseded any previously submitted Internet ballots – on Elec-
tion Day. If no paper ballot was cast, the voter’s most recent Internet ballot was 
included in the final count. The Norway trials also included a new safety 
mechanism whereby Internet voters received text messages containing party 
codes that could then be verified against the party codes listed on the Internet 
ballots. The text messages enabled voters to check their vote – as received by 
the system – and verify that it matched the ballot they intended to submit.  
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Although the official assessment of the Norwegian trials will not be re-
leased until later this year, initial reports suggest that nearly 25% of voters in 
the trial municipalities used the Internet to cast their ballots. This means that 
a little less than half of the voters (the total turnout in trial municipalities was 
62.3%) opted to use Internet voting rather than traditional paper-based poll-
ing. This figure is considerably high, given that the 2011 elections were 
Norway’s first time experimenting with Internet voting. If the official as-
sessment confirms that the internet trials were as successful as the initial re-
ports suggest, it is likely that Norway will implement Internet voting in all 
municipalities for future elections. 
6.7 Internet Voting in the United States 
In the United States, there have been several attempts to experiment with 
Internet voting. These efforts have typically been one-shot efforts to test 
Internet voting in a specific setting and rarely the type of evaluations in the 
UK have been conducted with American Internet voting trials. The Internet 
voting trials have occurred in two specific types of settings. First, Internet 
voting has been conducted as a part of primary elections conducted by De-
mocrats: in 2000 in Arizona, in 2004 in Michigan, and in 2008 with De-
mocrats Abroad. In each case, the Democratic Party in the state (or, in 
2008, for the organization) made a decision to use the Internet as a mode of 
voting for the party’s presidential primary election and the goal was always 
to see if Internet voting would boost interest in the primary and boost turn-
out. Second, Internet voting has been used in an effort to facilitate voting 
by one of the most difficult to reach set of voters in the United States – 
military personnel, military personnel’s dependents, and civilians living 
overseas who are covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Civilian Absen-
tee Voting Act (UOCAVA). In 2000, 2008, and 2010, Internet voting was 
deployed to serve a small segment of these voters and a larger experiment 
to provide Internet voting to this population was canceled prior to the 2004 
elections. 
Internet voting has been conducted in two Democratic primary elections. 
In Arizona in 2000, all registered Democrats were mailed a PIN that allowed 
them to vote online if they wanted. In Michigan in 2004, voters could choose 
to vote online and those who did so were provided a PIN that authenticated 
them to vote online. In the Michigan caucus, 162,929 caucus votes were cast 
and recorded, 29% of which were cast using the Internet. By comparison, in 
the 2000 Arizona Democratic Primary, 42% of all ballots were cast over the 
Internet before Election Day. More votes were cast in the Michigan Democ-
ratic Caucus in 2004 than were cast in the Arizona Democratic Primary in 
2000, even though a larger percentage was cast in Arizona. In neither Ari-
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zona or in Michigan did the use of Internet voting boost overall turnout in the 
election. In both cases, turnout was not greatly affected by the use of the 
Internet as a voting mode. Equally as important, neither of these elections 
contained an evaluation component. As several scholars have noted, there is 
little that can be learned from these two elections about the efficacy of Inter-
net voting in the United States because no data was collected during the 
process (Alvarez/Hall 2004, 2008). 
In 2000, the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) – the U.S. gov-
ernment agency tasked with serving UOCAVA voters – conducted a proof-
of-concept trial for Internet voting. In 2000, 83 UOCAVA voters from five 
states cast ballots online in the general election. In 2004, FVAP was going to 
build on their 2000 experience and implement an Internet voting project 
called the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE). 
SERVE was intended to build on the lessons learned in the 2000 experiment 
and allow UOCAVA voters to register and vote using a personal or work 
computer. The idea behind Internet voting for UOCAVA voters voting online 
is that it gives the flexibility to vote when it is convenient and helps them to 
overcome the problems associated with transmitting their ballots via mail. 
Because of a negative report about Internet voting that was released in late 
January 2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz signed a memo-
randum blocking the implementation of the SERVE system in the 2004 elec-
tion cycle (Alvarez/Hall 2008). 
The cancellation of the SERVE project did limit the desire of policy 
makers and election officials to consider Internet voting. However, in 2008, 
Okaloosa County, Florida conducted an experiment with kiosk Internet vot-
ing, allowing voters to cast ballots using the Internet from a remote polling 
location which transmitted the completed ballot online. The idea here was to 
test to determine how this version of Internet voting (where the election offi-
cial controls the voting computer) compared to Internet voting conducted on 
a personal computer. Much like the 2000 FVAP trial, this experiment was a 
proof of concept. In 2010, the state of West Virginia also conducted a limited 
Internet voting trial for military and overseas voters but it was quite limited 
in scope as well. 
6.8 Legal Limitations of Internet Voting in Germany 
Internet voting has been successfully implemented or tested in several nations, 
but in other countries the practice faces legal barriers. Germany is one such 
country. In 2009, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that electronic 
voting technologies (which were utilized in 39 German voting districts during 
the 2005 federal election) did not meet the constitutional requirement of elec-
toral transparency. Article 38 of the German Constitution guarantees the “pub-
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lic nature of elections”; according to the Court, this provision means that “all 
essential steps in the elections are subject to public examinability unless other 
constitutional interests justify an exception.”(Art. 38 in conjunction with Art. 
20.1 and 20.2 German Basic Law, see also Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009). 
After evaluating the voting technologies employed during the 2005 federal 
election, the Court decided that electronic voting did not meet constitutional re-
quirements insofar as it did not provide a way for voters to determine whether 
their votes had been “unfalsifiably recorded and included in the ascertainment 
of the election result” (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009). Moreover, the Court 
found that the electronic voting machines used during the election were not 
adequately guarded against potential tampering or manipulation. The Court 
also ruled that the Federal Voting Machine Regulation (Bundeswahlgeräte-
verordnung 1975) was unconstitutional because it did not require transparent 
safety and control measures to ensure accurate ballot counts. 
The Court’s 2009 decision could limit the use of electronic voting sys-
tems in future German elections. The ruling also creates legal obstacles for 
the implementation of Internet voting methods in Germany. If remote Inter-
net elections are to become standard practice in Germany, they will have to 
meet the standards for public elections articulated in the Court’s ruling on 
electronic voting. 
Schmidt et al. (2009) propose a legal framework for Internet voting that 
meets the requirements defined by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Schmidt et al. 2009). Their framework contains several components. First, 
the authors require that all remote electronic voting service providers (VSPs) 
be accredited by an administrative body. Accreditation would affirm that the 
VSP fulfils security requirements, generates adequate documentation of the 
voting process, and has a history of providing secure and dependable Internet 
voting services. VSP accreditation would have to be renewed on a regular ba-
sis, and Non-accredited VSPs would not be enlisted to provide services for a 
German election. 
Under the legal framework designed by Schmidt et al., VSPs would be 
held to certain legal requirements during an election. First, the VSP would 
have to prove that its technology established no link between a voter and his 
or her ballot; in other words, the VSP would have to provide for secret bal-
lots. Second, the VSP would need to have high service availability to guaran-
tee universal suffrage. Third, the VSP would be legally obligated to provide a 
secure voting environment that was free of manipulation. Fourth, the provider 
would need to be able to verify and authenticate the identity of voters. Fifth, 
the VSP would be required to brief voters on the risks and necessary security 
precautions associated with Internet voting. And finally, the VSP would have 
to satisfy the constitutional principle of public nature of elections by having a 
tangible way to verify the integrity of the voting procedure. 
The framework described above addresses the legal issues identified by 
the German Federal Constitutional Court in their 2009 ruling on electronic 
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voting equipment. Specifically, the framework ensures that Internet voting 
systems meet German constitutional standards for the public nature of elec-
tions. The legal principles articulated by Schmidt et al. are promising, be-
cause they provide a way for Internet voting to succeed in countries where 
the practice faces significant legal obstacles. If adopted in Germany, this le-
gal framework could become a model for other nations who want to imple-
ment Internet voting technologies in spite of legal barriers.  
6.9 Internet Voting and Security 
One of the primary concerns with Internet voting is the security of this voting 
mode. As Alvarez and Hall (2004, 2008) have noted, all voting modes have 
certain pathologies and the primary ones related to Internet voting have a 
comparative one in the paper-based voting world. However, it is worth re-
viewing the risks associated with Internet voting, including the risks associ-
ated with hacking, cyber attacks, and other deleterious practices (Volkamer 
2008). 
Although there are many benefits of Internet voting, numerous scholars 
have identified risks associated with Internet voting (Alvarez/Hall 2004, 
2008). As many scholars have argued, these risks “have to do with vulner-
abilities of the PC platform and vulnerabilities associated with the internet it-
self” (Lauer 2004: 182). Because Internet voting is conducted online, Internet 
elections are in danger of the same “worms, viruses, and Trojan horses” that 
threaten any user of the worldwide web (Schryen 2004: 2). For example, a vi-
rus or malware could prevent a voter from being able to cast a ballot online, 
effectively disenfranchising that voter for the given election. Additionally, 
Internet voting presents the risk of cyber-attacks which “could result in large-
scale, selective voter disenfranchisement, and/or privacy violation, and/or 
vote buying and selling, and/or vote switching even to the extent of reversing 
the outcome of many elections at once.” (Jefferson et al. 2004: 60). Such cy-
ber-attacks could be conducted “from anywhere in the world,” and would 
“have a devastating effect on public confidence in elections” (Jefferson et al. 
2004: 60). 
Another critique of Internet voting is that there is typically not a paper 
record – a so-called “paper trail” – of the votes, making the system vulner-
able to “programmed insider attacks” (see Jefferson et al. 2004, 61). Riera 
Jorba, Ruiz, and Brown (2003) believe that any problems that stem from the 
lack of a voter-verified paper trail can be easily overcome using adequate se-
curity measures. If technological, physical, and procedural precautions are 
taken, they argue, “paper trails are not strictly necessary” (Riera Jorba/ 
Ruiz/Brown 2003: 69). According to Lauer, such insider attacks are common 
in commercial settings and could easily compromise the outcome of an inter-
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net election (Lauer 2004: 182). However, there have been efforts in recent 
years to overcome this problem by conducting Internet voting from kiosks 
that do produce a paper record. For example, the Internet voting trial con-
ducted in 2008 in Okaloosa County, Florida for military voters did have such 
a paper record as a part of the process. Voters cast ballots at a specific Inter-
net enabled computer location – not their own home personal computer – and 
the machines at these locations printed a paper ballot.  
Critics of Internet voting also often make much of the fact that Internet 
voting affords less privacy and secrecy than traditional polls with voting 
booths (Schryen 2004). The argument here is that, when voters cast their bal-
lots from their home or work computers, it is possible that a spouse, co-
worker, or friend will oversee the voting process. This lack of privacy is 
problematic insofar as it would increase the likelihood that “individuals in 
abusive relationships could be coerced to vote a particular way.” (Lauer 
2004: 183). However, this type of critique is less one of Internet voting but of 
remote voting generally. As Alvarez and Hall (2004) note, these pathologies 
of Internet voting are exactly identical to those associated with postal voting. 
Any remote voting conducted outside of the control of election officials will 
have this problem. 
The types of attacks and threats that are more directly associated with 
Internet voting are generally places into one of two categories two basic 
groups: penetration attacks, which target the client or server directly, and de-
nial of service (DOS) attacks, which target and interrupt communications be-
tween client and server (Internet Policy Institute 2001: 13). It has been ar-
gued that each of these types of attacks has “advanced in sophistication and 
automation in recent years”; both penetration and DOS attacks can “do more 
damage, are more likely to succeed, and disguise themselves better than ever 
before” (Rubin 2002, 40). In the next section we consider penetration attacks 
and DOS attacks in more detail.  
6.9.1 Penetration Attacks 
Penetration attacks are the “use of a delivery mechanism to transport a mali-
cious payload to the target host in the form of a Trojan horse or remote con-
trol program” (Internet Policy Institute 2001: 13). Once it reaches the target 
host, the malicious payload is capable of inflicting unlimited damage on the 
system. According to Rubin, “a malicious payload on a voting host can actu-
ally change a voter’s vote without the voter or anyone else noticing, regard-
less of the encryption or voter authentication in place.” (Rubin 2002: 40). 
Another analysis expresses similar concerns, citing the malicious payload’s 
ability to “spy on ballots, prevent voters from casting ballots, or, even worse, 
modify the ballot according to its instructions.” (Internet Policy Institute 
2001: 13). 
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Penetration attacks are especially problematic because they are nearly 
impossible to detect. Many malicious payloads are designed with a “stealth 
mode” that enables them to evade virus and intrusion detection software 
(Internet Policy Institute 2001: 13, Rubin 2002: 40). Additionally, malicious 
payloads are capable of self-erasure and leave little evidence of fraudulent ac-
tivity. Malicious payloads “do not appear in the Task Menu of running proc-
esses; even an experienced administrator would have difficulty discovering 
its presence on a computer.” (Rubin 2002: 40). Perhaps most troubling is the 
fact that malicious payloads can be, and often are, delivered through seem-
ingly benign methods: CD-ROM, Internet downloads, e-mails, etc. And ma-
licious payloads can be activated unintentionally: “Even the simple viewing 
of a message in the preview screen of an e-mail client has, in some cases, 
proved sufficient to trigger execution of its attachment.” (Internet Policy In-
stitute 2001: 21). The recent so-called “stuxnet” attack on the Iranian nuclear 
program that may have devastated parts of their computer systems was ex-
actly this type of attack (The Christian Science Monitor 2011). 
Malicious payloads can affect Internet voting in several serious ways. It 
has been argued that such attacks can cause selective disenfranchisement, 
vote theft, privacy compromise, and disruption of democracy (Jefferson et al. 
2004: 62). In addition to carrying severe consequences, malicious payload at-
tacks are relatively easy to execute; the tools required for malicious payload 
delivery are “widely available” (Lauer 2004: 182). Perhaps most concerning 
aspect of malicious payloads is the fact “detection is difficult” and “no simple 
countermeasures” exist. Moreover, such attacks are most likely to be launched 
to attack the computer’s used by individual voters, and many individuals and 
corporations may fail to follow certain basic rules associated with good com-
puter security. 
Even with these concerns, there have been efforts to test the robustness 
of Internet voting systems that have proven successful. In Switzerland, Inter-
net voting was pilot tested in Geneva in January 2003 without incident. The 
Swiss also hired a team of “white-hat” hackers to try to break into their secu-
rity system over a three-week period – the system was online to voters only 
for two days – but the hackers failed (Alvarez/Hall 2004). 
6.9.2 Denial of Service (DOS) Attacks 
A second type of attack is Denial of Service (DOS). DOS attacks occur when 
“legitimate users are prevented from using the system by malicious activity 
such as overloading the election Web server.” (Jefferson et al. 2004: 63). 
Such attacks are not new, but have become more sophisticated over time. 
DOS attacks came to prominence in 2002, when several high-profile websites 
– including CNN, Yahoo, and eBay – were affected by DOS attacks that 
were launched by a teenager (Jefferson et al. 2004: 64). More recently, the 
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hacker group Anonymous has launched very effective DOS attacks against an 
array of corporations and these cyber-security threats – from Anonymous and 
others – have become so severe that the Director of the FBI has stated that “I 
do not think today [that cyber-attacks are] necessarily [the] number one 
threat, but it will be tomorrow. Counterterrorism – stopping terrorist attacks – 
with the FBI is the present number one priority. But down the road, the cy-
berthreat, which cuts across all [FBI] programs, will be the number one threat 
to the country.” (ABC news 2012).  
 
The technical description of a DOS attack is as follows:  
[A DOS attack] involves the use of one or more computers to interrupt communi-
cations between a client and a server by flooding the target with more requests 
than it can handle. This action effectively prevents the target machine from 
communicating until such time as the attack stops. A refinement of this technique 
is referred to as distributed denial of service (DDOS) in which software programs 
called daemons are installed on many computers without the knowledge or con-
sent of their owners (through the use of [malicious payload] delivery mechanisms 
[…]), and used to perpetrate an attack. In this manner, an attacker can access the 
bandwith of many computers to flood and overwhelm the intended target. (Inter-
net Policy Institute 2001, 14-15) 
 
A DOS attack would severely impair the administration of Internet elections 
in several ways. A successful DOS attack could result in wide-scale disen-
franchisement across one mode of voting. A DOS attack could even be tai-
lored to affect network services in certain geographic or potentially even 
other demographic areas – like a college campus – in an attempt to disenfran-
chise specific groups of voters who are more likely to vote for one demo-
graphic group (Jefferson et al. 2004: 64). Of course, such an attack can be 
overcome by allowing individuals to vote via multiple modes – early, re-
motely (by mail or Internet), and in-person – so that if there is a problem with 
any specific mode there is an alternate one that the voter can use. These at-
tacks would also be problematic because battling such an attack could be 
costly in terms of both time and resources.  
6.10 Additional Critiques 
Critics of Internet voting do acknowledge that there are problems associated 
with traditional voting modes and that many of the vulnerabilities associated 
with Internet voting do have an analogous version in traditional voting. How-
ever, computer security experts are generally more concerned about Internet 
voting. A survey conducted in 2004 of people working in the field of computer 
security found that 60% of respondents had a negative opinion of Internet vot-
ing (Machlis 2004). One reason for this is that Internet attacks are generally 
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considered to be more scalable compared to traditional voting (see Rubin 2002, 
44). Of course, the scalability of an Internet attack would depend on the way in 
which the Internet voting system is implemented. If the systems varied across 
jurisdictions, then the scalability might be more limited. Moreover, other voting 
systems, such as Oregon’s system where all of the voting is conducted via the 
postal service, are also vulnerable to failures in the system.  
Despite their concerns, election scholars realize that “the deployment of 
e-voting systems will likely continue.” (Lauer 2004: 184). Still, most argue 
that internet voting systems warrant careful and cautious implementation. 
Some researchers, like Jefferson et al. (2004), emphatically discourage the 
use of any Internet voting systems. Others researchers, recognize that Internet 
trials will be conducted but are concerned that election administrators and 
policy makers will assume that Internet voting trials that are not problematic 
prove that such voting systems are safe. “The fact that none of these experi-
ments has resulted in a serious breach of security,” Rubin asserts, “is no ar-
gument that these systems are not vulnerable.” (Rubin 2002: 40). Still other 
scholars accept the use of Internet voting in small, low-stake elections (such 
as school board elections) but advise against the use of online voting in “na-
tional elections where the fabric of democracy is at risk.” (Lauer 2004: 185). 
6.11 Conclusion 
Internet voting remains a controversial voting technology. On one side of the 
debate are those individuals who think that Internet voting will increase turn-
out – especially for difficult to serve and difficult to mobilize voters such as 
military personnel, expatriates, and young people – and will increase the 
quality of the voting experience by reducing the problems associated with 
remote voting, such as errors casting a ballot and difficulties returning the 
ballot on-time. On the other side of the debate are those individuals who 
worry about the security of voting online and fear that Internet voting – espe-
cially broad scale Internet voting – will prove to be a very attractive target for 
foreign governments, terrorists, and hackers, who want to influence the out-
come of a country’s election. Such an attack could undermine public confi-
dence in a given election outcome, in the electoral process, and ultimately in 
a nation’s democracy. 
This debate is likely to continue for the next several years but there is 
one clear trend in the area of Internet voting, which is that countries with 
Internet voting systems – Estonia and Switzerland – will continue to use them 
and many other countries, including Norway, jurisdictions in the United 
States, and other European nations, will continue to experiment with this vot-
ing technology. In the United States, such trials will be conducted in large 
part because of a desire by many to ensure that deployed military personnel, 
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who are poorly served through the postal voting process, are enfranchised. In 
Europe, these efforts are driven by several factors, including a desire to in-
crease turnout, to serve difficult to reach populations, and because of inter-
country competition (i.e., keeping up with the Swiss and Estonians!)  
These Internet voting pilot projects are only truly helpful if the countries 
that engage in them take the time to conduct a meaningful study of the pilot. 
For example, Estonia and the Swiss have conducted numerous surveys evalu-
ating the public’s attitudes toward Internet voting and the British and Norwe-
gians conducted broad studies of their Internet voting trials (Alvarez/Hall 
2004, 2008, Alvarez/Hall/Trechsel 2009, Trechsel/Mendez 2005). The Swiss 
and others have also conducted penetration studies of their Internet voting 
systems. By conducting these studies, it is possible for policy makers to learn 
about the various aspects of Internet voting and what works and what does 
not. Internet voting typically involves introducing an array of new systems 
into the voting process: new voter authentication processes and procedures, a 
new voting technology, new ballot tabulation and reconciliation systems, new 
voter registration interfaces, and other administrative activities. Unless these 
activities are well-studied, it is difficult for policy makers to know if a given 
Internet voting pilot was successful as perceived by the voter, the election of-
ficials, the political parties and candidates, and other interested groups. Given 
the steady movement of Internet technologies into all aspects of our lives, 
Internet voting will remain of interest to voters and policy makers across the 
globe. 
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7. Voting Advice Applications            
Andreas Ladner and Jan Fivaz                    
The Internet has become an integral part of politics and will continue to gain 
importance in the years to come. Internet-based solutions comprise simple 
websites conveying information, applications which incite and further politi-
cal participation, and more complex forms of interactive and deliberative pol-
icy forming. Particularly in the context of elections the Internet opens up new 
and promising possibilities for parties and candidates wanting to present 
themselves and their political programme, to organise the election campaign, 
to gather funds, to mobilise support and to enter into a direct dialogue with 
the electorate (cf. Chadwick/Howard 2009, Schweitzer/Albrecht 2011). 
So-called Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) take a privileged place 
among the political websites. VAAs offer help in deciding how to vote by 
comparing the preferences of parties or candidates with respect to different 
political issues with the preferences of the specific voters and indicating 
those parties or candidates who are politically close. Nowadays, one or sev-
eral VAAs are on offer at practically all national elections in Europe and they 
are used by millions of voters. The parliamentary elections of 2006 in the 
Netherlands are an impressive example of the widespread use of online vot-
ing aids: About 9.8 million voters took part in the elections and the two big-
gest VAAs alone were consulted 5.7 million times (Louwerse/Rosema 2011: 
6). 
These figures, even if regarded with a certain amount of caution, serve as 
an impressive indicator of the value of VAAs among political websites. 
Given their widespread use it is astonishing that so far, political scientists 
have hardly dealt with VAAs and their possible effects on electoral behaviour 
and election results. Generally, VAAs are seen as an interesting epiphenome-
non. It is only in the past few years that political scientists have begun to ask 
the many questions that arise in connection with VAAs and their use. 
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7.1 What are VAAs and how do they work? 
VAAs are issue-matching systems. Their basic functions are simple. At first, 
a catalogue of issues reflecting the most important political discussions and 
problems serves to identify the positions of the parties or candidates (for a 
party election or a personal election respectively). These political positions 
are saved in the form of a profile. As a next step, the website allows voters to 
construct their own profile by means of the same catalogue of issues. This 
profile can then be compared with the profiles of the parties or candidates. 
The VAAs then calculate the congruence between voters and parties or can-
didates and display the results as rankings. All VAAs have this basic system 
in common (differences will be discussed in section 2). 
This shows that online voting aids are not only based on the normative 
idea of so-called issue voting but actually implement issue voting in an ideal 
fashion (Klein 2006: 595). Issue voting is based on Downs’ (1957) spatial 
model of politics and on his notion that the congruence between voter and 
party or candidate with respect to the essential political issues should be the 
decisive criterion of an election. In its original form, this model assumes that 
a rational voter will vote for the party which is closest to his or her own 
views. This approach is thus also referred to as proximity voting. It has to be 
said, though, that a number of restrictive and somewhat unrealistic assump-
tions are involved. 
Downs based his approach on the electoral campaigns in the USA where 
in general two parties provide one candidate each, competing against each 
other in their constituency. The position on the left-right axis provided the 
only measure of political proximity. The voter needs to have clear prefer-
ences in order to arrive at a rational decision and he needs to know the posi-
tions of the candidates. This is where Downs’ approach invites criticism. It is 
doubtful that voters always display clear preferences. Rather, it can be as-
sumed that they often have diffuse preferences (Rabinowitz/MacDonald 
1989). Furthermore, in European countries there are usually more than two 
parties or candidates competing against each other, which considerably in-
creases the amount of information needed for a choice, and the left-right axis 
alone does not correspond to political reality (cf. Kriesi et al. 2008). In such a 
complex arena many voters will not have the time to comprehend and com-
pare the positions on a large number of issues. 
The model of directional voting takes account of all this and  while being 
a form of issue voting  assumes that the voter is interested in rough directions 
rather than detailed issue preferences. In this way voters can lower their in-
formation-seeking costs (Rabinowitz/MacDonald 1989). 
The question now arises whether VAAs in their basic approach are closer 
to the proximity voting model or to the directional voting model. At first 
sight the matter seems clear: Online voting aids help citizens to lower their 
information-seeking costs. They facilitate the comparison of the positions of 
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a large number of parties and a large number of issues with one’s own prefer-
ences in a short time (Jeitziner 2004). Insofar they follow the logic of prox-
imity voting. However, in their implementation several VAAs show features 
which are to be attributed to the directional voting model (for instance in the 
range of answers containing a neutral middle position or the possibility of 
weighting issues). The answer to this question is therefore ambivalent, at 
least from a theoretical point of view (Wagner/Ruusuvirta 2009: 9). Also, no 
empirical study has yet been undertaken to answer the question which model 
better explains the voting choices of VAA users. 
Such a study would also have to take into account other approaches ex-
plaining electoral behaviour, such as strategic considerations which may in-
fluence a voting decision. Often, governments are only formed after intensive 
coalition negotiations, and in parliamentary practice decisions are often com-
promises between two or more parties. By pre-empting such negotiations and 
compromises it may be rational for moderate voters to elect extreme parties 
even though they are not closest to their preferences (Kedar 2005). Moreover, 
there are sociological factors to be considered (e.g. voting according to social 
class; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) as well as socio-psychological factors (e.g. iden-
tification with a particular party; Schoen/Weins 2005). 
Up to now, VAAs have been based exclusively on the theoretical founda-
tion of issue voting. In principle, it is perfectly possible to integrate other ex-
planatory models of electoral behaviour. For instance, VAAs could offer the 
possibility of filtering candidates according to socio-demographic features 
such as gender, age, income and occupation. It will be interesting to see 
whether VAAs will evolve in this direction in the years to come. 
7.1.1 Historical development 
The Dutch Stemwijzer1 is generally regarded as the very first voting aid. Its 
earliest version was developed in 1989 in a printed form to be used in teach-
ing politics at school. The popularity of this tool left a lot to be desired, as 
only 50 copies were sold. In 1994 a first computer-based version was devel-
oped and several thousand disks could be sold. In view of the parliamentary 
elections of 1998, a first online-version was introduced, which was used 
6,500 times (De Graaf 2010). In Finland, a VAA had been developed inde-
pendently two years earlier. In subsequent years, new voting aids were added 
by and by, so that no fewer than 20 different online-voting aids were on offer 
for the parliamentary elections of 2007 (Ruusuvirta 2010: 47-49). In other 
European countries a veritable VAA boom began in the years following the 
millennium. Today it is difficult to find a European country that does not of-
fer several online voting aids during electoral campaigns (a good overview of 
                                                          
1 Cf. http://www.stemwijzer.nl (20.01.2012). 
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the rapid expansion of VAAs can be found in Walgrave et al. 2008b as well 
as in Cedroni/Garzia 2010). Besides a multitude of independent websites, 
three “families” of VAAs can be distinguished: 
The Stemwijzer family, based on the Dutch example, is used in many 
other countries. Its best-known representative must be the German Wahl-O-
Mat.2 Stemwijzer versions have also been employed in France, Italy and Bul-
garia. The Stemwijzer is a reliable and simple voting aid, characterised by a 
high degree of user-friendliness. 
The second family is based on the Kieskompas3, also developed in the 
Netherlands and in direct competition with the Stemwijzer. The Kieskompas 
differs from the Stemwijzer in that the positions of the parties with respect to 
political issues are not identified by means of questioning but rather by 
means of an analysis of the programmes of parties and election campaigns. In 
addition, the Kieskompas makes use of a diagram in a two-dimensional sys-
tem of coordinates rather than a list for the results obtained – in other words 
it provides a kind of map of the political space. This family comprises the EU 
Profiler4 (a VAA for the EU elections of 2009), the Canadian Vote Com-
pass5, the Portuguese Bussola Eleitoral6, a Turkish version7 and the US-
American Electoral Compass8. 
The third family, finally, has its origins in Switzerland. In 2003 smart-
vote9 began to operate and it has since been used in Scotland, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg10 and Austria11. smartvote is a relatively complex 
online-voting aid to handle, containing a simple list presentation and two dif-
ferent graphical presentations detailing the party positions. In addition, 
smartvote enables voters to compare their own positions not only with those 
of the parties but also with those of the individual candidates. 
7.1.2 Who develops and operates VAAs? 
Most VAAs have their origins in the context of universities. Scientists inter-
ested in electoral and party research are often strongly involved. Early on, in-
stitutions engaged in civic education expressed their interest. They then em-
ployed VAAs in the context of informing people and as an instrument to 
                                                          
2 Cf. http://wahl-o-mat.de (22.01.2012). 
3 Cf. http://www.kieskompas.nl (22.01.2012). 
4 Cf. http://www.euprofiler.eu (3.2.2012). 
5 Cf. http://votecompass.ca (3.2.2012). 
6 Cf. http://www.bussolaeleitoral.pt (3.2.2012). 
7 Cf. http://www.oypusulasi.org (3.2.2012). 
8 Cf. http://www.electoralcompass.com (3.2.2012). 
9 Cf. http://www.smartvote.ch (3.2.2012). 
10 Cf. http://www.smartvote.lu (3.2.2012). 
11 Cf. http://www.politikkabine.at (3.2.2012). 
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strengthen the political participation of young and new voters (Fivaz/Nadig 
2010). This is typically and ideally the case for the Stemwijzer, the Wahl-O-
Mat and the Austrian Wahlkabine12.  
Smartvote works in close conjunction with various universities, though it 
has been developed and operated by a non-profit organisation, while Ki-
eskompas is a project of a market-oriented enterprise. Online voting aids are 
also employed in new democracies in the context of projects aimed at estab-
lishing or furthering democracy and as such they are often financed by state 
agencies for cooperative development or by NGOs. This was the case in the 
transitional countries of Eastern Europe and more recently in certain coun-
tries of the Middle East against the background of the Arab spring. In 2011, 
versions of both Stemwijzer and Kieskompas were employed in Egypt, Tuni-
sia and Morocco. 
More and more often, the media get involved with online voting aids. For 
one thing, VAAs can be integrated directly into the websites of a media en-
terprise; for another, data captured in the VAAs such as the various positions 
of parties on a particular issue can be integrated into the reporting on elec-
toral campaigns. The Belgian Stemtest for instance was developed by several 
universities at the request of a television channel and was subsequently used 
in several television shows built around it and preceding the elections 
(Nuytemans et al. 2010). 
Rather unusually, certain political interest groups or even parties them-
selves operate online voting aids (Ruusuvirta 2010; Skop 2010). Such voting 
aids should be met with the greatest scepticism. Essential standards of all re-
spectable online voting aids  they must be politically neutral and nonpartisan  
can hardly be expected when political actors operate their own VAAs. How-
ever, such VAAs have remained isolated cases, not least because they are not 
sufficiently accepted by voters. 
7.2 Differences between VAAs 
Even though their basic structure is always the same, the various VAAs 
sometimes differ considerably in the details of their mode of functioning and 
the methods applied. 
At first, we can distinguish between candidate-oriented and party-
oriented VAAs. The overwhelming majority of VAAs belong to the party-
oriented type, i.e. they offer the voters a comparison with the parties and not 
with the individual candidates. This reflects the reality of the electoral sys-
tems of many countries in which one can vote for parties but not directly for 
candidates. In some countries, electoral systems are used which make use of 
                                                          
12 Cf. http://www.wahlkabine.at (3.2.2012). 
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open lists and other elements allowing the direct election of individual candi-
dates. Switzerland and Luxembourg offer the voter the possibility of compil-
ing a list of candidates from different parties. In Finland – to cite a further 
example – one can vote for one party only, but with the freedom to change 
the ranking order of candidates within the list according to personal prefer-
ences. In such countries, VAAs are often employed which enable not only a 
comparison between voter and parties but also between voter and candidates. 
Hence, with respect to the architecture of a VAA the specific voting system is 
of prime importance (Ladner et al. 2010: 92). 
Core element of all VAAs is the questionnaire or catalogue of issues on 
which basis the matching procedure is operated. The choice of issues consid-
ered is therefore a central criterion of quality (Walgrave et al. 2009). As a 
rule, the issues are selected by political scientists in a multi-step procedure. In 
the case of the German Wahl-O-Mart a group of young and politically inter-
ested voters are involved in addition to the scientists (Marschall/Schmidt 
2010). Statistical procedures are widely used to ensure that the catalogue of 
issues is adequate in splitting up the different parties. The most scientific and 
elaborate procedure by far is applied for the Belgian Stemtest. A catalogue of 
70 questions is compiled and then reduced to about 30 definitive questions by 
means of complex statistical procedures and with the aid of computer simula-
tions (cf. Nuytemans et al. 2010 for a detailed description of the procedure). 
VAAs also vary as to the size of the questionnaire which usually contains 
about 30 questions. smartvote with up to 75 questions features the largest 
questionnaire of all VAAs. 
Answer options and weighting possibilities play an important role be-
sides the design and size of the questionnaire. As for answer options there is 
a distinction between those with a neutral answer (e.g. “don’t know” or “no 
answer”) besides a “Yes” and a “No” answer and those without a neutral po-
sition. A second distinction concerns the degree of scaling. There are VAAs 
where certain questions can only be answered in the positive or negative 
while others allow answering in more detail along multi-step Likert-scales. 
Often the possibility is given of weighting certain questions or even entire ar-
eas of issues or of defining certain questions as “killer” criteria (i.e. in these 
areas a party must agree with the answer of a voter in order to be included as 
a recommended choice). 
A further distinctive feature is the way in which positions of parties or 
candidates are identified. Two procedures are in use: the direct questioning or 
the analysis of election programmes by experts. Both procedures have advan-
tages and disadvantages. When surveys are conducted it must be noted that 
parties and candidates may display a strategic behaviour by answering ques-
tions in order to appear in the best possible light. This problem will be ad-
dressed further in section 7. While the problem of strategic behaviour does 
not arise in the analysis of election programmes there are other challenges to 
be dealt with. It may happen that certain policy fields are not covered by the 
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election programmes of all parties and in the case of small parties an explicit 
election programme may not even exist. A special case is presented by the 
EU Profiler which was developed for the EU elections of 2009. It consisted 
in a version of Kieskompas which was supplemented by elements taken from 
smartvote. For instance, both procedures for identifying party positions were 
employed (Trechsel/Mair 2011). A definitive judgment cannot be made as to 
which procedure is to be preferred. In practice it has been shown that the ma-
jority of VAAs operate with direct questioning. This is particularly true of 
VAAs like smartvote which identify the position of each individual candi-
date. 
Different methods are also employed in the calculation of the congruence 
between party or candidate profile and voter profile. Often, simple measures 
of distance are employed such as the City Block model or Euclidian distance. 
From a purely methodological-mathematical point of view there are models 
which are better suited but the distance-based models have the advantage of 
being more transparent to the voter and easier to understand (Marschall/ 
Schmidt 2010). This is an important aspect as VAAs depend on voters trust-
ing them. It is difficult to trust a voting aid whose methods of calculation re-
semble a black box. 
A final difference between VAAs lies in their presentation of results. A 
ranking of parties according to their congruence with the voter is common to 
all VAAs. This ranking is usually presented graphically by means of bar 
charts. Additionally, presentations of left-to-right axes and multidimensional 
political spaces are employed. In multidimensional presentations, on the one 
hand, two-dimensional coordinate systems/maps are employed. They com-
prise not only a left-to-right axis but also a liberal-conservative axis or a so-
called GALTAN-axis (green/alternative/liberal-traditional/authoritarian/ 
nationalist). VAAs of the Kieskompas familiy apply this kind of presentation. 
On the other hand, some VAAs also employ spider web graphs, which pre-
sent political positions along up to eight axes (e.g. smartvote with the follow-
ing axes: openness in foreign policies, liberal economic policies, restrictive 
financial policies, law and order, restrictive migration policies, elaborate en-
vironmental policies, elaborate welfare system, and liberal society). 
It can be said that different VAAs have very different ways of dealing 
with design and methodology. Studies have shown that not only the composi-
tion of the questionnaire (Walgrave et al. 2009, Nuytemans et al. 2010) but 
also the matching procedure (Louwerse/Rosema 2011) have a significant in-
fluence of the results. The question thus arises whether there is a right and a 
wrong method and whether some VAAs issue good or bad electoral recom-
mendations. Research has not yet found definitive answers to these questions, 
probably because there is not a single correct approach but several possible 
approaches which lead to differing but perfectly correct electoral recommen-
dations.  
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7.3 Increasing popularity 
The use of online voting aids has increased considerably in recent years. 
The Dutch example shows this particularly well. In 1998 the first Stemwi-
jzer website was used 6,500 times. For the 2002 elections, over two million 
voting recommendations were registered, and for the 2006 elections as 
many as 4.8 million (de Graaf 2010: 41-42). For the 2010 elections the fig-
ure fell to 4.2 million due to competition with Kieskompas, which was used 
1.5 million times (Louwerse/Rosema 2011). Thus, the number of voting 
recommendations issued in 2010 corresponds to more than 50% of the 
Dutch voters. 
Similar developments can be observed in other countries. In Germany, 
Wahl-O-Mat was in operation for the first time for the parliamentary elec-
tions in 2002 and used 3.7 million times. For the 2009 elections 6.2 million 
voting recommendations were recorded, which corresponds to about 12% of 
voters (Garzia 2010: 14). In Switzerland, smartvote began operating for the 
parliamentary elections in 2003 and issued 255,000 voting recommendations. 
Four years later the number rose to 963,000 and in 2011 as many as 1.2 mil-
lion voting recommendations were issued. In other words, usage rose from 
five to over 23% in eight years. 
Even though this development is impressive, these figures must be met 
with caution. The number of voting recommendations issued does not in it-
self indicate the number of users. Some scientific studies are thus based on 
lower user figures (Ladner 2009). The example of smartvote and the figures 
for the 2007 elections in Switzerland help to show this. In 2007 there were 
4.9 million voters in Switzerland, 2.4 million of which took part in the elec-
tions. smartvote was used 963,000 times. However, many voters used smart-
vote several times in the course of the electoral campaign and asked for vot-
ing recommendations for more than one constituency. With the help of server 
statistics a clearer picture was gained and an estimate was made according to 
which between 350,000 and 375,000 people had in fact used smartvote. This 
figure corresponds to seven to eight per cent of voters (Ladner et al. 2010). 
Interestingly, this estimate can be confirmed by the results of the Swiss elec-
toral study Selects based on a representative survey of voters which included 
the question whether they used smartvote. If a figure of 350,000 users is as-
sumed and if this figure is put in relation to the total figure of citizens entitled 
to vote the percentage of users drops from 23 to seven per cent.  
To what extent user figures for other countries also need to be adjusted 
downwards is difficult to estimate. There are no uniform standards defining 
how the use of VAAs can be quantified in a reliable way. In order to prepare 
much-needed data sets which can be compared internationally it is necessary 
to take measures when evaluating the data of the websites of VAAs (e.g. by 
means of cookies; Marschall/Schmidt 2010) and to apply standardised proce-
dures when analysing the data.  
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Even though the user figures need to be somewhat adjusted, the rapidly 
growing popularity of online voting aids still demands an explanation. 
Clearly, the widespread use of the Internet is partly responsible. In many 
European countries more than 80% of the population have Internet access. It 
also has to be noted that VAAs often enter into partnership with the media – 
and they are sometimes operated by the media – which increases their popu-
larity enormously. And it can be argued that the logic of VAAs corresponds 
to the Zeitgeist of an increasingly individualised society: VAAs offer person-
alised information which the traditional media and information channels can-
not supply. 
A further reason for the popularity of VAAs can be found in the struc-
tural changes of voting behaviour. Electoral research has shown that voters 
try to reduce the complexity of voting decisions by means of shortcuts (Dal-
ton/Wattenberg 1993: 196). Two of the most important voting aids were 
originally the social classes or groups (e.g. adherence to the working class or 
to a religious group) and the proximity to a particular party. Especially the 
identification with a party tended to minimise the efforts involved in voting 
decisions. As a worker one would vote for the social democrats and as a 
catholic for a catholic party. In the 1970s, this began to change dramatically 
in the Western industrialised countries. The working class, for instance, has 
lost some of its significance, and so has adhesion to a particular religious 
group. Industrial societies have become service-based societies, globalisation 
has had a huge impact and geographical mobility has increased hugely. There 
has been movement in all directions and the social stratification has gradually 
lost its structuring effect (Garcia 2010). These developments have also led to 
changes in voting behaviour. In the course of a de-alignment process, ties to 
political parties have loosened, parties have lost members and the number of 
voters switching from one party to another is growing steadily (Dalton/Wat-
tenberg 2002). Today, voters pay more and more attention to issues and po-
litical position or to the record of achievements of parties and candidates. It is 
evident that online voting aids correspond well with the informational needs 
of the more individualised and issue-oriented voter. 
A final reason for the popularity of VAAs lies in the specific voting sys-
tems and party systems of the various countries. Particularly in countries with 
a candidate-oriented electoral system (such as Switzerland and Finland) and a 
strongly fragmented party system, voters find it much harder to gain suffi-
cient information about the positions of parties and candidates (Nuytemans et 
al. 2010). In these countries, VAAs and the reduction of complexity and in-
formational costs they offer correspond well to a service that is much sought 
after (Ladner et al. 2010b and Ruusuvirta 2010). 
Against this background we can assume that VAAs have yet to fulfil 
their potential. User figures will continue to increase though maybe less 
sharply than before (Cedroni 2010). 
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7.4 Who is using VAAs? 
When political science began to take an interest in VAAs, one of the first 
questions was who uses these new tools. As in other areas of research on e-
democracy, the issue of the so-called digital divide was one of the dominat-
ing aspects within VAA-related research. It was feared that only a very lim-
ited circle of voters would have access to VAAs (Cedroni 2010 and Trechsel 
2007). And in fact, the users of online voting aids are far from representing 
the voters at large. 
In a number of countries, surveys were made among VAA users. All 
studies arrive at almost identical conclusions with respect to the socio-
demographic features of the user groups (Fivaz/Nadig 2010, Fivaz/Schwarz 
2007, Marschall/Schmidt 2010; Wall et al. 2009). The typical VAA user is 
male, young, and well educated. It is of no surprise that the typical VAA user 
has much in common with the typical Internet user. 
These findings have been confirmed by the results of a representative 
survey among Swiss voters in 2007 (Fivaz/Nadig 2010: 181). As regards age 
groups, the 18- to 35-year-old users are overrepresented by 13%. But it is in-
teresting to note that only the age groups above 65 years are clearly underrep-
resented. It has also been shown that the biggest differences are not found 
among the gender or age groups but among the education level groups and, 
closely tied to these, the income groups. The only significant difference with 
studies from other countries is the proportion of women among the smartvote 
users which at 44% is just 2% below the proportion of women among the 
voters. According to other studies, the proportion of women is about a third 
of all users (Wall et al. 2009). 
With respect to the danger of a digital divide it can be noted that there are 
signs of normalisation, i.e. the socio-demographic profiles of VAA users and 
voters in general are becoming more alike. In the course of the years, dis-
crepancies between gender and age distribution have decreased noticeably 
(Ladner et al. 2010). 
In the studies on the characteristics of VAA users their political profiles 
have also been captured. Here, too, the results across different countries are 
closely comparable. The typical VAA user is very strongly interested in poli-
tics and can be said to have a political knowledge that is way above average – 
not only compared to the entire population but also compared to the voters 
(Fivaz/Nadig 2010). In view of their electoral behaviour, up to 90% of VAA 
users state that they will participate in the elections (Marschall/Schmidt 2010: 
78). In addition, it can be shown by means of Swiss data that VAAs are par-
ticularly popular with swing voters and voters with loose party ties (e.g. first-
time voters) (Fivaz/Nadig 2010; Ladner et al. 2010b). As regards the prox-
imity to the parties, in 2007 smartvote was used more frequently by voters of 
the left and middle-left parties than voters of the right and conservative par-
ties (Ladner et al. 2010). This gives rise to the question whether VAAs can 
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take an influence on the electoral behaviour of voters and on the election re-
sults. 
7.5 The impact of VAAs 
In view of the ever increasing use and importance of VAAs it is surprising 
that the question whether they have an influence on the electoral behaviour of 
their users has only moved to the foreground of VAA research in the past two 
or three years. Indications for such an influence have already been visible for 
some time. In Finland, for instance, before elections VAAs are the most im-
portant source of information for young voters (Ruusuvirta/Rosema 2009: 2). 
In Switzerland surveys among the users of smartvote show the crucial role of 
this website with regard to the information gathering and processing: 86% of 
smartvote users have referred to it as an important source of information, 
while other online media were relegated to second position with 68% of us-
ers; television channels and newspapers jointly took third position with 61% 
each (Ladner et al. 2010: 115). 
With respect to the impact on electoral behaviour, three questions can be 
posed (Garzia 2010: 23): First, do VAAs change the way in which users get 
hold of relevant information on elections and the way in which they handle 
this information? Second, do VAAs have an impact on electoral participa-
tion? And third, finally, do VAAs have a direct influence on the electoral de-
cisions of their users and on the election results? 
As for the impact on the way in which users get hold of and treat infor-
mation, the so-called cognitive effects, several studies arrived at clear and 
positive results. Marschall/Schmidt (2010) showed that in Germany about 
60% of people interviewed have been stimulated by Wahl-O-Mat to look for 
further information on the elections in general and on the parties and their 
positions in particular. 70% even claimed to have discussed the received vot-
ing recommendation with family members or friends. It is of particular inter-
est that even among those users who hardly talk about politics, 63% were 
stimulated by Wahl-O-Mat to discuss the elections with others (Marschall/ 
Schmidt 2010: 83-84). Comparable figures also exist for Switzerland and 
thus confirm the German results: 55% of Swiss VAA users went on to look 
for further information and 70% were led to discuss the elections with other 
people (Ladner/Pianzola 2010). 
The rise of the Internet and the expansion of new possibilities of an elec-
tronic democracy are not greeted with enthusiasm by everyone. There are 
also sceptical and critical voices to be heard. It is feared that the introduction 
of e-voting and other online services – as for instance VAAs – could lead to 
an instant democracy of sorts, in which the voters deal with political contents 
and actors in a hasty and superficial fashion. Instead of contact and exchange 
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with other human beings, information would be drawn almost exclusively via 
the computer. The electoral choice itself would also be largely delegated to 
the computer (e.g. Buchstein 2004). 
Fortunately, research on VAAs shows that these fears are not substanti-
ated. As has already been shown, VAAs have led their users to look for fur-
ther information elsewhere and to discuss the elections increasingly with oth-
ers. Besides political knowledge and interest, which is strengthened by the 
use of VAAs (Garzia 2010: 22), it has further been shown that users do not 
accept voting recommendations uncritically (Fivaz/Nadig 2010). Often the 
voting recommendations are simply taken as a starting point for further re-
flections in the course of finding a decision. Thus the first question can be 
answered in the positive. 
In many Western countries, low or declining voter turnout can be ob-
served. Even if it is clear that technological progress alone cannot increase 
rates of political participation, it is nevertheless a hope which is time and 
again expressed not only in connection with the introduction of e-voting but 
also in the context of the widespread use of online voting aids (Cedroni 2010: 
256). 
A series of studies based on user interviews has looked into the question 
whether the use of VAAs leads to an increased participation rate. These stud-
ies all conclude that there is a positive effect on participation; however, the 
figures found differ strongly depending on country and study. For Finland it 
can be shown that the use of an online voting aid increases the probability 
that the user participates in the elections by up to 23%. For Switzerland, the 
corresponding figure is 15%, for the Netherlands it is 12% and for Germany 
it is 8% (Garzia 2010; Ladner/Pianzola 2010). 
On the basis of these results alone it is difficult to estimate how big an 
impact VAAs have on actual participation. The studies were based on direct 
interviews with users. These tend to overestimate the impact of VAAs when 
asked directly. It must also be taken into account that some of the users 
would have taken part in the elections without the VAAs. Cautious estimates 
conclude that smartvote increased the participation in 2007 in Switzerland by 
0.6 to 1.0% (Ladner/Pianzola 2010: 220). 
Just as for the testing runs for e-voting systems, VAAs have been shown 
to have only a slight impact on electoral participation rates (Ruusuvirta/ 
Rosema 2009). An important explanation may have to do with the fact that 
these instruments are primarily preaching to the converted (Norris 2003). 
Among the VAA users those groups are overrepresented which are already 
characterised by an above average participation rate (e.g. those with a strong 
interest in politics). Even for VAAs it is difficult to persuade those who do 
not take part in elections to show an interest. Among young and first-time 
voters it appears to be possible to some extent to further their interest in poli-
tics and their electoral participation by means of online voting aids (Fivaz/ 
Nadig 2010). 
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From the perspective of the public and above all from the perspective of 
the parties and other political actors, the question of the impact of online 
voting aids on the electoral decisions of their users is of course very impor-
tant. If this question is put directly to the users, it appears perfectly plausible 
that there is a considerable impact of VAAs on the electoral decisions of 
their users. About 70% of users interviewed stated that smartvote had di-
rectly influenced their decisions (Ladner et al. 2010b). This is an unusually 
high figure, which, however, mirrors the complexity of the Swiss electoral 
system and the far-reaching possibilities involved in voting compared to 
other countries. 
For this reason it was asked more precisely in which way the smartvote 
recommendation had an impact on the voting decision. Only 15% of those 
asked stated that they had adopted the recommendation in its entirety and 
copied it onto the ballot paper. The other users adopted the recommendation 
only partially. For instance, they listed candidates from different lists on their 
ballot paper (so-called “panaschieren” or mixing) or they listed candidates 
with a particular proximity twice and thus gave them two votes (so-called 
“kumulieren” or cumulating). Very many users stated that on the basis of the 
recommendation they voted for candidates they had previously not known 
and would therefore not have voted for. And about a third of users claimed to 
have consciously not voted for particular candidates on the basis of the rec-
ommendation received (cf. Ladner et al. 2010). 
The Swiss results can therefore only be interpreted against the back-
ground of the specific Swiss electoral system and they cannot be directly 
compared with results from other countries. In the remaining studies the 
question was asked whether the use of VAAs had led to voting for a party 
other than the one originally intended. The resulting figures vary strongly de-
pending on the country. In the Netherlands, between ten (Kleinnijenhuis/van 
der Hoof 2008) and 15% of users  (Aarts/van der Kolk 2007) claimed to have 
adjusted their electoral decisions due to the recommendation received. For 
Germany this figure is six per cent (Marschall 2005) and for Finland as low 
as three per cent (Mykkänen/Moring 2006). 
These research results are viewed rather critically by the VAA research-
ers themselves. A series of considerable methodological difficulties gives rise 
to justified doubts as to their validity. 
Most of the studies are based on surveys conducted before the elections. 
Correspondingly, what is captured are voting intentions and not real voting 
decisions. Hence a Belgian study has captured both voting intention and vot-
ing decision for the users of the VAA Do De Stemtest! by means of question-
ing before and after the elections. Among those users who said that the Stem-
test had convinced them to vote for another party only two thirds effectively 
did so in the end. This study thus concludes that the evaluation of voting in-
tentions is a very unreliable measure of the impact of VAAs. Post-election 
questioning leads to more reliable results (Walgrave et al. 2008). 
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A second point of criticism concerns the quality of the survey data. Most 
studies are based on online surveys of VAA users. Usually the users are asked 
on the VAA website after the recommendation is given whether they would 
participate in a scientific survey. Only few studies deviate from this pattern 
and use data from representative surveys of electoral research (e.g. Mar-
schall/Schultze 2011 and Ladner et al. 2010). Most online surveys can neither 
produce representative data for the entire electorate nor for only the Internet 
users. As has been shown already, VAA users have a very specific socio-
demographic and political profile. Furthermore, the decision of the user to take 
part in a survey is a form of self-selection calling into question whether the 
data are representative with respect to VAA users, if measures are not taken to 
control this effect (Marschall/Schmidt 2010). Addressing this criticism it has 
been tried to control the distortions of the various selection procedures by 
means of elaborate statistical methods (e.g. “Heckmann-model/-corrections”) 
(Pianzola/Ladner 2011b, Vassil 2011a and 2011b). The findings of these stud-
ies show as before that VAAs influence the electoral decisions of their users 
but that previous studies have clearly overestimated these effects. 
A further problem arises with respect to causality. Even if VAA users 
can be shown to vote for another party than originally planned, it cannot be 
concluded with certainty that this is due to the voting recommendation. It is 
perfectly possible that the electoral behaviour has changed for another rea-
son. The only way of arriving at reliable results is by doing controlled ex-
periments (Pianzola/Ladner 2011b and Vassil 2011b). During the elections in 
Switzerland in autumn 2011 such an experiment was conducted with smart-
vote users. The results however are not yet available. 
In individual studies it has also been tried to measure the impact of VAA 
recommendations indirectly. This has not been crowned with clear results 
though. It can be shown that candidates who are recommended particularly 
often by smartvote also receive many personal votes during the elections. But 
individual candidates who are often low on the smartvote rankings may also 
finish with very good election results (Pianzola/Ladner 2011a). 
7.6 Linking VAAs with e-voting systems 
An aspect of VAAs that has hardly been addressed by research so far is the 
linking of VAAs with e-voting systems. At first glance this seems to be a 
risky proposal, but is this idea really so absurd? How would someone react if 
they were asked to fill in a booking form by hand or even appear in person at 
a travel agent’s after having found a hotel or a flight online? This is exactly 
what 15% of smartvote users do today (Ladner et al. 2010). They answer the 
smartvote questionnaire online, receive a voting recommendation and then 
copy the names of the candidates by hand onto their ballot paper. 
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Of course, a hotel reservation cannot really be compared with casting a 
vote in an election and it would be irresponsible to propose such a far-
reaching change to the voting procedure without thorough scientific studies 
which evaluate advantages and risks and propose necessary measures and 
safety mechanisms. The question still remains, though, why voters should be 
forced to copy the result of a fastidious electronic selection process by hand 
onto a ballot paper, above all when it is a matter of giving votes to a large 
number of candidates. 
In Switzerland the linking of VAAs with an e-voting system has been tried 
once in a test run based on which first conclusions can be drawn. In the elec-
tions 2005 for the student council at the University of Berne, voting was only 
possible via an e-voting system. The operators of smartvote were asked on the 
one hand to develop this e-voting system and on the other hand to make smart-
vote available for these elections. The students then had two possibilities for 
casting their vote. They could visit the e-voting platform directly and compose 
their ballot paper according to the legal requirements usual in Switzerland. 
They then had to log in to cast their votes. The second possibility involved hav-
ing a voting recommendation issued by smartvote which could be forwarded to 
the e-voting platform by means of a click. There the recommended candidates 
were inserted into a list. The students could then further adjust this list accord-
ing to their preferences and finally log in to cast their votes.  
The common offer of a voting aid and an e-voting system contributed to 
a threefold increase in electoral participation compared to the previous elec-
tions. At the same time, elections were held for the student council at the 
University of Zurich. Here an e-voting system was offered without any vot-
ing aids. The participation rate at the University of Berne turned out to be 
twice as high as the rate at the University of Zurich. This is an indication that 
the linking of the two online platforms can certainly have an impact on elec-
toral participation. It seems that VAAs provide an added value making voting 
more attractive. 
A juristic study has examined this test run at the University of Berne and 
has concluded that such a linking of VAAs and e-voting is in principle com-
patible with the constitutional and the election laws. This study further points 
out that the VAAs involved would have to be subject to conditions and clear 
quality standards, issued and controlled by the state (for instance in the form 
of a certificate) (Rütsche 2008). 
On the one hand, government institutions in many countries are develop-
ing safer and more reliable e-voting systems. These systems are supposed to 
simplify the act of voting and render it more attractive. On the other hand, in 
recent years numerous VAAs have been created which offer the voters a real 
extra value in the form of additional information and time-saving (Garzia 
2010 and Jeitziner 2004). A linking of the act of choosing with the act of vot-
ing makes perfect sense from a process-oriented point of view. For this very 
reason, scientists should address early on the challenges of such a step. 
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7.7 An open question: the quality of VAAs 
Up until now, VAA research has above all been concerned with how often 
and by whom online voting aids are used and whether their use has an impact 
on voting participation or voting results. Publications dealing with questions 
regarding the quality of VAAs are very rare (e.g. Skop 2010; Walgrave 2009). 
VAAs are used by a large number of voters (cf. section 3). Even if it is still 
unclear how strongly they really influence voting decisions (cf. section 5) it 
is nevertheless clear that they have an enormous potential to influence the in-
formation flow and the information processing of the voters (Lau/Redlawsk 
2006: 262). For this reason alone it is necessary that science takes a closer 
look at the quality of the recommendations offered. 
In the studies so far published four aspects of quality are mentioned: The 
formulation of transparency requirements and a behavioural codex, the qual-
ity of the questionnaire employed as well as the quality of the matching 
methods used, and finally the question whether the answers given by the can-
didates and the parties for the VAAs can really be trusted. 
From a normative and juristic point of view VAAs are committed to the 
principle of contributing to a free and authentic forming of opinion. Issuing a 
voting recommendation can however be seen as an intervention in this opin-
ion-forming process. Even if it is often not declared openly, many VAAs 
would like to not only improve the information base of voters but also influ-
ence them towards a “better” voting decision (i.e. one more strongly gov-
erned by issues). As long as this is based on objective political information, 
issuing a voting recommendation is in no way reproachable but rather desir-
able as an additional offer of information (Rütsche 2008). The required ob-
jectivity however can only be guaranteed by a maximal transparency on the 
part of the VAAs. 
VAAs cannot claim to stand for improved transparency in politics while 
operating like black boxes themselves. For this reason VAAs should not only 
make completely transparent their funding as well as who is responsible for 
developing and operating them but also the methods applied (Nuytemans et 
al. 2010 and Rütsche 2008). Only very few VAAs openly provide this infor-
mation, often they do not even publish the matching algorithms employed 
(Louwerse/ Rosema 2011). 
Over and beyond this they should also be committed to a correct behav-
ioural codex, which guarantees equal treatment of all parties and candidates 
(Rütsche 2008). This is something that is often violated today. Often VAAs 
are not in a position to get hold of the required information for all the candi-
dates or parties. For the 2009 elections in Belgium it was inevitable to ex-
clude nine of a total of 17 parties from participating in the Stemtest because 
of a mismatch of work and the time available. Thus, only the eight parties 
which were already represented in parliament were included. The operators 
of Stemtest were aware that small and new parties were put at a disadvantage 
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but they found no better solution (Nuytemans et al. 2010: 130). Many VAAs 
know comparable trade-offs (e.g. the Wahl-O-Mat). 
In practice one is still far from comprehensive transparency and an equal 
treatment of all parties. Originally it was expected that competing VAAs 
would have a positive effect on the quality of the offers and also improve 
transparency. In the meantime it has been admitted that this expectation was 
probably too optimistic. This raises the question whether the adherence to ba-
sic quality standards, as they have been called, should not be demanded and 
controlled by the state (Rütsche 2008). 
A second important quality feature of a VAA is the questionnaire em-
ployed to capture the political points of view. Depending on how this is com-
posed, completely different voting recommendations may result (Walgrave 
2009). In principle it is clear that the questionnaire must address the current 
and politically relevant issues before the elections. In addition, the questions 
should be clearly formulated and easy to understand. Finally, they should be 
questions to which the parties give different answers (Marschall/Schmidt 
2010: 67-68, Nuytemans et al. 2010; Walgrave et al. 2009: 1168). 
The problem with these quality criteria is that there are hardly any objec-
tively measurable indicators. Even in the Belgium system with its impressive 
and very elaborate procedure for the composition of the questionnaire 
(Nuytemans et al. 2010)  a large number of questions are formulated and in a 
second step a comprehensive statistical simulation is undertaken to show 
which questions are to be omitted  there is still a need for decisions which are 
made by means of estimates and experience rather than on an objective basis. 
Comparable problems are also encountered in the context of the third 
quality feature. It is understood that the matching procedure is of importance. 
Louwersa/Rosema (2011) calculated voting recommendations based on the 
Stemwijzer data set combined with the matching procedures of different 
VAAs and showed that the different methods result in marked differences 
with regard to the parties recommended. They compared city block models, 
distance calculations by means of Euclidian distance, as well as different 
multi-dimensional spatial models. This resulted in differing voting recom-
mendations for up to 90% of users! 
As impressive as these findings are, it is difficult to translate them into 
concrete recommendations. It cannot be said that one of the tested methods 
calculates the issue congruence “wrongly” or “better”; they simply calculate 
it “differently”. 
The fourth quality feature that is often criticised concerns the question 
how reliably and honestly parties and candidates answer to the VAA ques-
tionnaire. It can of course be assumed that parties and candidates try to posi-
tion themselves strategically well. In the Netherlands, parties have openly 
admitted this and it has subsequently been discussed in the media. In Switzer-
land, the parties provide their candidates with advice as to how to respond to 
the smartvote questionnaire in cases of doubt (Ladner et al. 2008). In the 
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cases of a Lithuanian VAA it has even been criticised that the online voting 
aid supports populist parties and puts these at an advantage, as they adapt 
their responses to the current public opinion and have no scruples to change 
them again after the elections (Ramonaité 2010). 
Precisely on this subject there are also well supported empirical findings 
which contradict the image of the politician who promises one thing before 
the elections and does something very different afterwards. A Swiss study 
(Schwarz et al. 2010) shows that the statements or political stances taken for 
a VAA can in fact be relied on. The starting point was 34 questions used by 
smartvote which after the elections led to discussions and votes cast in par-
liament. The study compared the pre-election statements of the elected mem-
bers of parliaments which they had made for smartvote with their effective 
post-election behaviour. In 85% of cases the parliamentarians’ behaviour cor-
responded to what they had promised before the elections, and this can be 
considered a very high figure indeed. A comparable study of a Czech VAA 
arrives at somewhat lower figures of congruence between VAA answers and 
voting behaviour. The question arises whether the problem of insufficient 
congruence between pre-election promises and post-election actions is really 
a problem of VAAs. It could be a general problem especially of “young” de-
mocracies in Eastern Europe (Skop 2010: 216), in which party structures and 
the very complex processes of a democracy have yet to be solidified. VAAs 
can thus be regarded as a part of the solution rather than as a part of the prob-
lem insofar as they increase the transparency in this context and support a 
systematic control of electoral promises. 
7.8 Conclusions and future developments 
In European countries online voting aids today constitute a solid component 
of electoral campaigns. It can be assumed that their user numbers will in-
crease in the years to come. After a somewhat timid start, research on VAAs 
has intensified in terms of both quantity and quality. It is known today which 
voter groups use VAAs and it has been shown that VAAs lead to positive ef-
fects on voter turnout. In particular, research has also shown that the voting 
recommendations issued influence the electoral decisions of voters. 
There remain, however, certain research gaps which should be filled in 
the years to come: It has been shown that there are substantial differences be-
tween the findings of different countries. The most important reasons for this 
are bound to be the possibilities of the voting systems at issue (e.g. whether 
parties only or individual candidates can be elected) as well as the differing 
party systems. It would be good if research could focus on these differences 
and launch more internationally comparative studies. But this would also ne-
cessitate uniform standards for surveys within the group of VAA researchers, 
Voting Advice Applications 195 
 
as is already the case for electoral research with the CSES study.13 It has fur-
thermore been shown that the available data sets are not in all cases convinc-
ing. Increased international networking and exchange would certainly lead to 
improvements in this respect. 
In analysing the impact of VAAs it has been shown that surveys alone 
cannot answer all questions. If a detailed analysis is required as to how VAAs 
influence the decision-making of voters it is necessary to work with experi-
mental research methods. 
Finally, the growing significance of VAAs with respect to the political 
reality requires that research focuses more than before on the question what 
constitutes the quality of a voting recommendation and how VAAs can be 
further elaborated and improved. 
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